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 My dissertation uses, as starting point, an interview with Michael Haneke in which 
the Austrian filmmaker criticises Downfall and Schindler’s List for manipulating audiences 
and for generating entertainment from real-life and unspeakable horrors. He argues that 
filmmakers have a responsibility to enable audiences to form their own opinion regarding a 
film and its subject matter. I set forth to engage, theorise and develop Haneke’s call for 
responsibility by asking the following questions as I move chronologically through his films: 
why is responsible filmmaking important, how does Haneke approach his own filmmaking 
and how does a responsible approach to filmmaking influence the position of spectators. 
Firstly, I draw from Stanley Cavell’s film theory to read our current experience in a media 
saturated society by describing the ways in which the media positions and influences the 
characters’ understanding of the world and their relationships with each other in The Seventh 
Continent, Benny’s Video and 71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance. Thereafter, I discuss 
Haneke’s use of genre in Funny Games, the long take and continuity editing in Code 
Unknown, music in The Piano Teacher and sound in Time of the Wolf to analyse Haneke’s 
approach to filmmaking. My readings are underpinned by Cavell’s understanding of 
automatism and the manner in which Haneke uses and reflects upon film’s automatisms. 
Finally, I illustrate Levinas’ concept of responsibility for the Other through a reading of 
Georges and Majid’s relationship in Caché, Kelly Oliver’s work on witnessing in The White 
Ribbon and Judith Butler’s work on responsibility in Amour in order to demonstrate how 




automatism: From the Greek word automatos, meaning ‘acting of itself’. The Oxford 
Dictionary defines automatism as the “performance of actions without conscious thought or 
intention” (“Automatism, n.”, 2016). In art, it is usually referred to a method in painting “that 
avoids conscious thought and allows a free flow of ideas” (Wehmeier, 2005:85). Stanley 
Cavell applies the term to photography, drawing from Bazin’s claim of the camera’s 
automaticity (1946:6) not only as a “mechanical production of an image of reality”, but also 
as our “mechanical defeat of our presence to that reality” (1979:25). I unpack Cavell’s 
understanding and application of automatism in Chapter Two and Three. 
Hollywood-style: Even though I explain the term classical Hollywood cinema in Chapter 
Three, it is still difficult to explain what exactly ‘Hollywood style’ refers to. In short, 
classical Hollywood cinema originated during the dominant Hollywood productions of the 
1930s to 1960s and has since influenced other mainstream and dominant cinemas around the 
world (Hayward, 2013:80). Mainstream or dominant cinemas depend upon the economic and 
ideological relations of a specific country, meaning that the film industry will favour certain 
productions over others (Hayward, 2013:118). Haneke explains that his films “attempt to 
provide an alternative to the totalising productions that are typical of the entertainment 
cinema of American provenance” (Haneke, 2000:172). In this sense, my usage of the term 
must be seen in light of Haneke’s filmmaking approach which responds to the dominant style 
of mainstream cinemas that, even though originally from Hollywood, has been adapted by 
other mainstream cinematic practices worldwide. 
irrecoverability: The word ‘irrecoverable’ refers to something “that you cannot get back; 
lost” (Wehmeier, 2005:790). Even though the word rarely appears in the form of a noun, 
Butler uses the word in her book Giving an Account of Oneself (2005:37). 
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knownness: The word ‘unknownness’ (noun) is derived from the word ‘unknown’. Cavell 
uses the word ‘unknownness’ in The World Viewed (1979:40,79,136,176,181,206). 
Rodowick, in his explication of Cavell’s theory, uses the word ‘knownness’ to refer to that 
which can be known (2007(a):70), to restore that which was once unknown. 
modernity/modernism: Cavell calls Charles Baudelaire the prophet of the modern 
(1979:41), who defined modernity in The Painter of Modern Life (1859) as that which is 
“ephemeral, fugitive, contingent upon the occasion” (qtd in Cavell, 1979:41). Baudelaire’s 
definition, according to Gerard Delanty, was to describe the “particular cultural current in 
modern society that captured the sense of renewal and cosmopolitanism of modern life” 
(2007:3068). The term, however, had a broader resonance with the revolutions that took 
place in the 19th century. Its presence already featured in Marx and Engels’s Communist 
Manifesto (1848), in which they described the conditions of society and capitalism as “all that 
is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with 
sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind” (2009:45). Moreover, 
social life in modern cities, for Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin, was best expressed in 
various “‘momentary images’ or ‘snapshots’” (Delanty, 2007:3068). It is perhaps for these 
reasons that Cavell argues that Baudelaire’s text anticipates the arrival of film (1979:43). 
According to Delanty, both the fragmentation of modern society and the new technologies 
that arose (such as the camera and the cinema), increased the feeling that “there is nothing 
durable and solid” (2007:3069). Modernity is thus, in the way that I use it in this dissertation, 
the “loss of certainty and the realisation that certainty can never be established once and for 
all” (Delanty, 2007:3069). 
other: The ‘other’, when spelt in lower-case, refers to the human other, someone different 
from the subject (me). 
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Other: Levinas and Butler use the capitalised ‘Other’ as a “placeholder for an infinite ethical 
relation” (Butler, 2005:x). 
skepticism: Since Cavell argues that the trajectory of Western philosophy and the 
development of film are related, I have decided to keep his American spelling of ‘skepticism’ 
(instead of scepticism). Jinhee Choi and Mattias Frey, British scholars, also stick with 
Cavell’s American spelling in Cine-ethics: Ethical Dimensions of Film Theory, Practice, and 




INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY: 
AN OUTLINE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FILM AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
1.1 Michael Haneke and the Filmmaker’s Responsibility 
During an interview with The Hollywood Reporter, Austrian filmmaker Michael 
Haneke was asked about the representation of Adolf Hitler in the German film Downfall 
(2004), upon which Haneke replied that he found the film repulsive and dumb. He questioned 
writer and producer Bernd Eichinger’s attempt to humanise Hitler by arguing that, by 
attempting to humanise Hitler, the film creates melodrama in order to generate an emotional 
response from the audience (Haneke, 2013). A representation of Hitler that depends upon 
melodrama as interpretative device dilutes the broad and historical context from which Hitler 
emerged. Haneke’s critique joins a chorus of voices, as some have argued that Downfall 
leavens the account of Hitler with a melodramatic narrative and that the realistic style, 
combined with entertaining Hollywood conventions, encourages the audience “to engage 
emotionally yet remain passive” (Lotti, 2011). Others have gone even further, arguing that 
Downfall bathes the “the atrocities of historical perpetrators in the revisionist light of 
compassion” (von Moltke, 2007:42) and that the film uses “generic cinematic idioms to tell a 
suspenseful story that happens to have a historical referent” (von Moltke, 2007:43). Haneke 
continues by pointing out, in the same interview, that Schindler’s List (1993) falls in a similar 
trap. While Downfall uses melodrama as a device to interpret Hitler, Steven Spielberg creates 
suspense in the scene in which the Jews are driven into a gas chamber by filming a close-up 
of a showerhead, teasing the audience by asking whether water or gas will come out of its 
nozzle. In both films, the complexities of the Holocaust are reduced to a device aimed at 
creating melodrama or suspense for the audience’s entertainment. For Haneke, the mere idea 
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of creating entertainment from something as horrific as the Holocaust is “unspeakable” 
(Haneke, 2013). How is a filmmaker supposed to treat such sensitive subject matter that has 
had a profound, harrowing and traumatic effect on its real-life survivors? Are certain subjects 
off-limits, their horrors unrepresentable? For Haneke, the question for the filmmaker is not 
“what am I allowed to show”, but rather, “what chance do I give the viewer to recognise what 
it is I am showing?” (2010(b):579). In this sense, the only film that treats the Holocaust 
responsibly, according to Haneke, is Alain Resnais’ Night & Fog (1995). Although Night & 
Fog is a documentary, Haneke highlights Resnais’ approach to the Holocaust and how it 
differs from Eichinger and Spielberg, as Resnais does not represent the Holocaust as 
something knowable, explainable or entertaining, but rather asks the audience “what do you 
think about this, what is your position, what does this mean to you?” (Haneke, 2013). 
Haneke’s response to the pitfall of providing answers or creating entertainment from 
something unspeakable is what he calls the responsibility of the filmmaker: 
Responsibility entails enabling your audience to remain free and independent 
from manipulation. The question is how seriously I take my viewer. . . Am I 
trying to force my opinion on the spectator, or on the contrary, am I taking the 
spectator seriously and providing him or her with the means of creating and 
forming their own opinion? (Haneke, 2013). 
 
It seems that a responsible filmmaker, according to Haneke, ensures that a film does 
not manipulate its audience, enables them to recognise that what is being shown and allows 
them to take part in the meaning-making process. Does the melodrama of Downfall and the 
technical gimmicks of Schindler’s List compromise the audience’s ability to recognise the 
historical context of Hitler and the gas chambers? Do these tropes keep the audience from 
forming their own opinion? How does a film allow for audience participation? In order to 
investigate these broad questions I will use, as starting point, the work of Stanley Cavell. 
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1.2 The Ethical Dimensions of Stanley Cavell’s The World Viewed 
D.N. Rodowick claims Stanley Cavell’s The World Viewed: Reflections on the 
Ontology of Cinema (1979) to be the last great work of classical film theory, a theory that 
dealt primarily with the specificity of the medium (2007(a):79). Even though classical film 
theories have given way to the structuralist and psychoanalytic film theories of the 1970s, 
Cavell’s work has “earned a new currency of late” due to film studies’ recent turn to ethics 
and focus on the affective nature of film spectatorship (Choi and Frey, 2014:2). It is through 
his reading of Cavell’s work that Rodowick reveals the ethical dimensions embedded in The 
World Viewed (Choi and Frey, 2014:3), demonstrating how Cavell’s classical film theory, 
dealing with aesthetic questions of medium specificity, has “continually turned into ethical 
questions” (Rodowick, 2007(a):73).  
In The World Viewed, Stanley Cavell argues that cinema is a response to the complex 
trajectory of the history of modern philosophy (Rodowick, 2007(a):66), as the essence of 
modern philosophy contains  “an epistemological skepticism regarding the existence of 
external reality” (Choi and Frey, 2014:3). Cavell uses skepticism as a term that signifies 
“some new, or new realisation of, human distance from the world, or some withdrawal of the 
world, which philosophy interprets as a limitation in our capacity for knowing the world” 
(1985:116). Empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume 
argued that human understanding and knowledge was limited to human experience.2 Personal 
experience, attained through our senses and perceptions, informs our understanding of the 
world and, if one were to move beyond the limits of experience, one will only fall victim to 
																																																								
2 Locke places epistemology before metaphysics, an approach followed by both Berkeley and Hume. Their 
approach countered the rationalist movement in Europe, which claimed that knowledge could be attained simply 
through rational reflection. For empiricists, however, the world only exists through what can be perceived. We 
experience the world only through our senses; to be is to be perceived. Knowledge is thus “primarily a 
knowledge of our ideas, the contents of our minds”, which is “mediated by our mental equipment” (Frame, 
2015:192). Hume, however, developed empiricist epistemology much more rigorously than Locke and 
Berkeley, which led empiricist philosophy into skepticism. Hume’s presupposition is based on the solitary 
dialogue with one’s own perceptions, a position that makes subjectivism and skepticism unavoidable. According 
to Hume, we are trapped within the subjectivity of our own impressions and ideas (Frame, 2015:205).  
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skepticism or entangle oneself with nonsense (Scruton, 2002:83). Being limited to our 
subjective selves has also compromised the manner in which we relate to those around us. 
William Frankena claims that our modern conception of living morally is “largely a matter of 
our relations with our fellow human beings” (1980:11), a statement which Jinhee Choi and 
Mattias Frey uses to argue that, if true, our lack of ontological conviction of external reality 
outside our subjectivity denies us the possibility of engaging with others (2014:4). 
Skepticism, consequently, not only doubts the existence of external reality, but also 
compromises the possibility of engagement with each other. This has become an ethical 
dilemma for the modern subject who, according to Rodowick, has tried throughout the course 
of modern philosophy to regain contact with the world, to overcome his or her distance from 
it and restore its knownness (2007(a):70). Regaining contact with the world is a precondition 
necessary for the modern subject, not only to recover itself, but also to assume moral 
responsibility and commitment (Choi and Frey, 2014:4). We can only relate to and become 
responsible for another if we have established that a world exists outside of ourselves.  
Film addresses and responds to the modern subject’s skepticism, or epistemological 
and existential concerns, by presenting a world in which the modern subject was absent. Due 
to our absence in the world that was filmed, that is, not being present during the shooting of a 
film, the mechanical nature of photography suggests that a world does indeed exist outside 
our subjectivity. Film thus responds to our skepticism of an external reality, as film’s 
“mechanical process prevent it from being an invented creation of the mind” (Choi and Frey, 
2014:3). Cavell’s argument that cinema has responded to our skepticism and desire to 
“escape subjectivity and metaphysical isolation” thus becomes clear (Cavell, 1979:21). 
Rodowick’s reading, however, illuminates the manner in which Cavell’s theory can be 
regarded as a cine-ethics, which provides the spectator with “an ethical solution to the 
dilemma of modern subjectivity” (Choi and Frey, 2014:3). How does film offer 
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(re)connectivity with the world and place the spectator within a collectivity that exceeds 
subjectivity? Cinema presents spectators with a situation, in contrast to the skeptical belief, in 
which humanity is visibly returned to nature, sharing the same ontological substance and 
“held in common duration” (Rodowick, 2007(a):72). In other words, the pro-filmic world 
evidences that humanity is indeed, not only present to external reality, but also share a 
common existence with nature. The “common duration” that Rodowick refers to, then, is the 
temporal experience of the spectator while watching a film, as the viewer “(re)experiences 
the past or the world passing in the present tense – a virtual time in which the skeptical 
subject and the world viewed share the same mode of existence” (Choi and Frey, 2014:4). 
Cinema thus provides us with the means to establish the existence of external reality and also 
offers us with the possibility to regain contact, respond to and engage with one another by 
placing us at one with nature. 
Even though the word ‘ontology’ appears in the title, Cavell’s film theory does not 
simply deal with the fundamental components of film, but rather, as Rodowick argues, values 
film’s ability to express the modern dilemma as well as the possibility to overcome it (Choi 
and Frey, 2014:4). Since film expresses our fall into skepticism as well as our possible return 
from it, Rodowick understands Cavell’s film ontology to be concerned with how film 
presents modern philosophy’s problem, of skepticism and the modern subject’s perceptual 
disjunction from the world, “as past, while orientating the modern subject towards a possible 
future” (Rodowick, 2007(b):107). He thus reveals the ethical dimension of Cavell’s film 
theory by linking the modern subject’s possible overcoming with Cavell’s theory of moral 
perfectionism, which guides us from skepticism to the possibility of human change, allowing 
us to evaluate the deeper moral problem of “our contemporary mode of existence and 
transcending it in anticipation of a better, future existence” (2007(b):108). Even though most 
of Cavell’s writing is dedicated to clarify exactly what moral perfectionism might be, Choi 
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and Frey summarises the aim of moral perfection broadly as the protecting and promoting of 
human goodness, as film “helps the subject perfect oneself by transcending the ontological, 
epistemic impasse through the virtual experience of the world (the past)” (2014:4). 
 
1.3 Free from Bearing the Burdens of the World  
While cinema enables us to view a world from which we were absent, thus proving 
the existence of external reality, one must ask to what extent the suggested connection 
between spectator and external reality can be substantiated (Choi and Frey, 2014:4) or, even, 
how this return from skepticism guarantees a response from the spectator because of the 
ethical connection gained between the self, reality and others. To what degree will an ethical 
connection compel the spectator to act? The fictional nature of the diegetic world keeps the 
spectator at a distance, while the mechanical reproduction of the pro-filmic world displaces 
the spectator both temporally and spatially from the world viewed, both of which inhibits the 
spectator’s participation in the meaning-making process (Choi and Frey, 2014:4). These two 
aspects underline the problem of film’s depiction of a world that is only present to us. We are 
not present to the world we are viewing. Since a film cannot watch us watching it, Cavell 
says that film has the “capacity to lift the burden of responsibility, relieving the spectator 
from the burden of acting on the situation” (Choi and Frey, 2014:4). Even though film meets 
the preconditions necessary for moral responsibility by enabling the modern subject to 
establish the existence of external reality, providing the opportunity to overcome distance and 
regain the world’s knownness, I argue that it remains questionable whether the modern 
subject will respond to the ethical connection made with reality and others, as an ethical 
connection between the self, reality and others does not automatically necessitate a response 
from the viewer. 
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Since it permits us to view the world unseen, Cavell claims that film satisfies a 
profound, modern desire “not a wish for power over creation… but a wish not to need power, 
not to have to bear its burdens” (1979:40). In her book Michael Haneke’s Cinema: The Ethic 
of the Image (2009), Catherine Wheatley draws from Cavell’s film theory to argue that 
mainstream cinema provides refuge for the spectator from the world of responsibility 
(2009:42). Due to its ability to provide spectators with the power of invisibility, film appeals 
to the modern desire for privacy and anonymity by granting spectators respite from their 
“complicity in the structuring of the world” (Wheatley, 2009:40). She goes on to criticise the 
modern subject’s desire to establish a connection with external reality, expounded by Cavell, 
by arguing that the return to nature that the modern subject so desperately craves is a state “in 
which everyone pursues his or her own desires without constraint” (2009:41-42). Since film 
provides us with the ability to return to nature and regain its knownness, spectators are under 
the spell of the narrative and unaware of any moral imperatives, a position she argues enables 
spectators to accept and even enjoy scenes of atrocity, violence, revenge and rape, even 
though they would never have the same reaction towards such horrors outside the cinema. 
Spectators, settled in a safe and voyeuristic position, cannot “perceive that [they] are 
participating in an act of spectatorship, and thus cannot take responsibility for that action” 
(Wheatley, 2009:42).  
 
1.4 Emmanuel Levinas and Responsibility 
If film offers us respite from bearing the burdens of the world and relief from 
responsibility, then I argue that, on the contrary, we cannot wish not to need power, not to 
bear the burdens of another, because we are responsible for each other. In keeping with 
Cavell’s revisionist approach, I problematise film’s ability to absolve spectators from bearing 
any kind of burden by turning to Emmanuel Levinas’ radical writings on responsibility. 
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Throughout his writings, Levinas continually refers to a passage from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 
The Brothers Karamazov, in which a character says “Each of us is guilty3 before everyone for 
everyone, and I more than the others” (qtd in Levinas, 1969:146). Levinas uses the quotation 
to demonstrate that, similarly to Father Zosima, we are “obligated to respond to the suffering 
and needs of others, [since] we are responsible for everyone, for everything” (Shepherd, 
2012:492). This is an obligation that regards oneself as infinitely and endlessly responsible 
for another’s well being, regardless of one’s position. My responsibility towards another is 
important, because my existence is predicated upon another and depends on those to whom I 
am responsible (Shepherd, 2012:492). Another’s needs, together with our responses, 
determine who we are. We have an obligation to answer the other’s claim upon us, because 
“actions taken in generous response to other people [are] what constitutes the human being” 
(Shepherd, 2012:476). Our responsibility towards others, however, runs the risk of being 
suspended during the viewing of a film. Spectators watch scenes of atrocity and violence that 
draw from real-life horrors as source material. Does this not aggravate our already warped 
desire of not wanting to bear the burdens of the world? How can we watch scenes of carnage, 
safe and anonymous, without taking responsibility for that what we have seen or for being 
entertained at the cost of those who have truly suffered? Similar to the close-up of the 
showerhead in Schindler’s List, suspense is created for the audience’s pleasure rather than 
making them aware of, not only their complicity in being entertained by something which has 
																																																								
3 Dostoevsky uses the word, виноват or vinovat, which means to be guilty or blameworthy. The Russian word 
for responsibility is ответственность or otvetstvennost, while a derivative of the word, ответчик or otvetchik, 
means one who defends or one who is answerable. The relationship between the two, in English, is like saying 
“the one responsible is the one obliged to make a response to a charge” (Doval, 2014:3). Even though it is closer 
to the meaning of ‘guilty’ or ‘answerability’, some translators translated виноват or vinovat as ‘responsibility’. 
Séan Hand translates the dictum as “We are responsible for everyone else – but I am more responsible for all the 
others” in The Levinas Reader (Hand, 1989:1), while Pevear and Volokhonsky’s translation of The Brothers 
Karamazov reads: “And I shall also tell you, dear mother, that each of us is guilty in everything before 
everyone, and I most of all” (Dostoevsky, 2004:289). 
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cost those subjected to the horrors in real-life, but also their responsibility towards real-life 
victims and the persecuted. 
 
1.5 Judith Butler on Responsibility and Opacity  
So how can a filmmaker get the audience to realise that they are participating in an 
act of spectatorship and thus take responsibility for the viewing situation? How can a 
filmmaker destabilise, challenge, disrupt the spectator’s wish not to need power and desire 
not to bear the other’s burden? How can a filmmaker hold the audience accountable and 
responsible for that what they are watching? In her book Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) 
Judith Butler argues how a theory of subject formation that “acknowledges the limits of self-
knowledge can serve a conception of ethics and, indeed, responsibility” (2005:19). I draw 
from Butler’s understanding of subject formation to illustrate how a filmmaker can help the 
audience secure an ethical position for themselves in a film. Since spectators come from the 
school of mainstream, entertainment cinema and television, they have become accustomed to 
the presentation of a world that is explainable and in which all contradictions are solved. 
They are not, in contrast, confronted with the limits of self-knowledge, since traditional 
narratives usually aim to explain the ways in which we are related to one another and other 
social realities. These narratives serve to extract meaning and purpose from a reality that is 
complex and confusing. If a film’s narrative is depicted as a knowable totality, a world that is 
easy to understand and explanatory in the ways that we are related to one another, the 
audience will be led to believe that they are wholly perspicacious beings. We do not, 
however, have the ability to understand everything quickly, accurately and in its totality. 
Butler argues the belief of our sagacity to be a lie, as such a belief would lead us to renounce 
our “infancy, dependency, relationality [and] primary impressionability” at the expense of the 
“active and structuring traces of our psychological formations” (2005:102). We do not know 
	 22 
the lived experience of others. To think we do proves our inherent pride, self-importance and 
arrogance. 
Butler’s understanding of ethics is informed by Levinas, whose ethical philosophy 
resides in the primordial face-to-face encounter with the other. When we encounter the other, 
an unavoidable demand is placed upon us to respond, because we are “trapped, captured, 
‘held hostage’ by the face of another person whose presence commands a response. The 
command to respond to the face of another person comes before anything else” (Shepherd, 
2012:476). When we encounter someone or something different from us, an Other, we are 
confronted with our inability to know. Similarly, Butler states that moments of 
unknowingness, in which people become unknowable to themselves, only emerge in the 
context of relation to the other (2005:20). In other words, it is only when we are put in 
relation to and confronted by another’s alterity, that we become aware of our own opaqueness 
and failure to be sagacious. Thus, if a person is opaque to themself, that is, not completely 
knowable or transparent to him- or herself, the subject “is not thereby licensed to do what it 
wants or to ignore its obligation to others” (Butler, 2005:19-20). Since mainstream films aim 
to solve social conflicts and explain the ways we are related to one another, we are presented 
with a worldview that is explainable, transparent and all-knowing. Spectators thus, I argue, 
can only respond when they are confronted with their own opacity. For it is only when we are 
confronted with the other’s alterity, that which keeps the Other from me, that responsibility 
can be demanded from us. If a film presents everything as knowable, easy to understand and 
without contradictions, we are not confronted with any form of otherness and thus remain 
safe from having to respond responsibly. That is why subject formation can only take place in 
the context of relations that “become partially irrecoverable to us”, because opacity is “built 
into our formation and follows from our status as beings who are formed in relations of 
dependency” (Butler, 2005:20). It is only when audiences are confronted with a film with 
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gaps and contradictions, opaque and unknowable, in other words, when a film is constructed 
as an Other, that a demand is placed upon the audience to respond. 
 
1.6  Responsible Filmmaking 
My dissertation, thus, argues that filmmakers have an imperative to construct films 
that are opaque, ensure that it becomes an ‘Other’ to its audience and enforce a face-to-face 
encounter, thereby enabling the audience to respond and become responsible. My research 
question approaches responsibility from both the filmmaker and spectator’s position. I argue 
that by creating a film that is opaque, in other words acknowledging its limits of self-
knowledge and constructed as Other, filmmakers will not only renounce their sagacity and 
admit their own inability to know, but also declare the irrecoverability attached in depicting 
scenes of carnage and violence. The audience will, in turn, be confronted with their own 
opacity, because the film is not explanatory or attempting to be sagacious. If the opacity of a 
film questions the spectator, the spectator might become aware of his or her own opacity and 
be confronted with the limits of their own self-understanding. No longer is a horrific and 
unknowable experience presented in a clear and coherent way, as the audience is left to fill 
the void and answer the questions with their own life experience. For it is only when 
spectators are posed with questions, without any instructions or guidance from the filmmaker, 
that spectators will be disturbed, gather their defences and respond. If film expresses, as 
Cavell argues, the modern subject’s dilemma of skepticism, presents the viewer with the 
possibility to transcend his or her skepticism, reinstate the spectator’s relations with others 
and the world towards a ‘perfect future’, then I argue that filmmakers have a responsibility to 
present the pro-filmic world’s opacity and closedness to the viewer. For it will only be when 
a film’s opacity confronts the viewer that the audience will become response-able, that is, be 
able to respond to the film, its subject matter and be held accountable for the viewing 
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situation and the other it depicts. The audience’s confrontation with the opacity of a film is, 
for Haneke, a productive conflict, for “the more radically answers are withheld, the sooner 
[audiences] will have to find their own” (Haneke, 2000:172). 
Responsible filmmaking, I thus argue, entails the filmmaker’s responsibility to ensure 
the audience’s response-ability. Instead of constructing a narrative that serves to explain and 
guide the audience, an approach that constructs a film with gaps and contradictions will 
enable audiences to respond to the film on their own terms. Since film responds to the 
modern subject’s skepticism, audiences now have a responsibility for having the possibility 
of gaining a connection to self, reality and others. A responsible filmmaker’s challenge, as 
Haneke argues, is thus how to make “images and information fresh and perceptible again, 
how to restore to them the power that derives from their potential for critical engagement” 
(2000:172). Cavell argues that, through modernist techniques filmmakers can acknowledge 
the world’s closedness and separateness from the audience, thereby allowing the world to 
exhibit itself through a consideration of “the conditions of nature not as they effect me but in 
their indifference to me; that is as autonomous, self-sufficient laws unto themselves” 
(Trahair, 2013:6). Thus, if the modernist filmmaker demonstrates the world’s closedness and 
denies the world’s coherence to and around me (imagined by traditional cinema), and I 
acknowledge the closedness of the world, then I “stand a chance of securing an ethical place 
for myself in the picture” (Trahair, 2013:6). 
 
1.7 Motivation for the Dissertation 
The motivation for this dissertation and its investigation was inspired by Haneke’s 
critique of Downfall and Schindler’s List and his call for the filmmaker’s responsibility 
towards the audience. I had three major questions: Firstly, why is responsible filmmaking 
important in the world that we live in today? Does the influence of the media necessitate a 
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responsible mode of filmmaking? Secondly, how does Haneke’s own approach to 
filmmaking shed light on responsibility and audience accountability? And finally, does 
Haneke assume his role as responsible filmmaker and, if so, how does he perform his 
responsibility and, in turn, ensure the audience’s response-ability? These three questions 
frame each of the following chapters, in which I guide my investigation with the film theory 
of Stanley Cavell and the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Judith Butler, in order 
to formulate a robust understanding of responsible filmmaking through the lens of Michael 
Haneke. Thus, I do not intend to examine each of Haneke’s films through an exhaustive 
filmic analysis, since there are various articles, books and monographs dedicated to his work. 
Instead, as I progress chronologically through his oeuvre, I am going to contextualise, argue 
and illustrate what responsible filmmaking entails, adjusting and focusing the lens of 
Haneke’s films on the specific question in mind. Due to the lack of space (and unavailability 
of the films), I will not draw from Haneke’s eleven films made for television.4 
 Firstly, in Chapter Two, I outline the importance of responsibility by discussing the 
influence and ubiquity of the media on modern society through Haneke’s first three films. I 
read and test Cavell’s arguments of film displacing the spectator and relieving the audience 
of bearing the burdens of the world in The Seventh Continent (1989), while I further 
problematise the influence of the media and the content on television in Benny’s Video 
(1992). Next, I focus on three selected scenes from 71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance 
(1994) in order to contextualise post-war/modern Europe and how the media contributes to 
identity formation and feelings of alienation. In Chapter Three, I draw from Cavell’s work on 
film’s automatisms in order to illustrate how Haneke responds to the influence of the media 
by using and reflecting on film’s form and its automatisms. I focus on the use of classical 
																																																								
4 The films made for television are: …Und was komt danach? (After Liverpool) (1974), Drei Wege zum See 
(Three Paths to the Lake) (1976), Spermüll (Household Rubbish) (1976), Lemminge, Teil 1: Arkadien (1979), 
Lemminge, Teil 2: Verletzungen (1979), Variation (1983), Wer war Edgar Allan (1984), Fräulein (1985), 
Nachruf für einen Mörder (Obituary for a Murderer) (1991), Die Rebellion (1992) and Das Schloß (The Castle) 
(1997). 
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Hollywood cinema and counter cinema in Funny Games (1997), the juxtaposition between 
classical Hollywood editing and the effect of the long take in Code Unknown (2000), the use 
of music in The Piano Teacher (2001) and the utilisation of sound in Time of the Wolf (2003). 
In Chapter Four, I theorise the filmmaker’s responsibility and the audience’s response-ability. 
Firstly, I read Emmanuel Levinas’ formulation of responsibility towards the Other in the 
context of Georges and Majid’s relationship in Caché (2005). Thereafter, I approach The 
White Ribbon (2009) through a contextualisation of Kelly Oliver’s work on witnessing, 
mapping the ways in which the audience is enabled to bear witness to the events of the film, a 
position which enables their response, in other words, their response-ability. My reading of 
response-ability flows over into my analysis of Amour (2012), in which I draw from Judith 
Butler’s formulation of responsibility and recognition in order to illustrate how Haneke 
succeeds in keeping the audience’s recognition of suffering on-going and open. The chapter 
will conclude by theorising how a harmonisation of content and form is imperative to 
responsible filmmaking. Additionally, each of the chapters draw from one of the articles 
written by Haneke himself, regulating my investigation and keeping my application of 
Cavell, Levinas and Butler’s theories in check: Chapter Two draws from his article “Violence 
and the Media”, which he presented at a screening of Benny’s Video, Chapter Three from “71 
Fragments: Notes to the Film” published in Wiley Riemer’s After Postmodernism: Austrian 
Literature and Film in Transition (2000) and Chapter Four from “Terror and Utopia: Au 
hasard Balthazar” . Finally, Chapter Five concludes the dissertation.  
	 27 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE GLACIATION TRILOGY: THE ONTOLOGY OF THE IMAGE 
AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA 
 
2.1 Introduction: The Glaciation Trilogy 
An established theme in the films of Michael Haneke is the role, influence and 
ubiquity of the media in modern society. Advertisements entice consumers, printed media 
govern its readers, radio transmissions penetrate kitchens, televisions spew images into living 
rooms, surveillance cameras follow subjects and multiplexes are deemed places of refuge. 
These aspects feature in Haneke’s first three theatrical films, The Seventh Continent, Benny’s 
Video and 71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance, which depict alienated and isolated 
characters in a state of glaciation, surrounded by technology and consumer ideals in a global 
capitalist economy. Haneke makes clear, however, that his characters are not unique, distinct 
or extraordinary. In the first eight minutes of The Seventh Continent, for example, the identity 
of the three main characters remains a mystery, even though the audience gets an intimate 
look at their morning routine. Anonymous bodies, detached from any face or personality, 
wake up and perform, almost mechanically, a series of tedious and banal tasks: getting out of 
bed, putting on slippers, opening curtains, brushing teeth, waking a child, tying shoes laces, 
feeding fish, making coffee, packing a briefcase and eating breakfast. This could be anyone, 
and perhaps, simultaneously, everyone.  
All three films of Haneke’s Glaciation Trilogy, serving as a critique of western 
civilisation and exposing the existential coldness of modern society, contain or culminate in 
violence. The Schröbers, a typical nuclear family, meticulously plan and effect their suicide 
after they destroy their entire home in The Seventh Continent, Benny videotapes himself 
killing a teenage girl in Benny’s Video and Max barges into a bank and executes several 
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customers before shooting himself in 71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance. Before a 
screening of Benny’s Video at the Marshall-Theatre in Munich in 1995, Haneke asked what 
bears responsibility for the increasing violence in our daily interactions with others. Were the 
media itself culpable, with its authoritative voice and apparent role of objective mirror of 
society the reason? Or was it, rather, the fact that violence enjoyed a privileged and 
permanent position in the media? (Haneke, 2010(b):575). 
In this chapter I problematise the media’s influence on modern society through the 
lens of Stanley Cavell’s film ontology, by mapping the ways in which the media, and 
especially violence in the media, takes responsibility from us and allows for our invisibility, 
thereby compromising our position as moral agents who consume media.  Firstly, before I 
discuss the influence of the media, I will contextualise the ontology of the image as described 
by Stanley Cavell with The Seventh Continent, in order to examine the act of viewing and the 
manner in which images are received and interpreted by viewers. Thereafter, I will 
problematise the form and continual presence of television through a close reading of the 
media’s influence in Benny’s Video. Thirdly and finally, I will draw from specific scenes in 
71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance to illustrate how the media, in the context of 
modern Austria, contributes to the alienation of modern western society. I will reference, 
throughout my readings of the films, Michael Haneke’s own article “Media and Violence” 
and illustrate the complex interchange between the two to emphasise the problematic effect 
of the media on modern society. I agree with Haneke’s argument that neither the media nor 
the presence of violence in the media to be culpable, but rather the manner in which violence 
is depicted and employed. In other words, I will redirect the question away from violence 




2.2 The Seventh Continent and Stanley Cavell’s Film Ontology  
2.2.1 The Ontology of the Image: The Advertisement of Australia in The Seventh 
 Continent 
At the end of the first chapter in The World Viewed, Stanley Cavell asks the question 
“What is film?” (1979:15), even though he does not intend to answer it. Rather, the question 
allows him to explore the ontology of film. He sets out to explore the question by recalling 
Erwin Panofsky’s claim that “[t]he medium of the movies is physical reality as such” and 
André Bazin’s statement that cinema is “committed to communicate only by way of what is 
real” (qtd in Cavell, 1979:16) by cautioning that a too literal reading would claim reality to be 
the foundation of cinema. Cavell argues that, instead of reality being the essence of cinema, 
Panofsky and Bazin intends rather that photography is the foundation of the cinematic 
medium and that a “photograph is of reality” not reality itself. The question, for Cavell, thus 
turns from what is cinema to “[w]hat happens to reality when it is projected and screened?” 
(1979:16).  
In order to contextualise his question, Cavell makes two important claims to 
understand the ontology of a photograph in order to guide him to his answer. Firstly, Cavell 
differentiates between a painting and a photograph by arguing that a painting5 is a rendering 
or likeness of an object, while a photograph6 presents the viewer with the object itself. The 
idea that a photograph presents the viewer with the object itself creates, in Cavell, a feeling of 
ontological restlessness, because a photograph of an object cannot be, and never will be, the 
physical object itself. The problem, for Cavell, is that spectators struggle to think about the 
connection between a photograph and the object photographed, thus failing to place a 
photograph ontologically (1979:17-18). The failure to determine or place a photograph’s 
																																																								
5 Painting, according to Bazin, will never escape from the subjective hand that painted it, as the intervening 
human hand “cast[s] a shadow of doubt over the image” (1967:12). 
6 Photography, on the other hand, is a “mechanical reproduction in the making of which man plays no part” 
(Bazin, 1967:12). 
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ontology is reflected in the Schröbers’ engagement and reading of the advertisement for 
Australia in The Seventh Continent. The film introduces Georg, Anna and Evi as the nuclear 
family going about their routine in modern Austria. The advertisement for Australia first 
appears after the family passes through a car wash during the opening scene of the film, after 
which the alluring tourist billboard welcomes them. The advertisement, depicting a beach and 
ocean with mountains in the background, fills the whole frame after the Schröbers drive past. 
The image of Australia haunts the family throughout the film over a three-year period and 
becomes an emblem of hope. While a photograph, such as the image of Australia, is not a 
“likeness…a replica, or a relic, or a shadow, or an apparition”, the image still contains traces 









The second idea put forth by Cavell in order to contextualise the viewer’s reception of 
a photograph, is the distinction he draws between auditory and visual transcriptions. In terms 
of auditory transcriptions, people can listen to a sound made by an object without being in the 
presence of the original object from which the sound emits. Cavell uses the example of a 
recording of an English horn. The presence of an English horn is not required to hear the 
Figure 1: The Australian advertisement greeting the Schröbers 
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sound of an English horn via a recording, as the sound is ontologically (although not 
empirically) the same. Sounds can thus be copied perfectly, its copy faithfully reproduced by 
a record. A photograph, on the other hand, is not an exact copy of the object, because it does 
not bear a relation to the object in the same way that a sound does of a recording. The 
photograph of Australia does not copy the ontology of an Australian beach in the same way 
as a recording of an English horn does. While a recording certainly reproduces a sound, a 
photograph does not reproduce a sight (Cavell, 1979:19), because a sight is an object, in and 
of itself. One can only sight an Australian beach when one is in the presence of the Australian 
beach, or, in other words, on the Australian beach. A sight is only possible when one is in the 
presence of the object being viewed, or, as Cavell says, the sight of something is always an 
object itself, not the sight of an object (1979:20). The Schröbers are not, ontologically, on an 
Australian beach when they see the advertisement. The Schröbers are looking at a sight of an 
image of an Australian beach, not a sight of an Australian beach itself. Could the image of 
Australia, rather, be a surface of an Australian beach? Cavell denies the idea of images 
producing a surface, as surface puts emphasis on texture. The problem is that the real 
Australian beach cannot make a sight or have a sight, because the Australian beach is “too 
close to [its] sight to give [the sight] up for reproducing” (Cavell, 1979:20). The only way to 
reproduce a sight of an object is to make a mould or create an impression, in other words, a 
hand-made copy of the object. Did photography enable the advertisement to be a physical 
mould or impression of an Australian beach? No, because according to Cavell, a physical 
mould, impression or imprint would get rid of the original Australian beach, put distance 
between the object and its impression, while in the photograph the original Australian beach 
is still as present7 as ever (Cavell, 1979:20). 
																																																								
7 Rodowick expands Cavell’s understanding of the presentness of an object in a photograph, by describing how 
we are not used to seeing objects that are not physically present to us or with us, even though ontologically, 
when viewing a photograph, we are presented with the presentness of an object (2015:18).	
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After much deliberation, Cavell concludes and argues for, instead, that photographs 
are manufactured, in other words, a manufactured image of the world (1979:20). The 
mechanism or automatism involved in manufacturing a photograph has so far8 satisfied, 
according to Cavell, the human desire “in the West since the Reformation, to escape 
subjectivity and metaphysical isolation – a wish for the power to reach this world, having for 
so long tried, at last hopelessly, to manifest fidelity to another” (1979:21). As I have outlined 
the modern subject’s skepticism in the introductory chapter, D.N Rodowick explains the 
effect that skepticism has had on the modern subject. He unpacks Cavell’s dense conclusion 
by explaining cinema’s response to the extensive and complex trajectory of western 
philosophy. The reawakening of Pyrrhonism and skepticism during the Renaissance and the 
rejection of theological dogmatism that the Reformation brought about had three effects on 
the modern subject. Firstly, the fact that God is in each of us (instead of the outside world) 
separated us from the modern subject of scientific empiricism. Due to our confinement to 
ourselves, we carry a responsibility for our epistemological isolation, and moral effects 
thereof, from the outside world. Thus, secondly, God’s absence in the world (because He is in 
us) led to a loss of meaning in nature, meaning that we can only derive and construct 
meaning by and through our isolated perceptions. Furthermore, and finally, we are separated 
from nature through our isolated perceptions, because humanity and nature “no longer shared 
the same metaphysical context” (Rodowick, 2015:20). Thus, Cavell argues that, since we 
believed that our hold on the world is confined to our perceptions of it, we “began to invent 
machines for perceiving the whole of the world” (Rodowick, 2015:20). As I outlined in the 
first chapter, the dilemma of modern subjects have been to regain contact, overcome their 
																																																								
8 Many theorists misquote Cavell by omitting ‘so far…’. Douglas Lackey, for instance, in his review of The 
World Viewed, understands Cavell to mean that photography has succeeded in satisfying the human wish to 
escape subjectivity and metaphysical isolation. Rothman and Keane point out that Lackey makes the mistake of 
thinking that painting and photography were in competition. Instead, Cavell is saying “so far as photography 
and modernist painting succeeded in satisfying this wish, they satisfied it in fundamentally different ways”. The 
‘so far…’, thus, leaves open “the possibility that photography’s satisfaction of this wish was less than complete” 
(Rothman and Keane, 2000:65). 
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distance and restore the world’s knownness to them. Such a desire is reflected in the 
Schröbers’ situation, since it is clear that they are isolated and feel disengaged from the world 
around them. Their disposition is symptomatic of living in the West, as Cavell explains, since 
Austria is one of the wealthiest countries in the world.9 They are thus prone to the skeptical 
attitude regarding the outside world. They understand that regaining contact with the world is 
a necessary precondition for recovering themselves and taking moral responsibility and 
commitment for themselves and one another (Choi and Frey, 2014:4). The chasm between 
the modern subject and nature, and the individual’s desire to regain contact, is experienced by 
the Schröbers and, so far, satisfied by the image of Australia. They want to escape their 
metaphysical isolation. As I outlined in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, film, or 
photography, expresses the modern subject’s epistemological and existential concerns. Since 
the Schröbers were not present during the taking of the picture of Australia, they can be sure 
that a world does indeed exist outside their subjectivity. Contained and trapped within their 
car, going through the mechanics of the carwash, the manufactured image of Australia waits 
outside and presents a utopic escape. The image becomes a marker of hope for them, 
representing a world they long for, providing them with the possibility of regaining contact 
with the world they feel isolated from.  
 
2.2.2 Displacement as the Schröbers’ Natural Condition 
After the opening scene, the first section of the film is introduced, chronicling a day in 
1987 that depict husband Georg, wife Anna and daughter Evi, going about their daily and 
																																																								
9 In a lecture he presented at the Graz (Austria) Photography Symposium, Cavell argues that photography could 
not “have impressed itself so immediately on the European […] mind unless that mind had at once recognised in 
photography a manifestation of something that had already happened to itself. What happened to this mind, as 
the events registered in philosophy, is its fall into skepticism, together with its efforts to recover itself” 
(1985:116). While many people argue that photography has changed the way we see, Cavell criticises the idea, 
because the remark does not explain photography’s power, but rather assumes it. For him, it is the modern, 
European mind that attributes photography its power and value, because of their fall into skepticism [see 
Cavell’s essay ‘What Photography Calls Thinking’ (1985)]. 
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banal routine. Georg and Anna go to work, Evi goes to school, they buy groceries, the family 
enjoys dinner with Alexander, Anna’s brother, and they watch television. The day is, 
however, punctuated by a few disturbing incidents: Evi feigns blindness at school, Anna slaps 
Evi through the face and Alexander breaks down during dinner. The second section, a day in 
1988, portrays the same routine with minor adjustments: Georg gets promoted and the family 
witness the effects of a car crash, after which Anna cries during another carwash. The third 
section, taking place in 1989, shows the family cutting all their ties with the outside world, 
destroying their entire home and committing suicide. Throughout the three segments, the 
alluring advertisement reappears and becomes kinetic, representing an ultimate ideal for 
Georg and Anna. When Anna and Georg go to the bank to withdraw all their money in the 
third section of the film, the teller queries their decision, upon which Anna answers that they 
are immigrating to Australia. Even though they have already decided to commit suicide, 
Anna’s decision to use Australia as a cover-up proves her equating death to an escape.10 Lisa 
Coulthard argues Australia, referenced by the Schröbers as a sort of paradise, to be a false 
destination. The poster’s both static and kinetic appearance, with the unnatural landscape, 
dreamlike quality and odd tidal movements, indicates its “own non-existence”, as well as the 
“isolation, false idealisation and dehumanised existence of the family” (Coulthard, 2009:16). 
The Schröbers place their hope in the world represented by the image of Australia, but does 
that world even exist? Is their confidence in the image justified, supported and protected by 
the represented world’s actual existence? 
The world in a photograph, for Cavell, comes to an end as the “camera crops [the 
world] by predetermining the amount of view it will accept” (1979:24). Even though the 
Australian image becomes animated later in the film, it never recedes or reveals the utopic 
																																																								
10 The fact that the Schröbers kill themselves in front of their television, the only appliance they do not destroy, 
alludes to the way they are “lost in a televisual void of consumer objects where no plane of existence or 
meaning can be found to take precedence over another…[They are] now free to ease back off into a group coma 
that elides consciousness with death – a coma exacted by either television or its role as ceaseless witness to our 
gravest ways of being, which is to say our nonbeing” (Sutherland, 2010:173). 
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world hidden beyond the edges of the frame. The promise of paradise is caught between the 
edges of the frame and does not allow movement beyond, reflecting the entrapment and 
isolation experienced by the family. Similar to the confined space of the frame of the 
Australian beach, the Schröbers are confined to and trapped in their world: the car frame, the 
walls of the house and the capitalist structures they find themselves in. The image of 
Australia provides hope for another world, to reach another world, but there is still a frame 
that contains and traps the paradise represented by the image of Australia. Cavell says that 
when a photograph is cropped, the “rest of the world is cut out”, yet its implied presence and 
explicit rejection are still essential to the experience of the photograph (1979:24). The 
Schröbers are thus not longing for the specific Australian beach visible in the advertisement 
contained in the frame, but rather the Australia implied beyond the frame. Nevertheless, it is 
exactly the world beyond the frame that they cannot reach. The dreamlike quality of the 
image, the fact that the sterile advertisement has transformed into a moving image, presents a 
world that does not exist: a manufactured photograph that has transformed into a memory, a 
manufactured lie. Cavell says that “drawing the camera back, and panning it, are two ways of 
extending the frame” which enables the film medium to “let the world happen, to let its parts 
draw attention to themselves according to their natural weight” (1979:25). The utopic dream 
of Australia, however, does not ‘happen’ for the Schröbers. Instead, paradise stays confined 
in the frame witnessed from their restricted space of the car. Together with the fragmented 
sections that depict the family going about their daily routine, the repetitive shots of the 
advertisement “suggest a kind of oppressive sameness, an unchanging existence marked by 
false imaginings…that are ultimately as repetitive and static as the daily routine itself” 
(Coulthard, 2009:16-17). Thus, for the Schröbers, suicide is the only way of escape, escaping 
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the confines of the frame, the frame of paradise, the frame of modernity and the frame 
imposed by the capitalist global economy.11 
The mechanical reproduction of the Australian beach results in the spatial and 
temporal displacement of the Schröbers and thus prevents them from participating in it (Choi 
and Frey, 2012:4). Even though they watch the image of Australia, the image does not watch 
them watching it; they remain unseen. The magic, thus, of manufactured images such as 
photography or cinema, is that it presents spectators with the ability to view the world 
unseen. The viewing of the image of Australia thus expresses and epitomises the invisibility 
and displacement that the Schröbers are experiencing in modern-day Austria. Since they are 
present to an image of Australia from which they are spatially and temporally displaced, the 
photograph of Australia contributes to their feelings of being screened from the world and of 
being “held before it in a state of anonymous and invisible viewing” (Rodowick, 2007(a):65). 
Cavell points out that, since we are displaced from the world being show, the screen 
overcomes our fixed distance and “makes displacement appear as our natural condition” 
(1979:22). In viewing the exotic and foreign world of Australia as an image, the Schröbers 
are made aware of their displacement, since “this view is screened for [them], and from 
[them], in time” (Rodowick, 2007(a):65). The Schröbers are invisible to the image of 
Australia, as neither the static nor kinetic image of Australia reacts to the Schröbers watching 
it.  By permitting us to view the world unseen, or, in this case, permitting the Schröbers to 
view the image of Australia unnoticed, the image has the capacity to satisfy, as Cavell claims, 
the profound, modern wish, not for power over creation, but “a wish not to need power, not to 
have to bear its burdens” (1979:40). The image of Australia thus simultaneously displaces the 
Schröbers and provides them with the means of looking and viewing the world without 
having to take responsibility for it. The advent of television has, furthermore, exacerbated our 
																																																								
11 The advertisement remains, according to Brigitte Peucker, a dystopian space, a “landscape of death to which 
the family will ultimately gain access” (2000:182). 
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desire to view the world anonymously and not need power over that which we are viewing. 
The next section of this chapter will problematise television and its influential role in 
permitting us to view the world unseen and thereby absolving us from bearing the burdens of 
the world. 
 
2.3 Viewing the World Unseen: Television in Benny’s Video 
 According to Mattias Frey, Haneke’s Glaciation Trilogy serves as a critique of 
civilisation that portrays  “lives deformed by the media, technology and generational 
discontent” (2010:154). All three films take place in the industrialised world of the West, in 
which existential coldness envelops the characters. They are surrounded by rampant 
technology and consumer culture, while being alienated from each other and victim to 
dysfunctional relationships, all “under television’s baneful eye” (Vogel, 1996:74). How is 
television, a product of technology and consumer culture, implicated in the modern subject’s 
feeling of isolation and alienation? What is the context of those that Haneke’s films aim to 
critique? As I have shown in the previous section, that the advertisement of Australia makes 
the Schröbers’ displacement seem as their natural condition, Benny’s situation reflects a 
similar situation. I will argue that, by providing us the possibility of viewing the world 
unseen, television takes responsibility out of our hands and frees us from bearing another’s 
burden, a position that impacts our relation with others and the world. Benny’s Video serves 
as an excellent example of television’s influence; it’s ability to allow us to view the world 
unseen and distort our relation to self, reality and others.  
 Benny’s Video tells the story of a young teenager from an upper class Austrian family 
who spends most of his time watching television and recording videos. One of the videos that 
he is fascinated with depicts a squealing pig being killed with an airgun, a clip that he 
constantly replays. During one of his outings to the local video store, Benny meets a girl who 
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he invites over to his house. His interactions with her are awkward and uncomfortable, but he 
decides to show her the video of the pig. He shows her the airgun with which the pig was 
killed and, after a playful dare, shoots her multiple times, the entire exchange being recorded 
by the watchful eye of his camcorder. He struggles to get rid of the body and eventually 
decides to inform his parents by showing them the video that recorded the murder. His 
mother and father, also named Georg and Anna, distraught and upset by the video, decide to 
secretly get rid of the body. Benny, on the other hand, records their conversation from his 
bedroom. They decide to get to work, as Anna takes Benny to Egypt on a holiday while his 
father dismembers and disposes the corpse. Upon their return Benny decides to show the 
video of their conversation to the police, implicating his mother and fathers and their act of 
disposing the body. Benny offers a curt apology to his parents right before the film ends, his 
parents fate unknown. 
 
2.3.1 The Ubiquity of the Media in the Domestic Space 
One of the characteristics of Benny’s environment is the ubiquity of the media and 
how his day-to-day activities revolve around these mediated technologies. He spends his days 
after school at the video store, plays video games and videotapes the people around him. The 
walls of his room are adorned with posters and rows and rows of videotapes, while a 
television glares at its centre. He also has a video recorder aimed at the street outside, 
delivering a live feed into the confines of his bedroom. Benny’s bedroom depicts the manner 
in which domestic spaces are overwhelmed by media technologies. 
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The film, which premiered in 1992, illustrates how the boundary separating media 
and the domestic space were, and still are, gradually disappearing. Even though the influence 
of the media is more profound today, it is interesting to trace media’s slow colonisation of the 
domestic space. Barbara Klinger traces the development of the media infiltrating the 
domestic space back to the 1980s in the United States, when the advancement of technology 
made it possible for films to be watched on VHS in the comfort of one’s own home. Since 
then, the advance of technology has enabled the expansion of theatrical space into the 
domestic area. Television produced cable TV, VHS developed into DVD and Blu-Ray, while 
the Internet provided an immediate platform for those seeking films not commercially 
available. Today, the advent of YouTube and Netflix further exacerbates the expansion of the 
theatrical space. The hardware displaying these media also expanded from small television 
sets into giant home theatre systems, flat screens and projectors. All these developments have 
made the commodities produced by Hollywood an intimate part of the domestic space, 
becoming our favourite pastime and entrenching itself firmly into our routine (Klinger, 
2006:4,7). Furthermore, the capitalist drive to accumulate as much profit as possible has led 
studios to generate additional commodities and products by using film as a marketing tool. 
Figure 2: Benny in his techno-sanctuary 
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The commodification of film expands into as many forms as possible, from “fast-food 
franchise promotions and T-shirts to cartoon series spin-offs based on a film’s original 
characters” (Klinger, 2006:8), all of which will enter the domestic space eventually. These 
media-related and capitalist goods have, for example, entered Benny’s bedroom. Videotapes, 
CDs and figurines decorate the shelves, small placards adorn the walls and Pepsi bottles and 
Coca-Cola cans lie on his desk, while a Mickey Mouse masks grins on a display board. The 
rest of the family’s ultramodern home is similar to Benny’s bedroom. The wall of the 
family’s dining room is overwhelmed by consumerist artworks, from a portrait of a vintage 
Pepsi Cola cap to a sequence of Andy Warhol’s famed Marilyn Diptych print. Together with 
Leonardo da Vinci’s ‘Mona Lisa’ and Claude Monet’s ‘Houses of Parliament’, the diverse 
prints not only point to Georg and Anna’s “middlebrow bourgeois status”, but also reveal and 
implicate their “so-called higher forms of art [to be] on the same level as Benny’s comic 
books, slasher flicks and video games” (Frey, 2011:157). These various media and artworks, 
from a variety of public sources, enter the private home of the family and receive a special 
place in their domestic space, while being collectively treated as consumer products. 
Figure 3: The domestic space of the Schröbers 
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Klinger thus argues that the home has become a “site of negotiation and tension 
between the public and the private” (2006:7). She draws from Umberto Eco’s reading of 
Superman’s hideout called the ‘Fortress of Solitude’ to describe the paradoxical situation of 
the domestic sphere. While the idea of a fortress conjures up the image of a strong and 
protected environment, Superman’s fortress is secluded and situated on the outskirts of 
civilisation, providing him with a safe space to turn to when the world becomes too much. 
The Fortress of Solitude is built in a steep cliff and situated in the mountains, only accessible 
through a gigantic steel door. The solace that Superman finds in his fortress provides him 
with a place to think, to write his memoirs and do important research, as the fortress is 
furnished with a screening room, communications and exercise equipment and other 
household items (Klinger, 2006:8-9).  Comparable to Superman’s fortress, the hi-tech 
apartment of Benny and his parents also provide seclusion and safety from the outside world. 
As the elevator’s metal doors close behind them, the family enter their ultramodern apartment 
with state of the art kitchen and appliances, comfortable furniture and various media 
technologies. Benny’s modern bedroom is similarly adorned with audio-visual and cine-
televisual equipment, enabling him to immerse himself with cinematic and other mediated 
images. After Benny plays video games at the video store and rents a movie, he returns to his 
fortress of technology. He does his homework while an ice hockey game plays on television, 
rock music blasts in the background and a live feed of the street below projects into his room. 
The paradox of the domestic space thus becomes clear: the private space has become an arena 
in which media from the outside world is consumed, intimately linking one’s privacy to 
“larger cultural developments such as industrialisation and modernisation” (Klinger, 2006:9). 
Klinger claims that even the manner in which houses are built or constructed are influenced 
by consumer consciousness. The style in which rooms are wired allow for the variety of 
multimedia to function, which contributes to the interrelationship between the domestic space 
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and its hardware (2006:10). The cupboards upon which Benny stores his videotapes are 
neatly built to allow for the television to feature in the middle. His bed, also, is strategically 
placed so that he can watch television before falling asleep, while a remote conveniently 
enables him to control the television without having to move. The home, or in this case, 
Benny’s bedroom, is thus a conundrum: while appearing as a retreat from the public sphere, 
the domestic space is dependent on its cine-televisual technologies in order to function as a 
sanctuary (Klinger, 2006:10). 
 
2.3.2 The Death of the Pig 
In the article he presented before a screening of Benny’s Video, Haneke explains that 
one of the reasons genre films preoccupied with violence became popular, is because of the 
oscillation between “the disconcerting feeling of being present at a real event and the 
emotional security of seeing only the image of an artificially created or a found reality” 
(2010(b):578). Before the title sequence, the first scene of Benny’s Video display grainy, 
hand-held footage of a squealing pig led outside. The pig is steadied, a rope raises his snout 
and an airgun is placed on its forehead. A shot rings out, the pig plummets to the ground and 
convulses on the floor. The dead pig is flung with its hind legs to the left and a streak of 
blood smears the floor. The image suddenly freezes. Tell-tale white lines appear and 
rewinding skids are heard as the video is rewound until the pig has been summoned back to 
life.  The scene freezes again and replays, this time at a slower speed. Slowly, the airgun is 
put on its forehead again, a deep bellowing sound rings out and the pig drifts to the ground, 
dying again. Benny is fascinated with the video. He replays the video various times 
throughout the film and, later, it becomes clear that Benny filmed the killing of the pig 
himself. He was part of the real event of the pig’s death, but hid behind his camera. During 
their conversation, Benny tells the girl about the death of his grandfather and the open casket 
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at his funeral. Since the open casket was too high for him, his father had to pick him up to see 
his grandfather one last time. He admits that he closed his eyes, using his young age as an 
excuse and the fact that he was too short to look himself. It is clear, however, through his 
fascination with the video of the pig’s death and his recollection of his grandfather’s funeral, 
that Benny is unable to confront death on its own terms. He can only deal with a mediated 
version thereof, as the video presents him with the possibility of witnessing the real event of 
the pig’s death, yet remain emotionally safe and secure in the knowledge that it is only an 
image. While he could not handle the abject body of his grandfather, he could deal with the 
death of the pig, not because “it was just a pig” (Benny’s Video), but rather because he was 
hidden behind the video camera and mediating the death through his lens. Even though 
Benny was not viewing a video, but rather making a video, his actions recall Cavell’s claim 
that photography (or, in this case, videography) takes responsibility out of Benny’s hands and 
relieves him of acting on the situation (Cavell, 1979:40). 
In an interview for the film, Haneke suggests that Benny has the impression or 
illusion that he can control things by capturing them on video. Haneke reveals that, 
personally, he has never filmed or taken photos when going on vacation, because he finds the 
act perverse. I would argue that he expands Cavell’s claim that photography provides relief 
from responsibility, as Haneke points out that photography gives one the impression of 
ownership, in other words, that you are able to take ownership of the object that you have 
photographed. He believes that the strong desire to control and own something through an 
image is created by the media. Since people see and learn of the world through different 
media such as film, television and photographs, they are in the danger of “believing that it’s 
only through the medium that reality exists…[while] in truth it’s exactly the opposite” 
(Haneke, 2005(b)). Haneke’s claim becomes loaded with significance when read in 
conjunction with Cavell’s idea of the mechanical reproduction of photography. Due to 
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photography’s ability to reproduce the world mechanically, it points, as I have written earlier, 
to the existence of a world outside our subjectivity. Even though Cavell and Haneke differ in 
the role of the spectator, their different starting points draw the same conclusion. While 
Cavell’s argument rests on the spectator’s absence when the mechanical creation of a 
photograph takes place, Haneke’s rests on the subject’s presence during the taking of a 
photograph or video, in other words, actually being the one to record. Either way, both argue 
that the act of viewing, whether in the absence (like the Schröbers in The Seventh Continent) 
or presence (like Benny) of its mechanical creation, serves as material evidence of reality 
outside one’s subjectivity. In other words, regardless whether one was present during the act 
of filming or whether you are the one doing the filming, both acts are intended to validate 
reality. 
 
2.3.3 Mediated Reality: Benny’s Control Over the Image 
Benny records various events on his video camera. Apart from having a live feed of 
the street below his room, Benny records his sister’s party, his parents’ conversations, 
Egyptian landscapes and ruins, as well as banalities such as his mother on the toilet. The most 
disturbing thing that Benny videotapes, however, is his murdering of the girl. After he invites 
her to his house, Benny decides to show the girl the video of the dead pig as well as the 
weapon that was used to kill it. He gives her the weapon and playfully challenges her to shoot 
him. After she declines, he calls her a coward, but she returns the weapon and he reiterates 
his request. She also calls him a coward, but Benny casually aims and fires the gun off-
screen. The girl drops out of the frame and the viewers are left to witness her final execution 
via the television screen that projects a live feed of his bedroom, his camera recording since 
the start of the scene. Even though it was not Benny’s deliberate decision to do so, her death 
is captured on video. After the girl is killed and Benny eats some yoghurt, he covers her body 
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and goes through her things.12 He then puts some rock music on and continues with his 
homework while the television shimmers in the background. The violence that has taken 
place in his bedroom has not, however, disappeared like all the other mediated scenes of 
violence have before. He simply cannot return to his fortress safe, secure and in control, for 
there is a lifeless body lying in his bedroom. After a while he decides to do something about 
the corpse by cleaning the blood that oozed from her head. He starts to drag her, but the 
blood continues to flow. He cleans it up again, and pulls her a few inches further, only to see 
more blood oozing.  It does not stop. After he takes a break, Benny spots some of her blood 
on the side of his stomach and decides to videotape it. He then goes to his bedroom and 
records the lifeless body on the floor. He turns her around, revealing her bloodied and lifeless 
face. He then watches the recording on his console. 
While the video of the pig provided Benny with the ability to watch a real event yet 
remain emotionally secure and safe, his television enabled him to rewind and replay the video 
at will. Since the pig’s death can be replayed countless times and at various speeds, the 
remote provides Benny with the ability to control reality and reverse its progression (Frey, 
2011:159). Similar to the video of the pig, Benny decides to watch the video of the girl’s 
murder from his television and, afterwards, rewinds the sequence. Not only does Benny want 
to control the video by rewinding and slowing the sequence as he pleases, but he also wants 
to watch himself kill her on television. The virtual experience after the actual murder is, to 
him, even more dramatic, important and real, as he “spends much more time viewing and re-
viewing the video than cleaning the body” (Frey, 2011:156). Haneke’s argument that, for 
Benny’s generation, reality only exists through the medium of film or video is conveyed in 
his decision to videotape her dead body and re-watch it on television. Her death only 
																																																								
12 One of the things that Benny finds is a wooden egg, which he opens only to reveal another egg and then 
another, with nothing inside. A “reduplication of images or concepts referring to the textual whole”, is called 
mise-en-abyme (Hayward, 2013:239). The wooden eggs thus encapsulates Haneke’s attitude towards the media, 
a mise-en-abyme which “inverts the relation between part and whole…itself the aesthetic trope through which 
spectacle produces society as such, withdrawing it from our grasp only to dump it back” (Sutherland, 2010:185).  
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becomes real, becomes part of ‘reality’, by being captured on video and replayed on 
television. The difference, however, is even though Benny could control the video of the pig 
and make its presence instantly disappear by switching the video off, the recording of the 
girl’s death does not forget her lifeless body lying a few feet away.  
Benny’s idea of violence is thus informed by the way in which television depicts 
violence and its instant disappearance. Mary-Ann Doane addresses the forgettability and 
instantaneousness of television, by dividing the content of television between information, 
crisis and catastrophe. She argues that each programme, episode, talk show, documentary or 
news broadcast is self-destructing in order to make way for the next (1990:223-224). 
Television organises itself around the most current event and is characterised by the present-
ness of the situation as it “does not deal with the weight of the dead past but with the 
potential trauma and explosiveness of the present” (Doane, 1990:222). At the beginning of 
the film, video footage of a party held by Benny’s sister, also named Evi, is shown in which 
she initiates a game with her guests that involves some sort of pyramid scheme. After almost 
a minute, Haneke reveals Benny watching the video footage on the television in his room. 
His mother’s off-screen voice asks him to switch the channel to the news. He obliges and, 
instantly, bulletins flash across the screen, from glaring scenes of xenophobia in which 
football fans chase asylum seekers, to Imelda Marcos returning to the Philippines after living 
in exile. As the news anchors relay the details of the day’s greatest hits, Benny and his 
mother discuss his sister’s party. His father leans from the door and asks if there is any news 
worthy of attention, upon which his mother says no and complains that she cannot hear what 
the news anchor is saying, even though news footage display the destruction inflicted by the 
Croatian War of Independence on civilians in Zagreb. Georg resumes the conversation and 
questions Benny about Evi’s pyramid scheme party and where she got the money. The 
television, however, continues to show the devastation wrecked by Serbian troops, while the 
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family, unmoved by the scenes of atrocity, chatter off-screen. While they continue to blabber, 
the news anchor’s voice relay and explain the atrocities, carefully trained to “exclude all 
emotion” and render a “sanitised version of the real” (Peucker, 2000:179).  Later, Benny 
watches a B-grade American slasher film in which a zombie assaults a man while he drives 
speeding car, crashing into a variety of obstacles. Even though the sources of the pig’s video, 
the news footage and the American movie differ, the position of Benny remains the same: in 
front of his television. He is able to flick through different channels, from news bulletins that 
display atrocities to violent movies, without having to do more than press a button. Violence 
has thus, due to its interchangeability, become domesticated in its image and, through 
administering and broadcasting violence in fair amounts, Haneke argues that the “controlled 
invocation of evil permitted the hope for its controllability in reality” (2010(b):578). The 
girl’s lifeless body, however, is not as controllable and ‘disappearable’ as those bodies on 
television. 
 
2.3.4 Thís is Violence: Pedagogy of Television 
Haneke argues that, before television, viewers only received “homeopathic dosages” 
of violence (2010(b):577). Since the appearance of television, however, a shift in viewing 
habits took place due to the speed in which media was broadcasted and the manner in which 
information was circulated (Haneke, 2010(b):577). He argues that the impression that the 
arresting and attention-grabbing images of the cinema commanded was matched and then 
eclipsed by television’s “sheer mass of impressions and their permanent presence in the 
living room” (2010(b):578). The added complexity of actual, violent footage that televisions 
spew into living rooms through news broadcasts and documentaries challenged filmic 
representations of violence. It was much easier to spot fake violence in fictional films, since 
television gave audiences a thorough schooling on what real violence looked like. 
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Filmmakers thus had to compete against the real violence of news and documentary footage, 
by upping the visual appeal of their own fictional films in order to carry the same sensation of 
authentic terror (Haneke, 2010(b):577). The fabricated violence in fictional films aims at 
authenticity, even though audiences know that, somehow, it is faked. The constructed 
authenticity of violence does, however, allow the audience to forget momentarily that they 
are watching a fabrication. During their encounter in his bedroom, Benny explains to the girl 
that he has seen on television an explanation regarding the construction of fictional violence. 
The grotesque scenes of violence are actually only “ketchup and plastic.” He adds, however, 
“it looks real though” (Benny’s Video, 1992).13  While Benny has only seen violence on 
television, death was usually a part of the domestic space in a radical different way. Before 
the nineteenth century, death was a public process in which the dead were left in their room 
for a few days to allow the members of society to grieve. There was thus “no house, hardly a 
room, in which someone had not died” (Benjamin in Doane, 1990:233). The arrival of 
modernity, however, has sequestrated death from the domestic space and everyday life to 
“hospitals, old people’s homes and hospices” (Turnock, 2005:48). Neither the girl nor Benny 
has thus ever seen a dead body in real-life, with Benny losing his only chance at the funeral 
of his grandfather by closing his eyes.  
Benny’s generation is thus part of a contemporary society in which death is concealed 
“to such an extent that its experience is generally a vicarious one through representation” 
(Doane, 1990:233). With the coming of media, death has slowly been replaced in the 
domestic space by a mere representation of it. While violence such as murder, brutalities of 
war and bloody massacres have always been present in film, the advent of television has 
contributed greatly to the manner in which our perception of violence has been distorted. 
																																																								
13 Benny cannot, however, distinguish between what is simulated violence and what is real violence, because, 
for him, “there is no difference between a death marked by ‘ketchup and plastic’ […] and one that produces real 
blood” (Peucker, 2000:179). 
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What has changed over the years, according to Haneke, is the “increase in quantity and the 
distribution potential of electronic media” (2010(b):577). Scenes of carnage have bombarded 
audiences increasingly since the advent of television up until the release of Benny’s Video, an 
assault, I argue, that has not lost any momentum into the new millennium. Haneke asks 
whether the similarity between real and fictional forms of violence and its representation, be 
it news footage or a action flick, have influenced audience’s perception and sensitivity in 
such a way that they are unable to distinguish between the different contents of each. The 
question, for him, is whether the influence of television have dulled our perceptions to such 
an extent that “authenticity of the corpses of Grozny and Sarajevo approximate that of The 
Terminator” and that the only thing that distinguishes Star Wars from the “media event of the 
blitz invasion of Kuwait [is the] the timeslot in which it goes on the air” (Haneke, 
2010(b):577). While Haneke’s claim may seem like a stretch, as context will always orientate 
its audience, one must keep in mind that the spectatorial position of the audience still remains 
the same: the comfort of their couch. If the viewing situation remains the same for the 
audience and the different contexts of violence depicted bears resemblance to each other, will 
the boundary separating ‘real and distressing’ violence from ‘for entertainment’s sake only’ 
not get blurred, at least to some extent?  
To problematise our inability to distinguish between different depictions of violence 
even further, Haneke addresses the interchange between cinema and television. He traces 
cinema’s attempt to counter the tremendous omnipresence of electronic media by intensifying 
its own means of representation, techniques employed which television simply “integrated 
into its system again” (2010(b):578). The desire of cinema and television to outdo one 
another led to the constant attempt to intensify scenes of violence more than the other, 
resulting “indirectly to the further blurring of the boundary between reality and image” 
(Haneke, 2010(b):578). The battle between various film companies and television networks is 
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driven by the desire to gain market shares and viewer ratings. In order to meet the audience’s 
growing atavistic thirst for destruction, these companies compete in finding new ways in 
which violence can be represented more intense, horrific and disturbing than the other. Thus, 
any artistic or technical innovation is solely focused on the intensification of representation in 
order to stimulate the capitalist drive (Haneke, 2010(b):578). Haneke believes, however, that 
the “form of representation determines the effect of its content” (2010(b):578). Therefore, 
since corporations compete in the intensification of form, be it faster editing, louder music or 
eye-popping mise-en-scène, “content has become an interchangeable variable” (Haneke, 
2010(b):578). Thus, be it real or fictional violence, the war victim or the movie star, the car 
or toothpaste, Haneke argues that: 
The absolute equivalency of all the contents stripped of their reality ensures 
the universal fictionality of anything shown and, with it, the coveted feeling 
of security of the consumer (2010(b):578). 
 
A rape scene, horrors of war, genocide or even bullying are all interchangeable 
content, as the form in which these violent acts are packaged are, usually, spectacular. Due to 
the fact that fictional violence approximates real violence, the violent acts of both contexts 
are stripped of the reality from which they emerged from, resulting in them simply becoming 
part of the stream of mere representations that emit from various media. The merging of 
various media into a common stream recalls Guy Debord’s work on The Society of the 
Spectacle as images “detached from every aspect of life merge into a common stream, and 
the former unity of life is lost forever” (1994:2). In the same way that violent footage of 
something approximates that of another, what is the actual video referred to in the title of 
Benny’s Video? Is it the recording of the pig’s death, the footage of the girl’s murder and the 
subsequent cleaning thereof or the video he delivers to the police to implicate his parents? 
Perhaps, as Frey suggests, the title implies that these different videos are, in fact, all the same, 
	 51 
since, for Benny, the videos create a “flat line of reality or unreality, a total conflation of the 
actual and the virtual” (2010:161). 
 
2.3.5 Television Today 
How has the position of the generation after Benny deteriorated since 1992? Has the 
flat line of reality and unreality become worse? The past twenty-four years since the film’s 
release have seen, as Klinger explains, media entrenching itself increasingly into our daily 
routine. Most notably, the attacks of September 11 have resulted in a decline in traveling and 
attendance of public events in American society. Klinger argues that people decided that the 
safest place would be their home, which led to an increase in expenditure in home 
entertainment that Klinger describes as “bunkering the house” or “post-9/11 cocooning” 
(2006:25). The modern tendency was to retreat to our home entertainment systems by 
cocooning ourselves in the comfort of our own living room. Even though this was a 
temporary and localised phenomenon, the proliferation of media has not abated. Since then, 
television has attempted to bring the “even more real” into our living rooms in high 
definition, with UHD and 3D televisions allowing us to lose ourselves in a reality that bears 
little resemblance to our normal definition of the world. The dominating images of the 
domestic space provides “an on-going blanket of white noise” dulling perception and 
rendering “everything safe, logical, anodyne” (Wheatley, 2011:19). The popularity of 
YouTube and the immediacy provided by Netflix has given consumers of media even more 
power, much more than Benny’s ability to rewind and replay. Not only can we watch 
anything at any time and any place (provided there is a Wi-Fi connection), we also digest 
media at a staggering speed. We watch and process the world with several Chrome tabs open 
or a “social media feed where news about beheadings and refugees are sandwiched between 
duckface selfies and Buzzfeed quizzes” (McCraken, 2016). Even though we consume these 
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media safely and anonymously, Klinger argues that all viewers, including couch potatoes, are 
both active and implicated in the world, as our “daily encounters with the cinema and other 
media in [our] homes entail decoding and evaluation as well as, at times, a passionate 
attachment to domesticated media objects” which turns the domestic space into an 
“aesthetically and ideologically charged environment of reception” (2006:11). Cultural 
theorist Douglas Kellner has pointed out that the Internet is absorbing previous forms of 
culture, as the computer has become “a major household appliance and source of 
entertainment, information, play, communication, and connection with the outside world” 
(2003:13). He describes two distressing fears of critics of media that the influence and 
expansion of media generate. Firstly, the spreading of media into the ever-expanding realms 
of cyberspace may obliterate and substitute the real with an “ersatz, contrived, and 
manufactured pseudo-reality for the ordinary experiences of everyday life”, or, secondly, the 
surplus of information and entertainment available to consumers might distract individuals 
from the “trials and travails of ordinary life” in exchange for the escape to “the realm of hi-
tech entertainment” (Kellner, 2003:16). 
Since he grew up without the continual presence of television, Haneke explains that 
he was able to learn from the world directly, without an intermediary. In contrast, children 
today are taught to “perceive reality through television screens” (Haneke in Cieutat, 
2000:28), an argument I extend to smartphone screens. While Haneke does not attempt to 
psychologise or explain Benny’s actions by blaming the media’s ideological power, I do 
think he implicates the media in influencing the way in which Benny perceives reality, as his 
world is completely “mediated through video and saturated by spectacle” (Frey, 2010:161). 
After Benny returns from Egypt with his mother, his father asks him why he killed the girl. 
After answering he does not know why, he adds, “I wanted to see what it’s like” (Benny’s 
Video, 1992). Haneke has repeatedly told interviewers how he read similar cases in 
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newspapers about senseless murders committed by boys from bourgeois homes. While none 
of them were disturbed, mentally ill or drug-addicted, they all admitted they only wanted to 
see what it would be like to commit violence. Benny’s Video, and by extension Funny 
Games, does not label youths committing violence in sociological terms as ‘other’ or 
‘disturbed’, as American films usually do, but rather suggests that the motivation to see what 
it feels like to inflict senseless violence on strangers is in actual fact “no real motivation at 
all” (Falcon, 1998:12). Would Benny then have killed the girl if there were less violence in 
the media? In an interview with Sight & Sound, Haneke makes clear that he is not arguing 
that less violence on television would mean less violence in society. What he argues instead, 
which is clear in Benny’s Video, is that by watching a falsified world through a television 
screen leads spectators to perceive the world only through images. He argues that if a child, 
who has little or no contact with violence, watches a television series in which a myriad of 
people get shot, while it may be entertaining, the danger lies in the violence taking on the 
same level of reality as a Coca-Cola advertisement. For Haneke, “everything becomes 
drained of reality, so violence appears easy to exercise and with few consequences” (Falcon, 
1998:11). That the media has become the chief pedagogue for teaching and representing 
reality to its spectators is one of the main criticisms that Haneke aims at television, a critique 
I argue can be extended to our use of smartphones. He argues that people do not perceive 
reality anymore, but rather television or smartphones’ representation thereof. He continues:  
Our experiential horizon is very limited. What we know of the world is little 
more than the mediated world, the image. We have no reality, but a 
derivative of reality, which is extremely dangerous, most certainly from a 
political standpoint but in a larger sense to our ability to have a palpable 
sense of the truth of everyday experience (Haneke in Sharrett, 2010:585). 
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Instead of our everyday experience revolving around having real encounters and 
engagements with the outside world, we are glued to our screens that represent and mediate 
our encounters and engagements. Yet, how does the mediation of the world through a screen 
affect our relationships? Are we not given a greater purview of the world through our 
televisions, computers and smartphones? 
 
2.4 Modern Society of Spectacles: 71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance  
2.4.1 Modern Europe in Context: The Sorrows of Young Werther and the Second 
 World War 
Now that I have outlined the problematic influence of the media, especially television 
and its depictions of violence, I now turn to the manner in which the ubiquity of the media 
facilitates, influences and devalues the relationships of those in modern-day Europe. The 
impact of the media on the relations in modern day culture can only be illustrated within the 
context of modern (1990s) Europe, which I will do by drawing from two frameworks 
contextualised by Peter J. Schwartz and Georg Seeßlen. Schwartz points out that Haneke’s 
critique of German tradition mirrors that of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s key Romantic 
text The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774), which links “an empty centre of selfhood with 
problems of media, taste, commodities, and desire” (2010:340). Werther is a sensitive and 
passionate young artist who is rejected by his beloved Lotte, a warm-hearted girl who is 
betrothed to someone else. The rejection experienced by Werther, together with his self-
absorption and restlessness, leads him to exclaim: “Oh the gap, the fearful gap, I feel here in 
my breast! – Often I think if once, just once, I could press her to my heart the gap would all 
be filled” (Von Goethe, 2012:74). After his rejection, however, young Werther, from the 
bourgeois class, leaves the rural region where Lotte lives to pursue a respectable career in 
court. The aristocratic environment he finds himself in, where class and etiquette determines 
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one’s identity, forces Werther’s restless and passionate spirit to take a backseat. He attempts 
to fill the gap or void left by Lotte through various means and seeks to distinguish himself 
from other bourgeois “in expressions of taste and feeling, in clothing and conduct, as an artist 
and as a lover” (Schwartz, 2010:340). He reads a great deal and constructs his narrative in 
line with the literary works he pores over, such as Homer, Goldsmith, Ossian, Rousseau and 
the Bible (Schwartz, 2010:340). The suit Werther wore when he danced with Lotte the first 
time, a blue jacket with yellow vest, tan coloured breeches and leather boots, topped by a tall 
hat with a rounded brim, becomes his favourite outfit. The value of the outfit is bestowed by 
his memorable first experience with Lotte, which serves as a reminder of and contributes to 
the prolonging of his illusionary relationship with her (Purdy, 1998:160). In other words, his 
attire serves as an intimate sign of his personality and experiences. Werther, thus, defines his 
selfhood through what he reads, the fashion choices he makes, the work he does and the 
people he surrounds himself with. As Werther’s story progresses, however, the distinctions 
he bases his identity on turns out to be illusory. The identity markers collapse, leading young 
Werther to commit suicide. The tragic end that Werther succumbs to is “on the one hand a 
failure of differential self-definition to compensate lack of positive content […] and on the 
other a fatal consequence of reality’s misdescription by media” (Schwartz, 2010:340). The 
shaping of a sense of self through different media is a “late eighteenth-century product of 
bourgeois cultural ascendance”, a phenomena that Schwartz also points out that Faust, in 
Goethe’s other famous work, complains that bourgeois tradition, literature, technology and, 
interestingly enough, “distortions of sunlight through coloured glass” prevents him from 
experiencing the world directly (2010:340). 
The novel had a great impact on German society during its release. The book was 
reprinted thirty times within sixteen years and spawned a number of suicides; one even 
drowned herself with a copy of the book in her pocket (Constantine in Von Goethe, 
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2012:xxvi-xxvii). Many youth attempted to emulate Werther by following his mannerisms, 
speech, reading habits, fashion sense and dress code, his suit, especially, serving as a “badge 
of identity” (Purdy, 1998:151,153). By dressing themselves according to Werther’s outfit, 
young men signalled to others that, they too, possessed the same qualities as Werther such as 
his “emotions, moral character, political commitment, and capacity for productive work” 
(Purdy, 1998:154). Daniel L. Purdy attributes The Sorrows of Young Werther with 
contributing to the cultural shift of physical appearance and personal identity that took place 
in the late eighteenth century (2010:147). What you wore, what you spent your time doing, 
your interests and acquaintances became markers of identity. Thus, as Schwartz argues, 
Haneke’s critique of modern Europe has early roots, originating from Goethe’s assessment of 
how the bourgeoisie identified themselves through their professions and consumerist 
tendencies. Haneke points out, however, that the problem is still very much present in the 
twentieth century (Schwartz, 2010:347), a problem that, I argue, is present in the twenty-first 
century as well. 
The second factor that needs to be taken into account in order to understand the 
context that Haneke’s characters find themselves in is the post-war context. Georg Seeßlen 
reads Haneke’s first three films in terms of the larger context of Haneke’s work in television 
that evaluates modern Austria (in the late 1980s and early 1990s), a generation guilty of 
“concealment in Germany and Austria after the world war” (2010:333). The two generations 
depicted in his first three films, namely that of the first post-war generation (the Georgs and 
Annas) and their children (Evi, Benny), have their imaginary place of origin not only in 
industrialisation and middle-class society, but also, due to its repression, the persistence of 
fascism (Seeßlen, 2010:333). This is hinted in both The Seventh Continent and Benny’s 
Video, when the news on the radio or television informs about a Nazi trial or neo-Nazi 
activities, the characters just ignore the statements or turn a blind eye, reacting only “in their 
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orderliness and in their repression to fascist guilt” (Seeßlen, 2010:333). In an interview 
Haneke contextualises the post-war generation by pointing out that those who came back 
from the Second World War either kept their ideals intact, or had to ignore the collapse of the 
world in order to keep on living. In other words, they simply continued to live upright as if 
the nineteenth century had never ended, “as if God, Emperor and Fatherland were still living, 
just under a pseudonym” (qtd in Seeßlen, 2010:333). The Glaciation Trilogy, thus, looks at 
the lives of those whose parents passed down those repressed feelings and anxieties. For 
Haneke there existed a vague fear of “living without a real sense of abode”, resulting in the 
“hapless furnishing of the synthetic home” (Seeßlen, 2010:333). The icy reactions of Evi, 
Benny and Anni (the orphan child in 71 Fragments) throughout the trilogy is thus the final 
consequence of their parents’ repression through which amplified guilt is carried over from 
one generation to the next (Seeßlen, 2010:333). These two ideas, namely, consumer ideals as 
markers of identity and the post-war generation’s repressed feelings and anxieties, are 
important factors to take into account when reading the actions and decisions of the 
characters in 71 Fragments. 
 
2.4.2 The Failure of Communication: 71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance 
 71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance expands the setting of the nuclear family of 
The Seventh Continent and Benny’s Video to a large cross-section of characters. The variety 
of characters range from two married couples, two orphans, (one a young girl, the other a 
Romanian boy), an old pensioner and his daughter, and three university students. Hans and 
Maria, caught in their working class routine, are concerned about the health of their baby, 
while Inge and Paul desperately want to adopt a child to “fill their comfortable but empty 
bourgeois lives” (Grundmann, 2010:378). They attempt to adopt the orphan Anni, but instead 
settle for Marian, a young refugee from Romania. Mr Tomek is a socially isolated pensioner 
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who finds it difficult to maintain a relationship with his estranged daughter, while Max, a 
university student, ends up shooting several of these characters in a bank. For Roy 
Grundmann, the cross-section of characters and its myriad of stories represent “the 
complexity, heterogeneity, and interconnectedness of the modern world”, while conveying 
“the fragmented mode in which this fully globalised, fully mediatised world experiences 
itself” (2010:371). The whole film is told in seventy-one sequences, each separated by a 
blank spacer. From Mr Tomek’s routine in his apartment, Inge and Paul watching the news, 
Hans reciting an empty prayer in the bathroom, to Max getting food at a cafeteria and Marian 
wandering the streets of Vienna, most of the seventy-one sequences are “remarkable only in 
their unremarkability”, forming a system that “implicates an entire form of society for the 
crime of one” (Frey, 2003). Adam Bingham, on the other hand, understands the blank spacers 
to reinforce the theme of alienation and the breakdown of communication in modern society, 
as each character “exists in their own insular bubble”, while each scene exists “with no 
connection to any around it” (Bingham, 2005). The “chaotic cosmic ordering of drab, 
disparate lives” thus corresponds to the “fragmented narrative structure that follows the 
unconnected characters as their paths crucially intersect” (Bingham, 2005). The film is 
bookended by two news reports, the first of which depicts news of the 12th of October 1993, 
from Georgian refugees fleeing from one of the cities that supporters of the exiled president 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia captured, to the set-back that the peace talks in Somalia experienced 
due to the refusal of rebel groups to cooperate, to the crisis in Haiti concerning the resistance 
of locals towards the American and Canadian troops that train there. I will discuss the other 
news report bookend later in the chapter. In my reading of 71 Fragments, I will focus on 
three key scenes: Max playing Ping-Pong, Mr. Tomek talking to his daughter over the phone 
and Hans’s declaration of love to Maria, in order to point out how the technological, media-
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saturated and industrial world of the characters keep them from experiencing human contact, 
leading inevitably to frustration, despair and disaster (Bingham, 2005).  
About twenty minutes into the film, Max hits Ping-Pong balls that are ejected from an 
automated machine in a long take that last almost three minutes. A black net stretches across 
half of the table to contain the balls, enclosing half of the medium shot of Max’s body. The 
balls are discharged at rapid speed, while Max’s right arm weaves, almost mechanically, back 
and forth, hitting most of the balls. The circular motion, while intense and rhythmic, conveys 
a sense of stasis, a paradox, which Jerry White points out, is “at the core of the film’s 
portrayal of everyday European life; furious activity everywhere and everyone still drowns in 
inertia” (2009:34). In almost all of the scenes in which Max appears, he is either framed 
within a larger frame, busy with a puzzle or coordinated into some sort of assembly. Max is 
introduced in the film sitting on his bed, crouched down to the floor and piecing puzzle 
pieces together that form a crucifix, while a doorframe surrounds him. He fails at the puzzle 
and his roommate shows him how to do it, thus losing the bet of twenty shillings. Later, he 
walks through a hallway in the student hostel into his room, framing him once again, and 
looking down through the window, which, in the next fragment, he walks outside and sees 
the outline of a human figure drawn on the pavement. These two fragments are incredibly 
brief and are cut-off abruptly. During another crucifix puzzle, Max looses his cool at the new 
participant who also failed to complete the puzzle in a minute by flinging his food tray to the 
ground. In other fragmented scenes he forms part of a conveyer belt passing and getting food 
and talks to his mother in a phone booth. The collection of these scenes do not account for or 
explain Max’s murdering spree and suicide at the end of the film. Their formal construction 
of entrapment and coordination does, however, perhaps hint at Max’s lived experience in 
modern Vienna, reflecting the experience of the Schröbers in The Seventh Continent. Even 
though the few fragments in which Max appear do not rationalise the murders he commits at 
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the end of the film, the stress and humiliation he experiences (especially the final 
embarrassment he is subjected to in the bank moments before he shoots everyone) could be 
viewed as key factors to his behaviour. The symptoms of his breakdown, however, are not 
completely explained by these markers, suggesting the complexity of his actions. 
For Roy Grundmann, however, the most revealing scene is when the Ping-Pong coach 
shows Max a video that recorded him at a tournament. The coach’s scornful and wounding 
comments during Max’s performance neutralises the video’s “pedagogic potentials, [as he] 
prefers to use it for discipline, punishment and humiliation” (2010:389). The scene suggests 
something quite interesting about the glaciation that the characters experience. Glaciation is 
not just a condition or sickness experienced by society, but is rather the result of the 
characters’ own desire for self-domination. The desire of these middle class and well-
educated characters is efficiently put into action: Max is consensually taking part in the 
pedagogical video exercise. He wants to increase his performance and ability and thus 
subjects himself to the coach’s destructive teaching. Since it reveals his mistakes unbiasedly, 
easy to rewind and replay again, the video is, in other words, the “very instrument of his self-
oppression” (Grundmann, 2010:389). By watching his body and performance on television, 
Max’s body becomes an automated machine, which needs to do and fulfil specific mechanics 
in order to function optimally. The coach barks that his “feet are wrong”, he needs to “step 
back”, “follow the ball” and points out that his balance is “up shit creek” (71 Fragments). 
Figure 4: Max plays Ping Pong and watches himself on television 
	 61 
Together with the mechanical Ping-Pong exercises that Max subjects himself to earlier, 
Seeßlen argues that there is an inherent numbness in the empty mechanics of Ping-Pong 
practice. Max understands that his body has to imitate the “matrix of media images” that he is 
bombarded with, a form of violence that contributes to the loss of the body (Seeßlen, 
2010:331). Similar to Georg in The Seventh Continent walking past machinery to his desk 
job, Max is also a modern, human automaton. Schwartz draws a parallel between Max’s 
mechanical practice of Ping-Pong and the headless, morning rituals of the Schröbers, by 
recalling Günther Anders’ concept of ‘Promethean shame’, embodying modern man’s 
embarrassment in his failure of matching the “efficiency, strength, productivity, beauty [and] 
longevity” of his own technological products (2010:347). Similar to Werther, Max bases his 
identity on his desires, in other words, his aspiration of playing Ping-Pong like a pro, an 
identity that crumbles before his eyes on the television.  
The 35th fragment, halfway through the film, (right after Max’s pedagogic video 
lesson), depicts Mr Tomek, the old pensioner, on the telephone in an eight-minute long take. 
Mr Tomek talks to his daughter and granddaughter on the telephone while a television flashes 
in front of him and a bookcase closes in from the other side. Their conversation is banal and 
goes in circles. While he waits for the phone to travel between the two recipients on the other 
line, he glances at the television, its presence filling the void that the disappointing 
relationship with his daughter is leaving. His loneliness is palatable, while his clear agitation 
and anger towards is daughter is obvious. He knows he is a burden and scolds her for trying 
to pretend that he isn’t, voices his frustration of being blamed for being either uninterested (if 
he does not ask about her husband) or interfering (when he does) and sarcastically apologises 
for existing. After voicing his irritation with the expression “kisses”, he is criticised by his 
daughter that he only talks about himself, upon which he retorts “What should I talk about if 
not myself, then?” (71 Fragments).  He calls his daughter a spiteful and nasty person and tells 
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her to stop try and hurt him. He then wants to talk to his granddaughter again. In many ways, 
the sequence reflects Max’s mechanical Ping-Pong long take, as the same tension between 
stasis and action exist. While not as rhythmic as the ejection of Ping-Pong balls from the 
machine, Mr Tomek’s emotional outbursts likewise intersperses the shot, while the circular 
conversation reflects Max’s motion of “resignation [and] of being forever fated to repeat the 






Two fragments after Mr Tomek’s phone-call, Hans and Maria are having dinner. 
Hans gorges himself with salad, rice, meat and beer, while his wife Maria slowly pecks at her 
food. Before Hans takes another gulp of his beer, he tells Maria “I love you” (71 Fragments). 
Maria stops eating, looks at Hans perplexed and asks what is the matter with him and whether 
he is drunk. He answers yes, upon which she angrily questions his motives and points out that 
his words are out of character. “I thought it might help”, he says, a claim that Maria does not 
appreciate. After a moment of silence, Hans suddenly slaps Maria through the face with the 
back of his hand. Shocked, Maria puts her cutlery down and turns to leave the table. Hans 
looks down at his food, while Maria sits back into her chair, also looking down. After a while 
she reaches for his arm, touches it, retreats and returns to her food. 
Figure 5: Mr Tomek on the telephone 
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For Seeßlen, Hans’ declaration unearths the buried emotions between the couple, 
leading to the violent outburst. Since his sentence is completely foreign to Maria, those three 
words must “remain completely foreign, like a tremendous provocation” (Seeßlen, 
2010:330). After a brief pause she continues to eat, while Hans plays around with his food 
and starts to eat later on. They continue just as they have at the start of the scene. Ultimately, 
nothing changes between Hans and Maria, as the words Hans uses are essentially foreign to 
them. In the context of the film, Seeßlen argues that the “more language there is in the media, 
the less language people have themselves” (2010:331). The three words of “I love you” are 
words that usually carry great value in narratives. In mainstream films, those words magically 
fix a relationship or bring two quarrelling lovers together. Not, however, in the instance of 
Hans and Maria. It is not the words that make Maria reach out to Hans, but rather the slap 
through the face that the words carried with it. 
Wheatley argues, however, that the truly remarkable fact about Hans and Maria’s 
scene is “its opacity, its inability to be ‘read’” (2009:67). Even though, when all the 
fragments are read together, there emerges some sort of congruence, each “subplot struggles 
Figure 6: Hans hits Maria during dinner 
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against our attempts to read it as a unified whole” (Wheatley, 2009:68). We do not 
completely know why Maria was so dumbfounded by Hans’ declaration. Even though we 
know he rarely says those three words, we do not know why. His explanation that it “might 
help” perhaps refers to their sick infant and Maria’s frustration, or possibly even alluding to 
Maria’s depression (his prayer in the bathroom reveals her unhappiness). While it is clear that 
the family suffers, alongside with Mr Tomek’s loneliness, their story depicts how their 
mutual alienation and ways of manipulation are characteristic of their relationships 
(Grundmann, 2010:379). The only way these characters are linked, though, is through the 
media. When Mr. Tomek watches Marian, the Romanian, homeless boy, on television, there 
is no fragmenting black marker between his scene and Inge and Paul’s, who watches the 
same news report. The omission of the black interjection might suggest that, even though 
they are alienated from one another, the media is the only thing that links all these characters. 
Thus, for Seeßlen, the loss of the body that Max experiences, Mr Tomek’s inability to 
communicate and the loss of intimacy inherent in Hans and Maria relationship are all “pitted 
against the excessive influence of the media, [as] people evade one another and then catch 
one another again in the web of the media” (2010:332). It is certainly true for Inge and Paul 
who, after being frustrated with Anni, sees Marian on the news and decides to adopt him 
instead. In being moved by the story of Marian relayed in the news report, the television 
informed and determined their life-altering decision of adoption. Anni and Marian are thus in 
indirect competition for Inge and Paul’s attention, as Marian’s social viability is only granted 
by the neglect and discarding of Anni (Grundmann, 2010:403). The media plays a mediating 
role, either implicitly or explicitly, in these relationships. The informing role of the media in 
relationships has been present in The Seventh Continent and Benny’s Video as well, which 
might illustrate my point further. 
 
	 65 
2.4.3 Using the Media to Mediate their Relationships: Alexander and Benny 
In his seminal work The Society of the Spectacle, Guy Debord defines the spectacle 
not as “a collection of images; [but] rather…the social relationship between people that is 
mediated by the images” (1994:4). The relations between people are governed and facilitated 
by spectacles of media, its presence always looming when people are unable to connect with 
one another. During a dinner sequence in The Seventh Continent, the song “Send Me Roses” 
by MO starts to play on the radio, filling the silence while the Georg, Anna, Evi and 
Alexander eat and drink. Georg looks anxiously towards Alexander, asking him whether he 
should turn the music down. Alexander answers not on his account and the family continues 
to eat while the music overwhelms the dining room, but Georg decides to turn the music 
softer in any case. While Anna tells Alexander which spices she used in their meal, 
Alexander starts to cry. The music is put off while Anna, awkwardly, tries to console him. 
While the song probably reminded Alexander of something, the manner in which the 
interfering media robs Haneke’s characters of engaging with one another becomes even 
clearer in the scene right after Alexander’s breakdown. When Georg, Anna and, a now calm 
Alexander, watch television, Alexander tells them what his and Anna’s mother told him a 
few days before she died. He recalls that she wondered “what it would be like if people 
would have a screen instead of a head so everybody could see their thoughts” (The Seventh 
Continent). Neither Anna nor Georg responds, while their eyes stay glued to the screen. The 
voice of the television personality, however, fills the silence left by Alexander’s recollection. 
The scene reveals two disturbing characteristics of the perceived role of television. 
Not only do the presence of television allow Anna and Georg to comfortably ignore 
Alexander and revert their attention back to its commanding gaze, but their mother’s wish, 
that everybody’s heads be screens in order to expose their innermost thoughts, reveals an 
alarming belief that undergirds their faith in television. Firstly, it assumes that the projected 
	 66 
images on the screen are always the utmost truth. Secondly, their mother’s statement reveals 
that, not only do people hide their true thoughts and thus become alienated from one other, 
but that it is up to the media to solve the separation. Their mother attributes the media with 
the power not only to mediate the relationships between people, but also presupposes that the 
media plays an integral role in restoring those relationships. Debord’s linking of the spectacle 
with the influence it exerts on human relationships become clear in the trilogy, as the 
characters use different media to drone out their personal problems. Another example is the 
family’s apartment in Benny’s Video, which is divided into spaces reserved for private use. 
Both at the start of the film, when Benny and his mother watch the news and, halfway 
through, when Benny shows his parents the video of him killing the girl, his father remains at 
the door and does not enter his techno-sanctuary. Benny’s father treats the doorway to 
Benny’s room as a border (Frey, 2011:157), the media-saturated fortress only reserved for 
Benny. Alexander is unable to voice his pain and difficulty of dealing with his mother’s death 
during dinner, but it is only when they are in front of the television that he has the courage to 
say something. Seeßlen argues that the three films depict the “loss of the body and language 
[that] leads to the attempt to send each other messages by way of an electronic medium” 
(2010:332). While Alexander can only attempt an engagement with his sister and brother-in-
law in the presence of media (they can also only eat while some form of music plays in the 
background), Benny communicates his act of murder to his parents through media. He is 
unable to admit that he murdered the girl directly to his parents, which leads him instead to 
replay the video of her death to them after they watched the news. The video obviously forces 
a response from them, albeit a cold and rational one, revealing the manner in which Benny is 
able to exert an influence on his parents via the recording. The control that Benny imposes on 
his parents via media thus replaces the emotional relationship (Seeßlen, 2010:332), as the 
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video is talking for him and instead of him.14 Different media, be it television or videos, have 
thus become the “meta-stratum of the global village in which we find ourselves” (Seeßlen, 
2010:332). 
2.4.4 Construction of Identities Through Media-Informed Pedagogy: Evi 
The prolific media culture that Haneke’s characters find themselves influences their 
relationships with each other, but also, as Douglas Kellner points out, “provides ever more 
material for fantasy, dreaming, modelling thought and behaviour, and identities” (2003:1). 
Werther used media such as novels and clothing to build his identity. Similarly, Evi’s 
decision in The Seventh Continent to feign blindness can be traced back to the media and its 
influence on her behaviour. After Evi’s teacher informs Anna of her daughter’s actions, Anna 
fails to address Evi’s behaviour and slaps her through the face. After their confrontation, 
Anna finds a newspaper article underneath Evi’s drawings of a smiling girl with a headline 
that reads “Blind, but no longer lonely”. While Anna failed to engage with Evi’s actions 
properly, it is clear that the medium of the newspaper guided Evi’s actions and provided her 
with the material to model her behaviour accordingly, in the hope of attaining the same 
outcome as the smiling girl in the picture. The picture shows the smiling girl embraced by 
someone else, proving to Evi, in its eternal manufacturedness, that even though the girl is 
blind, she is loved. Simplistically understood by Evi: blindness cures loneliness. 
Not only does Evi draw from the medium of the newspaper to guide her actions, the 
media also informs her, as well as her parents’, fantasy and dreams. Debord argues that for 
one whom the “real world becomes real images, mere images are transformed into real 
beings” (1994:18). For the Schröbers as well, images not only influence their behaviour, such 
as Evi feigning blindness, but transforms into something real. After Anna reads the heading 
																																																								
14 When Benny and his mother go to Egypt, his mother also videotapes Benny with a second camera. This 
implies that “even the relation of mother and child is mediated by the video camera, and that in some sense their 
meeting ground is the collaborative work of the videotape itself” (Peucker, 2000:183). 
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of the article, she goes to Evi’s bedroom and asks her whether she is lonely or not. An 
awkward interaction ensues as Evi denies feeling lonely and Anna clumsily lays on her to 
give a hug. Evi then prays before she goes to sleep: “Dear Lord make me meek so I in 
Heaven Thee shall meet” (The Seventh Continent). It is here that the image of Australia 
transforms into a real being. Right after her prayer, the image of Australia reappears and fills 
the whole frame, but differs from its previous appearance: the image has become animated. 
Haneke’s editing choice of connecting Evi’s prayer of meeting God in heaven, the world 
beyond, and the moving image of Australia suggests her conflation of the Christian belief of 
heaven with the utopia presented by the image of Australia. For Debord, the hope for 
paradise is no longer projected into the heavens, but rather placed within material life itself as 
the spectacle is a “technological version of the exiling of human powers in a ‘world beyond’” 
(1994:20). For Evi, the image of Australia is her only reference point of heaven, thus 
transforming into a visual manifestation of the promise of paradise. 
It is important to note that the countries referenced throughout the three films, 
Australia, Egypt and Romania are all east from Austria. Schwartz explains that, for German 
romantics, the Orient was a dream that served as a counterpart to the complexity of 
Figure 7: Australia's promise of paradise 
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modernity and a means of escape, which carried the idea that any differences or problems 
will be solved. However, the dream too often turned to “one of self-dissolution in death, in 
suicide” (Schwartz, 347:2010). The self-dissolution of the Schröbers in The Seventh 
Continent literally ends in suicide. As they methodologically go around and destroy their 
possessions and then kill themselves, they reveal that what they are actually seeking in the 
image of Australia is the “escape from the social-semantic system their things trap them in” 
(Schwartz, 347:2010). 
 
2.4.5 Becoming Part of the Spectacle 
For Seeßlen, the media’s integral role in the three films renders the characters both 
perpetrator and victim. They fluctuate between observers and those being observed, as they 
all sooner or later enter the medium (2010:329). The final fragment in 71 Fragments, the 
news bookend of the film, encapsulates Seeßlen’s point. After the final series of scenes, Max 
massacring most of the people in the bank and killing himself, blood oozing from a victim, 
Max lying face down on his car wheel and Marian still waiting for Inge in the car, the final 
fragment of the film shows a news broadcast reporting on Max’s horrific shooting spree. The 
bulletin is integrated with news from the war in Sarajevo and the child abuse claims against 
Michael Jackson, reports that have already been shown in fragment forty-nine. 15  The 
massacre at the bank enters the common news stream and is subsumed by other noteworthy 
bulletins. The characters of the film, depicted with real lives, thus become “subject to a 
relentlessly impersonal image system. In a world saturated with images, they just become 
another image” (Wheatley, 2009:70). The shooting, condensed into a brief, fifty-five second 
news bite, displays the tendency of television to banalise events, subjecting real occurrences 
																																																								
15 For Doane, catastrophe always seems to “have something to do with technology and its potential collapse. 
And it is also always tainted by a fascination with death – so that catastrophe might finally be defined as the 
conjuncture of the failure of technology and the resulting confrontation with death” (1990:229). 
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to a kind of levelling process (Doane, 1990:228).  The horrific shooting thus attains the same 
value as the war in Sarajevo and the child molestation accusations of Michael Jackson, a flat 
line of reality in which three vastly different cases differ only in their time-slot. These 
newsbites are easily consumable and, as Wheatley points out, since rapidly edited bulletins 
dull our perception and forecloses any engagement with the actuality of the horrors, the 
bulletins are, in the end, ultimately meaningless (2009:71). 
During the news report, the press interviews a man who spoke to Max just before the 
shooting. The guiding voice of the neutral news anchor announces that the man has no 
explanation, after which the man confirms in his interview: “No idea, don’t know. It’s 
madness” (71 Fragments). For Doane, eyewitness accounts of a horrific event carry authority 
only due to their ‘being there’, since their reported presence makes up for the absent camera. 
Since the man is interviewed in the area that the massacre took place, as well as the property 
on which Max committed suicide, the man and interviewer’s presence in the space 
“compensates for the inevitable temporal lag” (Doane, 1990:229). The story assumes 
‘realness’ due to the press being there, interviewing those who witnessed the brutality, thus 
enabling them to subject the catastrophe to “analysis, speculation and explanation” (Doane, 
1990:230). For the viewers of the news bulletin the horrific event only attains credibility 
through its presence on television, revealing our “understanding of natural catastrophe [to be] 
a fully technological apprehension” (Doane, 1990:231). Since Max and his victims enter the 
very spectacle that enveloped their lives, the final fragment of the film indicates how 
“television and ‘real-life’ continuously consume and reflect one another” (Wheatley, 




2.5 Conclusion: The Media’s Ability to Decontextualise 
 As I have illustrated Cavell’s two major arguments with the advertisement of 
Australia, the act of viewing, firstly, makes displacement appear as our natural condition and, 
secondly, provides the viewer with the ability to view the world without having to bear its 
burdens. Clearly, television exacerbates these two conclusions made by Cavell, since the 
manner in which information is packaged and broadcasted influences the way in which the 
viewer regains contact with external reality. Since most social and political conflicts are 
played out on television and smartphone screens, displaying “spectacles such as sensational 
murder cases, terrorist bombings, celebrity and political sex scandals, and the explosive 
violence of everyday life” (Kellner, 2003:1), the mixture of information, crises and 
catastrophic news with shallow entertainment results in, as Haneke has pointed out, the time-
slot being the only marker that separates these shows. The editing practices of television, 
characterised by its speed and conciseness, provides the viewer with linear information that 
can “quickly [be] consumed and checked off…[offering] the most persuasive guarantee for 
sanitised emotions, that is, for sterility” (Haneke, 2000:173). The content displayed on 
television, thus, increasingly loses its resemblance to reality, approximating a pseudo-reality, 
which, I would argue, displaces the viewer even more. 
 Doane draws from N. Katherine Hayles’ work to point out that, since television 
makes information “quantifiable by removing it from the context which endowed it with 
meaning”, television is a massive force of decontextualisation (Doane, 1990:225). 
Television’s reorganisation of information, crises and catastrophes makes it possible to 
“fragment, manipulate, and reconstitute informational texts at will. For a postmodern culture, 
the manipulation of text and its consequently arbitrary relation to our context is our context” 
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(Hayles in Doane, 1990:225).16 The viewer thus, desiring to regain contact with the outside 
world, is presented with a manipulated reality, a pseudo-reality that the viewer believes 
constitutes the external reality outside of his or her subjectivity. Since the content of 
television range from commercials to news coverage of the latest disaster to blockbuster 
movies, television is “the preeminent machine of decontextualisation” (Doane, 1990:225). 
Doane’s argument could equally be applied to the situation today, perhaps even more, where 
smartphones provide its users with the ability to scroll, without effort, from horrific images of 
terrorist attacks and suffering refugees, to cute pictures of cats and Kim Kardashian’s latest 
nude selfie. Therefore, not only is television a mass tool of decontextualisation, but all digital 
technology in which the viewer is presented with an image stemming from photography. 
Being presented with a pseudo-reality that is deprived of any context, the viewer’s modern 
desire to not need any power or responsibility is all the more exacerbated. The 
decontextualisation that characterise these images draws our attention further away from 
bearing the other’s burden, since a simple click of a button or a further scroll downward will 
erase, not only the brutality that has just been witnessed, but also one’s responsibility. The 
Other’s face is left somewhere else on your newsfeed, unfollowed or simply scrolled past. 
The instantaneousness of these images is thus just one more aspect that relieves the viewer of 
bearing any burden for the Other. 
 Since spectators are used to the programming style of television, entertainment 
cinema and, I would add, the immediate content available on our smartphones, Haneke 
believes that those who produce images have a responsibility to find new ways of making 
images and news fresh and perceptible again, as well as to “restore to them the power that 
derives from their potential for critical engagement” (Haneke, 2000:172). His films, thus, 
																																																								
16 For Debord, the spectacle is a means of unifying society, as it is the “sector where all attention, all 
consciousness converge. Being isolated – and precisely for that reason – this sector is the locus of illusion and 
false consciousness; the unity it imposes is merely the official language of generalised separation” (1994:3). 
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serve as a response to the dominant forms of available media, especially television and 
entertainment cinema: 
I attempt to provide an alternative to the totalising productions that are typical 
of the entertainment cinema of American provenance. My approach provides 
an alternative to the hermetically sealed-off illusion, which in effect pretends 
at an intact reality and thereby deprives the spectator of the possibility of 
critical participation. In the mainstream cinema spectators are right off herded 
into mere consumerism (Haneke, 2000:172).  
 The lives of the characters in the Glaciation Trilogy are certainly deformed by the 
various media that saturate their day-to-day lives. How then, does Haneke approach his 




REFLECTING ON FILM’S AUTOMATISMS: 
GENRE, EDITING AND SOUND IN 
FUNNY GAMES, CODE UNKNOWN, THE PIANO TEACHER 
AND TIME OF THE WOLF 
 
3.1 Introduction: Cavell’s Automatisms and Haneke’s Filmmaking Model 
 Cavell borrows the idea of automatism from André Bazin’s seminal essay “The 
Ontology of the Photographic Image”, which, as I have outlined in the previous chapters, 
refers to the fact that photographs are automatic, manufactured images of the world (Cavell, 
1979:20). Due to the automaticity of film’s mechanical apprehension of nature, the human 
subject is unburdened from having to apprehend nature by him- or herself, since a mechanical 
apparatus is doing the apprehension for and instead of the human subject (Trahair, 2013:1). 
The concept of automatism, as Lisa Trahair (2013:1) points out, is developed by Cavell at 
different stages in The World Viewed, the first two of which I have already discussed in the 
previous chapter. To summarise, automatism, firstly, reproduces an unseen world to which 
the spectator was not present (1979:40), thereby displacing the spectator and making 
displacement appear as the spectator’s natural condition (1979:41). When watching a film, 
we are invisible to the world that is screened before us, an invisibility which is mechanically 
assured (Rothman and Keane, 2000:93). This invisibility ensures that spectators remain 
powerless, watching the world without having to bear its burdens (Cavell, 1979:40). I argue 
that these two important ideas, that, firstly, the viewing experience of film makes 
displacement appear as our natural condition and, secondly, that viewing takes responsibility 
for the world out of our hands, are fundamental underpinnings to understand Haneke’s 
approach to filmmaking. 
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Cavell’s shifts the emphasis during his second discussion on automatism from the 
unburdened subject’s view of the world to the reality of the world that is projected (Trahair, 
2013:3). What is film’s medium, what forms its basis? The basis that presents us with views 
of the world is a material medium comprising of “a succession of automatic world 
projections” (Cavell, 1979:72). Cavell explains that ‘succession’ refers to the motion of the 
images, the frames that follow one another and the juxtapositions provided by editing, while 
‘automatic’ underscores the mechanical fact of photography, which includes the absence of 
the “human hand in forming these objects and the absence of its creatures in their screening” 
(1979:73). The term ‘world’ that he refers to includes the “ontological facts of photography 
and its subjects”, while ‘projection’ intends the “phenomenological facts of viewing…[as 
well as] the continuity of the camera’s motion as it ingests the world” (Cavell, 1979:73). 
Trahair highlights how, from his definition, Cavell’s understanding of cinema’s automatism, 
at this point, refers to two different mediums that cinema has at its disposal: Firstly, the 
photographic apparatus or the camera sensor that captures views of the world17 and, secondly, 
the world that offers itself to be viewed and recorded. These two mediums are automatisms, 
because the world gives itself automatically and the camera apprehends it mechanically. In 
other words, both “the automaticity of the apparatus and the becoming of the world comprise 
the necessary and essential conditions of cinema” (Trahair, 2013:3). Automatism is a 
fundamental aspect of cinema that underpins our viewing experience, since no other art form 
brings us closer to nature. Closeness to nature is, according to Cavell, the purpose of art in 
modernity, proving that humanity is co-present to nature (Trahair, 2013:3). 
In order to continue from the two fundamental ideas that underpins our viewing 
experience, as well as Cavell’s second discussion of automatism, that both the mechanic 
																																																								
17 It is not the scope of this essay to outline how digital has changed Cavell’s understanding of automatism. 
While I will touch upon it in the section on Code Unknown, D.N. Rodowick reads Cavell’s film theory in light 
of the digitisation of cinema in The Virtual Life of Film (2007). For the purposes of my research, I am not going 
to distinguish between celluloid emulsion that captures light and digital recording (even though Haneke has 
switched from film stock to digital from Caché onwards). 
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apparatus and the world itself are automatisms of cinema, I now turn my attention to Cavell’s 
third meditation on automatism. His third discussion on automatism will form the foundation 
of my analysis, in which I map the ways that Haneke’s approach to filmmaking serves as a 
response to the ubiquity of the media outlined in the previous chapter. Cavell’s third 
meditation on automatism takes place in Chapter Fourteen’s Automatism in The World 
Viewed. Since the basis of film is a succession of automatic world projections, the material 
basis of film is given significance by the “artistic discoveries of form and genre and type and 
technique”, features which Cavell also describe as automatisms (1979:105). All art forms 
have a variety of automatism at their disposal. Poetry, for example, has letters of the alphabet, 
words, language and sounds of its pronunciation (Trahair, 2013:4). Automatism, thus, is not 
only restricted to the world giving itself to be viewed and the apparatus recording that what is 
given, but also includes all filmmaking techniques and practices, such as genres, editing, 
music and sound (Trahair, 2013:4).  
 Cavell’s understanding of automatism being a general condition of all art allows him 
to distinguish easily between traditional and modernist art. For Cavell, the distinction 
between traditional art and modernist art is the manner in which the artwork is related to its 
automatisms (Trahair, 2013:4). Traditional art simply uses its automatisms, by employing 
them as a means to an end. In other words, the traditional artist knows “best how to activate 
its automatisms, and how best to entice the muse to do most of the work” (Cavell, 1979:107). 
Modernist art, however, does not simply use its automatisms, but rather understands 
automatism as both its “means of freedom and constraint” and thus uses its art to reflect on 
the automatisms it employs (Trahair, 2013:4). While traditional artists take film’s 
automatisms for granted, Cavell argues that the modernist filmmaker does not exist without 
questioning those specific traditions (1979:15). It is the modernist artist’s “awareness and 
responsibility for the physical basis of its art [that] compels it at once to assert and deny the 
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control of its art by that basis” (Cavell, 1979:105). A responsible filmmaker, therefore, 
cannot be without ascribing to the requirements of modernism, reflecting on the automatism 
he or she employs during the filmmaking process. The conventions of traditional filmmaking 
do not control and prescribe Haneke’s way of making films. Instead, he employs the 
automatisms of cinema in order to reflect upon them. This is why Michael Haneke is a 
modernist filmmaker. Wheatley points out that Haneke’s description as modernist filmmaker 
is substantiated by both the formal qualities of his films as well as the relevance to and 
criticisms of modern day Europe (2009:23). The following sections will discuss how Haneke 
thinks about film’s automatisms, by discussing how he reflects upon classical Hollywood 
cinema and genre in Funny Games, editing and the long take in Code Unknown, music in The 
Piano Teacher and sound in The Time of the Wolf. Each section will use, as starting point, a 
section from Haneke’s essay “71 Fragments of a Chronology of Chance: Notes to the Film”, 
which deals with image, editing and sound respectively. These ideas will guide my reading 
and understanding of Haneke’s approach to, use of and reflection on the automatisms of 
genre, editing, music and sound. 
 
3.2  Subverting the Genre From Within: Funny Games and the Thwarting of 
 Classical Hollywood Cinema 
3.2.1 Introduction: Classical Hollywood Cinema as Automatism 
Originating from theatrical melodrama, classical18 Hollywood cinema refers to a 
tradition that dominated Hollywood film production during the 1930s to 1960s, a style that 
																																																								
18 Even though I use Bordwell and Hayward’s term throughout my dissertation to refer to the Hollywood films 
from the 1910-1960s, I agree with Mark Cousins’ apprehension of applying the word ‘classic’ to American 
cinema, as if it refers to Hollywood’s heyday or lucrative golden age. For Cousins, classicism in art describes “a 
period when form and content are in harmony, when there is balance between the style of a work and the 
emotions or ideas it is trying to express”. American films, instead, are “mostly given to excess rather than 
balance – their characters are emotional, their stories express yearning”, thus he replaces ‘classical Hollywood 
cinema’ with “closed romantic realism” to describe the style (Cousins, 2011:15-16). 
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has infiltrated and shaped mainstream cinema today (Hayward, 2013:80). David Bordwell 
calls Hollywood Cinema an “excessively obvious cinema”, a mode of filmmaking that aims 
to be comprehensible, unambiguous and explain the narrative, while striving to “conceal its 
artifice through techniques of continuity and ‘invisible’ storytelling” (Bordwell et al., 
1985:1). The style of this cinema, in other words, is subordinate to the narrative, as the type 
of shots, lighting, editing, mise-en-scène and sound never draw attention to themselves, but 
are rather employed to manufacture a naturalistic form of realism (Hayward, 2013:82). The 
narrative of a classical Hollywood film is constructed along the lines of the three-act arc, a 
triadic composition of order/disorder/order-restored (Hayward, 2013:80). In drawing from 
Cavell’s understanding of automatisms, Trahair points out that when traditional film gives us 
views of the world, it constructs its narrative in accordance to a casual ordering of events. 
Even though flashbacks may be used, it is usually constructed along the lines of cause and 
effect. By following such a construction, the stories depicted in traditional film appear natural 
(Trahair, 2013:4). Her critique is manifested in Robert McKee’s Story, one of Hollywood’s 
screenwriting bibles, in which he advises that audiences want to be “taken to the limit, to 
where all questions are answered, all emotions satisfied – the end of the line” (1997:140). 
Since these traditional or classical Hollywood films aim to elucidate characters’ actions, 
explain events concisely and resolve all conflicts perfectly, spectators are positioned in a 
position of sagacity. Wheatley argues, however, that the manner in which Hollywood cinema 
position spectators are morally problematic and that, therefore, the filmmaker “has an ethical 
imperative to produce a work that breaks with cinematic illusionism and thereby [grant] the 
spectator the opportunity to engage critically with the cinematic image” (2009:39).19 I would 
																																																								
19 In writing on Haneke, Grundmann refers to Bertolt Brecht’s alienation effects in theatre that kept audiences from blindly 
identifying with the characters and, instead, made them engage with the play on a conscious level (see Brecht’s essay 
‘Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting’ (1936)). Grundmann mentions that Jörg Metelmann doctoral thesis (2003) argues that 
Haneke has not only applied Brecht’s theories, but has also succeeded in moving beyond him. Even though Haneke has 
dismissed Brecht’s approach for being too ‘message orientated’, Grundmann agrees with Metelmann’s analysis and points 
out that Brecht’s influence might have been greater on Haneke than he realises (Grundmann, 2007:8,14). 
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argue, then, that classical Hollywood cinema is an automatism that allows traditional 
filmmakers to use its construction and techniques, as McKee calls for, as a means to make 
their stories appear natural, proclaiming ‘that’s just the way it is’. In Funny Games, however, 
Haneke does not use the classical Hollywood cinema as a means to an end, but rather reflects 
upon it by subverting it from within. 
 
3.2.2 Funny Games: A Suspense Thriller? 
Funny Games (as well as Funny Games U.S. (2007)) tells the story of an upper-
middle class, nuclear family, Georg, Anna and Georgie (George and Ann in the U.S. 
version), terrorised by two young men, going by the names of Paul and Peter, who intrudes 
the family’s home while on holiday. The film starts with the family driving to their house by 
a lake. They arrive at their luxurious home and settle in, during which Peter appears at their 
front door and asks if he can borrow some eggs. Anna welcomes him and kindly hands him a 
few, which Peter drops and breaks to her dismay. When Anna, trying to hide her increasing 
irritation, gets him a few more eggs, Peter elbows the telephone into the water of the kitchen 
sink. Anna asks Peter to leave and tries to calm down. Their dog, Rolfi (named Lucky in the 
U.S. version) barks non-stop. When Anna goes to calm him, Paul has joined Peter in the 
house. Again, Anna asks them to leave, upon which Georg enters and reprimands his wife for 
being so hostile and unwelcoming. She asks Georg to get them off the premises. Georg 
realises, albeit too late, that something is wrong and Paul hits him with a golf club, breaking 
his leg. They find out that Paul and Peter already killed their dog, which Anna had to find 
during a game of hot and cold. Paul and Peter then take the family hostage and start to play 
sadistic games on them, betting that they will not be alive within twelve hours. At one point, 
Georgie escapes to a neighbouring house, during which a Hitchcockian suspense sequence 
ensues, ending with Georgie firing a shotgun at Paul that fails to go off. Paul takes Georgie 
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back to the house and gives Peter permission to play a counting-out game on the victims that 
would determine who to shoot first. As Paul goes to the kitchen to make a sandwich, Peter 
shoots Georgie. The two intruders flee from the premise, while Anna and Georg are left with 
the consequences. After Georg and Anna try and fathom the death of their child, Anna leaves 
the immobile Georg at home and tries to find help. She attempts to get the attention of 
passing cars during the middle of the night, only to run into Paul and Peter again who 
recapture her. They return to the house and continue their game, after which they shoot Georg 
and take Anna on a lake in a sailboat. They tie her up, throw her overboard to drown and sail 
back to the coast. The film ends as Paul and Peter enter another house, suggesting that they 
are going to repeat their game on a new and unsuspecting family. 
It is clear from the plot outline that Haneke draws heavily from the generic 
conventions of the suspense thriller (Wheatley, 2009:79). Charles Derry defines the suspense 
thriller loosely as a film that “presents a violent and generally murderous antagonism in 
which the protagonist becomes either an innocent victim or a nonprofessional criminal within 
a narrative structure that is significantly unmediated by a traditional figure of detection in a 
central position” (1988:62). While the family is clearly the innocent protagonists and Paul 
and Peter the tormenting, murderous antagonists, both Georgie and Anna are put in positions 
that require them to shoot the imposters. There is no help from the outside world, no police to 
free the victims from their horrific situation. Derry continues by listing binary opposites that 
characterise the suspense thriller genre, such as life/death, good/evil, order/chaos and 
redemption/damnation in a narrative with a “constant emphasis on time” (1988:63). The 
temporal demarcation that Paul and Peter place on the family’s lives heightens the suspense 
and creates a dreaded expectation in the audience, which are “multiply reversed and extended 
before they are fulfilled” (Derry, 1988:63). Georgie’s escape reverses the audience’s dreaded 
expectation by permitting a moment of hope, but his capture extends the audience’s dread. 
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When Paul and Peter leaves and Anna tries to find help, the tormentors’ return extends the 
suspense that was momentarily lifted, adhering to the genre’s promise. Both of these 
sequences contribute to the increasing pace of the film, giving the audience the sense that 
“the narrative is gradually and inexorably tightening” (Derry, 1988:63). 
Derry claims that the suspense thriller is almost exclusively defined in terms of the 
films of Alfred Hitchcock, arguing that they can only be deemed suspense thrillers if they 
somehow relate to “specific works of Hitchcock or general qualities present in his films” 
(1988:8). Wheatley points out how the sub-genre of the family being victimised by an outside 
force is a recurring trope in Hitchcock’s films, such as Shadow of a Doubt (1943), The Birds, 
(1963) and The Man Who Knew too Much (1934/1956) (2009:109). The recurring motives of 
Hitchcock’s suspense thrillers reveal the influence that genre has on the construction of and 
the manner in which the narrative develops. Barry Keith Grant, one of the foremost scholars 
on genre criticism, defines genre movies as “commercial feature films that, through repetition 
and variation, tell familiar stories with familiar characters in familiar situations” (2007:1). 
Funny Games, especially its first thirty minutes, tells the familiar story of a family victimised 
by intruders, similar to films such as Cape Fear (1962/1991), Fatal Attraction (1987) and 
The Hand that Rocks the Cradle (1992). Wheatley notes that, in all of these films, the 
terrorised family consists of three people and a pet, an animal that is usually killed by the 
antagonist. Even though Haneke does not overtly reference these films, Wheatley argues that 
the similarities indicate how formulaic the sub-genres of the suspense thriller are, as well as 
how comprehensively Funny Games reproduces the generic conventions of the suspense 
thriller (2009:81,109). Thomas Schatz explains that, since genre draws from familiar 
formulas, it provides a collection of expressions for filmmakers and an array of experiences 
for audiences. Since filmmakers and viewers have become sensitive to the genre’s range of 
expression, the previous contact that they had with the genre have “coalesced into a system of 
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value-laden narrative conventions”, a system in which characters perform actions and 
celebrate values that the audience are all too familiar with (Schatz, 2009:568).  Genre, thus, 
similar to the classical Hollywood structure, is an automatism that provides filmmakers with 
the means to construct a film as a thrilling end in itself. 
The first thirty minutes of Funny Games neatly settles the audience into the suspense 
thriller genre, creating and affirming the expectations that the hordes of previous suspense 
thrillers have taught them. The audience’s thorough schooling in both television and prior 
suspense films results in what Theodor Adorno calls a pre-established attitudinal pattern, 
which determines the manner in which the content will be interpreted (1957:482). In 
believing that the film is a generic suspense thriller, the audience of Funny Games are not 
reading the horrific victimisation of the family through their own life experience, but rather 
through their previous experience of suspense thrillers. The first thirty minutes help the 
audience to recognise the suspense thriller’s familiar cultural arena and troupes: the family of 
three and a pet being victimised by outsiders. Since these genres usually end with the defeat 
of the imposing threat (as is the case in Cape Fear, Fatal Attraction and The Hand that Rocks 
the Cradle, in which the antagonists are killed), audiences are thus “fairly certain how the 
game will be played and how it will end” (Schatz, 2009:572). The manner in which the 
conflicts that have disturbed the protagonists are resolved, whether temporarily or 
permanently, are, for Schatz, the most significant aspect of the genre film. The narratives of 
genre films are escapist as it repeatedly asserts that conflicts and struggles that threaten a 
community can be solved favourably (2009:572). Schatz argues that a popular film audience 
have shared needs and expectations that draw them to the cinema. Since genre films resolve 
basic cultural conflicts, audiences enjoy genre films as it “celebrates our collective 
sensibilities, providing an array of ideological strategies for negotiating social conflicts” 
(Schatz, 2009:572). Even though the different films within a genre will present variations on 
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a cultural theme or conflict, as well as different ways of reaching a resolution, the closure is 
“generally as familiar as the community and its characters” (Schatz, 2009:572). Schatz’s 
comments are reiterated by Robin Wood, who likewise points out that a striking and 
persistent phenomena of classical Hollywood cinema is the happy ending, often serving as a 
mere “‘emergency exit’ […] for the spectator, a barely plausible pretence that the problem of 
the film has raised are now resolved” (Wood, 2009:594). 
The generic systems that enable spectators to recognise and understand the narrative, 
as well as render the film intelligible and explicable, also involves a knowledge of “various 
regimes of verisimilitude” (Neale, 2012:179). Neale explains that verisimilitude entails that 
which is probable, likely and plausible, which, in the case of genre, would mean that an 
audience’s previous knowledge of regimes of verisimilitude would guide them in 
understanding the rules, norms and laws that govern the world in which the characters find 
themselves (2012:179). In Funny Games, the plausibility that the three family members will 
die is unlikely, since such a result is contrary to the previous suspense thrillers that they have 
seen. The norms and rules that govern the world of the characters in Funny Games entail that, 
no matter what, that Paul and Peter will be defeated and that the family’s threatened world 
will be restored.  
 
3.2.3 Drawing from Counter-Cinema 
An important model that Haneke draws from in order to subvert the codes and 
conventions of the suspense thriller is the radical principles of counter-cinema. In direct 
contrast to classical Hollywood, counter-cinema is a type of cinema that “questions and 
subverts existing cinematic codes and conventions” (Hayward, 2013:93). It is a cinema that 
draws attention to itself, exposes continuity and deconstructs contiguity, as spectators are 
“intentionally distanced by these practices so they ‘can see what is really there’ and reflect 
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upon it rather than be seduced into false illusionism” (Hayward, 2013:94). Film theorists such 
as Peter Wollen20 and filmmakers such as Jean-Luc Godard and Agnès Varda invented the 
term in order to categorise a filmmaking system that responded to the domination of classical 
Hollywood cinema (Hayward, 2013:94). In the essay “Godard and Counter-Cinema: Vent 
d’est”, Wollen tabulates the “seven deadly sins of cinema” and the “seven cardinal virtues”, 









 Counter-cinema, thus, actively opposes mainstream cinema and offers an alternative 
to the discourses of mainstream cinema. Counter-cinematic films, however, are extremely 
formalist and difficult to watch, which results in two problems. Firstly, the rationality with 
which counter-cinema operates places audiences in a cold and fixed position vis-à-vis the 
spectacle, keeping them from considering their own position. Secondly, it attempts to liberate 
audiences from Hollywood’s illusionism without drawing from the interpellative structures 
and techniques it stems from, thus ignoring audiences role as consumers of mainstream film 
(Wheatley, 2009:86). 
																																																								
20 Peter Wollen is a film theorist, filmmaker and writer of Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (1972), who 
merged structuralist and semiotic film theory in order to reflect upon his various concerns with film, such as 
feminism, sexuality, the social construction of identity, experimental aesthetics and politics (Braudy and Cohen, 
2009:418). He also co-wrote and co-directed six films with Laura Mulvey, among others Riddles of the Sphinx 
(1977), in which they applied counter cinema techniques (Wheatley, 2009:52). 
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Funny Games neither follows the generic conventions of a suspense thriller through to 
the end, nor does it solely implement the practices of counter-cinema to its full effect. 
Wheatley points out that the majority of Haneke’s films from Funny Games onwards, draw 
from the generic conventions only in order to subvert them, usually through the principles of 
counter-cinema. The films of Haneke that are based on genre, such as Funny Games which I 
will use as example, not only ironises the generic conventions from which it stems, but also 
places the spectator “in a more immediately responsive position than the counter-cinematic 
principles of pure negation of mainstream convention allow” (Wheatley, 2009:80). The tools 
of classical Hollywood cinema and genre conventions are therefore mobilised only in order to 
deconstruct it (Wheatley, 2009:86). 
An example of a counter-cinematic technique, the virtue of estrangement, happens at 
the twenty-eight minute mark, in which a character addresses the audience directly (Wollen, 
1972:420). When Paul plays a hot and cold game with Anna so that she can find the dog, he 
looks into the camera and winks. 
This breaking of the fourth wall is a Brechtian technique in which an actor steps out 
of character in order to address the audience directly (Brady, 2006:314). The film continues 
Figure 8: Paul winks at the audience 
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up until the forty-two minute mark, when Paul makes a bet with the family that they will not 
be alive in twelve hours’ time. He turns his attention to the camera and addresses the 
audience, in a much more radical sense than his previous address, asking them “What do you 
think? Do you think they have a chance of winning? Who will you bet on?” (Funny Games).  
The alienation technique does not, however, alienate the audience in the same manner that a 
counter-cinematic film would, since the first thirty minutes (apart from the first address) have 
already adhered to the rules of a classic, Hollywood suspense thriller. The audience are made 
uncomfortable with Paul’s address, since they expect that the narrative will conform to the 
generic conventions of the suspense thriller. Yet, just as spectators become aware of 
themselves in relation to the cinematic image through the address, Haneke reverts back to 
classical Hollywood filmmaking, evident in the sequence when Georgie escapes to a 
neighbouring house, keeping the audience emotionally invested in the fate of the characters.  
 
3.2.4 Georgie’s Death and the Rewinding of the Diegetic World 
There are two main sequences on which I will focus on that subvert the audience’s 
prescribed, generic expectations. The first of which is the murder of Georgie. At a certain 
point, Georgie succeeds in escaping from the tormentors. He runs to a neighbouring house (a 
family which Paul and Peter have already killed). Paul chases after Georgie into the house, in 
which a Hitchcockian sequence ensues. Tension builds as Georgie treads on the creaking 
floorboards of the house, while Paul attempts to find him, his shadow lurking beneath the 
closed doors. As Georgie finds a shotgun and Paul puts heavy metal music on, the editing 
quickens and the close-ups tighten on the characters. During the chase, a cutback to Anna and 
Georg continues their situation with Peter, a crossover editing technique that is typical of the 
suspense thriller (Wheatley, 2009:90). Georgie’s escape, however, ends on an anti-climactic 
note. When Paul eventually finds him, Georgie points the shotgun at him and pulls the 
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trigger. The gun, however, does not go off and Georgie is taken back to Anna and Georg. 
This anti-climactic moment still, however, adheres to the suspense thriller genre. Even 
though the expected cathartic moment proved to be false, the sequence only serves to 
frustrate the audience’s hope and reignite their sense of tension (Wheatley, 2009:91). Paul 
then orders Peter to play a counting out game on the family in order to determine who to 
shoot first. Paul leaves the scene to make a sandwich, during which the audience hears a 
gunshot go off. Haneke then cuts to a close-up of a bloodied television, guffaws and moaning 
heard off-screen, with Paul and Peter announcing their exit. 
What follows is a long take of ten and a half minutes, revealing the loser of the 
counting out game, as Georgie’s body is sprawled across the floor. The death of Georgie 
contravenes an unwritten Hollywood narrative rule that children are never killed in a 
suspense thriller, as it is too “emotionally unsettling for an audience to absorb within the 
limits of the pleasure drive” (Wheatley, 2009:92). Moreover, Hollywood films usually tend to 
use violence or death as “a cathartic punch line that snaps the intricately crafted spell of 
suspense…[in which] the dead are forgotten before the bodies even hit the ground” (Pevere, 
1997). Haneke, however, does not forget or shy away from Georgie’s sprawled-out body. He 
confronts the audience with a long take that forces them to scrutinise, deconstruct and 
contemplate the “structure of the representational strategies that informed the creation of this 
image” (Wheatley, 2009:93). The duration of the take allows the audience to witness the 
immediate consequences of the death of Georg and Anna’s child. Likewise, the long take 
serves as a contrast to the rapid editing that preceded Georgie’s death, ignoring the rules of 
the suspense thriller and making the audience uncomfortable. The audience’s selfish desire to 
enjoy a narrative situated within the suspense thriller genre is thwarted. By making the 
audience uncomfortable, Haneke is making them aware of the reality of violence: bodies do 
not magically disappear. Real death is traumatising and violence is not supposed to be 
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enjoyed at the cost of those families who have, in real-life, been tortured and murdered. The 
audience thus experiences discomfort by having to engage with “a set of emotions unfamiliar 
to the genre” (Wheatley, 2009:92).  
Wheatley argues that the aftermath of Georgie’s death to be a ‘benign’ form of 
reflexivity, echoing the approaches of Robert Bresson and Chantal Akerman, a self-conscious 
style that “allows the spectator time to reflect on the image and thus distances them from the 
action on-screen” (2009:94). The second modernist sequence, however, is much more 
antagonistic. Wheatley calls the rewind sequence in Funny Games a form of aggressive 
reflexivity, recalling the modernist works of Jean-Luc Godard, which is not so much 
concerned with distancing the spectator, but rather emphasises the spectator’s proximity to 
the cinematic action (2009:95). After Paul and Peter recapture Anna and return her to the 
house, they play their final game with her. He tells her that “[w]e’re not up to feature length 
film yet”, looks at the audience again and says: “Is that enough? But you want a real ending, 
with plausible plot development, don’t you?” (Funny Games). He turns back to Anna and 
orders her to recite a prayer, first normally and then back to front. Anna, however, sees the 
shotgun lying on the table. She grabs it, points the gun at Peter and fires, hurling him to the 
wall, a bloody spectacle. Paul snatches the shotgun from Anna and shouts frantically: 
“Where’s the remote? Where’s the fucking remote control?” He searches hysterically, finds 
the remote and presses the rewind button. The whole frame freezes for about three seconds 
and the entire sequence rewinds up to Anna’s prayer recital, summoning Peter back to life. 
The frame freezes for three seconds again and replays Paul’s instructions to Anna. When she 
attempts to grab the shotgun again, Paul snatches it before her, shaking his head, saying: 
“You shouldn’t have done that, Anna. One doesn’t break the rules. Sorry. You’ve failed.” 













Peter’s (momentary) death, similar to Georgie’s escape earlier, serves as another 
cathartic release for the audience. The blast from Anna’s gun results in a violent and bloody 
spectacle, matching the horror and gore of commercial Hollywood action flicks (Wheatley, 
2009:97). The sequence also contains the only on-screen violence and verbal obscenity in the 
film. At the film’s premiere at Cannes the audience’s collective sigh of relief was both 
audible and tangible (Eisenman, 2010:128). Finally, it seems, Haneke is playing according to 
the rules of the classic Hollywood cinema and the conventions of the suspense thriller. The 
audience believes that their expectations have finally been met and anticipation fulfilled, yet, 
by pressing the rewind button, Paul destroys the diegetic world that the audience believed in 
(Rhodes, 2010:96). Suspense thrillers are only entertaining if they meet the expectations of 
the audience. The good and innocent protagonists have to win the evil intruders, since genre 
films promise that the threats are usually killed. The antagonists in Cape Fear, Fatal 
Attraction and The Hand that Rocks the Cradle all meet a sticky end, similar to Peter’s 
sudden and grotesque death. Anna’s unexpected opportunity to exact revenge on the 
intruders, who have been winning their games for most of the film’s running time, serves as a 
Figure 9: Peter is (momentarily) killed by Anna 
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cinematic signpost that signals to the audience that the built-up tension can finally be 
released. What is more final than death? The intruders simply cannot recover from this. Yet, 
Haneke’s radical decision to rewind the scene not only shatters the cathartic release, but also 
incriminates the audience’s perverse thirst for violence. The rewind sequence, although an 
aggressive and radical technique that (probably) alienates the audience too much, is Haneke’s 
way of refusing the audience pleasure in witnessing Peter’s death. The audience realises that 
they do not have privileged control over the narrative in Funny Games, a false belief of 
sagacity that was taught by previous suspense thrillers (Wheatley, 2009:98).  
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
The questions that Paul addresses to the audience expose our perverse desire: what 
exactly do we want from the film? Do we want to be assured that goodness will, 
simplistically, always prevail over evil, that the conflict in Funny Games will be solved and 
thus reaffirm our faith in the simplistic nature of reality? While genre films provide audience 
with narrative sagacity that exceeds that of the diegetic characters, and counter-cinema 
distanced its audience into a cold and fixed position, Funny Games allures the audience with 
its generic structure yet ruptures the created expectations through distancing techniques. Even 
though the film is an extreme example of how Haneke draws from both classical Hollywood 
cinema and counter-cinema in order to get an audience both emotionally invested and reflect 
on the film, he does refine his approach to greater success in Caché, which also draws 
heavily from the suspense thriller genre. Nevertheless, Funny Games is an example in which 
the exchange between the narrative forms of classical Hollywood cinema and counter-cinema 
are easiest to outline and identify. The rest of his oeuvre, in a much more nuanced way, enter 
into “dialogue with and draw upon existing narrative forms and genre conventions in order to 
generate a new spectatorial experience which focuses on the spectator’s ethical position in 
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relation to the film” (Wheatley, 2009:87-88). The rupturing of the audience’s expectations, 
learned from previous experiences with similar films, are an integral part of Haneke’s 
filmmaking model that aims to implicate and enable audiences to take part in the meaning-
making process. In this way, the automatism of genre is reflected upon to implicate the 
audience. 
 
3.3 The Image and the Edit: Continuity Editing and the Long Take in Code 
 Unknown  
3.3.1 Introduction 
In the notes he wrote for 71 Fragments, Haneke outlines his approach to the image 
and editing. As I have discussed in the second chapter, the influence of television on filmic 
practices have resulted in a rapid flow of attractive images that provide “linear information 
which can be quickly consumed and checked off” (Haneke, 2000:173). Advertisements, for 
example, make it difficult for viewers to recognise that what is being shown, since adverts 
have established the timing standard in which information can be communicated to its 
recipients (Haneke, 2000:173). Audiences, however, need time to understand what they are 
seeing, a requirement that the accelerated images of television disallow (Haneke in Sharrett, 
2010:568). For Haneke, however, the long take is an aesthetic means that enables audiences 
to become potential partners in the film, refusing easy and speedy consumption. The use of 
the long take that preceded Georgie’s death, for example, is a manifestation of real-time that 
disturbs viewers accustomed to the speed of mainstream films and television, especially if the 
scene’s content in a long take confronts them with a difficult subject matter that audiences 
have learned to suppress. By confronting the audience with, for instance, the horrific reality 
of violence in a take that resembles real-time, the contents thereof will become real and felt, 
instead of “being merely registered as information to be checked off” (Haneke, 2000:174). 
	 92 
Code Unknown tells the story of an actress named Anne who attempts to avoid the 
violence in Paris. Her boyfriend is a war photographer named Georges while his brother Jean 
comes in a dispute with Amadou for dumping trash onto a beggar’s lap. The beggar, named 
Maria, gets deported after the police intervene in the dispute. The film follows these 
characters as they struggle to avoid and navigate themselves through the violence, frustration, 
xenophobia and Babylonian confusion of languages in modern-day Paris. Haneke wishes, 
however, to avoid reducing and isolate the film to a single theme, since it would lead one to 
think along the lines of clichés and banalities (Haneke, 2005(a)). The film, similar to 71 
Fragments, have black spacers that divide sequences, consisting of long takes that are shot 
from a single perspective. Haneke asked a series of questions to guide his construction of the 
film, asking whether the “truth [is] the sum of what we see and hear”, if reality can truly be 
represented and what makes a represented object “real, credible, or more precisely, worthy of 
being believed?” (Haneke, 2005(a)). Haneke’s use of the long take addresses these questions, 
which I approach by focusing on how Haneke uses long takes and standard Hollywood 
editing in the segments that deal with Anne, pointing out how Haneke uses the form of the 
image and editing to reflect on the automatism thereof. Instead of providing a generic reading 
of the film’s famed opening tracking shot, I am rather going to focus on two sequences that 
follow one another, separated by a scene in a car. Similar to drawing from both classical 
Hollywood cinema and counter-cinema, Haneke juxtaposes two suspense sequences in which 
the one employs standard editing techniques, while the other takes place through a static long 
take. Haneke’s contrast of both standard cuts and long takes is a clearer example of how he is 
reflecting upon the automatisms of editing. 
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3.3.2 The Swimming Pool Sequence: Classical Hollywood Editing 
During a visit to Georges’ father on the farm, Anne says that she just finished a 
thriller called The Collector. Later in the film, after a sequence that depicts Maria crying over 
losing her chance to get a work permit, Anne emerges from a swimming pool with a man. 
The editing immediately kicks in, comfortably shifting between shot/reverse shots, a 
technique “most commonly used for dialogue” (Hayward, 2013:331), as Anne and her lover 
splash, banter and play with each other in medium-close up. When Anne pushes him 
underwater and looks off-screen, her expression changes. “Pierrot!” she screams, a reverse 
shot revealing a long shot of a small boy climbing on top of a wall. The next shot shows the 
man coming up for air and looking over to where Anne’s attention is, another reverse shot 
revealing the boy on the edge. The camera then shifts across the 180-degree line to a close-up 
of Pierrot, while the man orders him not to move and swims to the pool edge. A point of view 
shot reveals the ground below, situating Pierrot on top of a high apartment block. The camera 
zooms in to the ground far below and cuts to an extreme close-up of Pierrot’s eyes, after 
which he suddenly slips. The next cut shows the man and Anne climbing out of the pool, 
running to him from opposite directions. The slide door that the man attempts to open does 
not budge. Anne runs around another way while the man continues to struggles with the door. 
He looks screen right as a cut reveals Pierrot holding onto the ledge while his leg dangles 
over the edge. Anne runs closer, the boy still holding on. Finally, a long shot that zooms into 
medium shot reveals the man pulling Pierrot to safety. After the two lovers chide Pierrot and 
embrace one another after the intense moment, another cut shows a different setting and time. 
Suddenly an off-screen voice commands, “Let’s stop there”. The image freezes and the man 
from the swimming pool and Anne stand up from below the screen as the camera pulls back 
into a sound studio, revealing that what we just witnessed was a projected film on a screen.  
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Figure 10: Classical Hollywood editing in Code Unknown 
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Similar to Funny Games, Haneke draws from generic conventions to construct a 
thrilling sequence in order to reveal the “tension between his own modernist methods and 
those of mainstream commercial cinema” (Wheatley, 2009:122). No narrative signal informs 
the audience after Maria’s segment that the swimming pool sequence is a film within Code 
Unknown. Wheatley points out that, if we were alert spectators, we would have recognised 
that the sequence differs drastically from the rest of the film’s style (2009:122). Yet, the 
standard Hollywood editing, with the shot/reverse shots, zooming and point of view shots, 
activates our myriad of previous experiences with these techniques. How many spectators 
did, immediately, notice the difference in style? If the change in style goes unnoticed, the 
scene’s different construction proves how inured and accustomed we have become to 
traditional forms of editing.  
The sequence, comprising of twenty-four shots, are constructed along the rules of 
continuity editing, a style that “follows the logic of a chronological narrative” in which time 
and space are “logically and unproblematically represented” (Hayward, 2013:119). The 
beginning and ending are clearly demarcated: the lovebirds embracing in the pool, the two 
embracing after being traumatised by Pierrot’s brush with death. The film does not draw 
attention to itself through the ‘invisible’ editing, offering a “seamless, spatially and 
temporally coherent narrative” (Hayward, 2013:119). Husband and wife cajoles in the pool, 
their son climbs onto the wall, the ground beckons twenty stories below, they see him, he 
slips, they rush to him, he struggles to get back up and they save him. The production of a 
linear text is a style that Hayward most readily associates with classical Hollywood cinema 
(2013:120). The style produces a key effect she defines as seamlessness, whereby audiences 
are not made aware of the editing, but rather “presented with a narrative that is edited in such 
a way that it appears to have no breaks, no disconcerting unexplained transitions in time and 
space” (Hayward, 2013:120). The seamlessness of continuity editing masks, however, both 
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the labour that goes into manufacturing a film and, consequently, the ideological effect 
thereof. The unwritten rule that prohibits the killing of children in suspense thrillers, that 
Funny Games breaks, are upheld in the film within Code Unknown: Pierrot does not fall from 
the building. His safety is, however, momentarily jeopardised in order to create a thrilling 
sequence. The continuity editing thus, in this instance, presents the spectator with an 
idealistic reality: parents will always catch their children in time. Absurdly, Anne’s character 
immediately draws a lesson from her son’s near fatal fall, telling the man during their 
embrace that she’s afraid for Pierrot’s life and cannot live on the twentieth floor any longer. 
The whole sequence also places the spectator in an all-knowing position. One moment the 
audience is in intimate close-up with the characters, the next moment they see the beckoning 
ground far below Pierrot. Audiences thus have a sense of unitary vision, providing them with 
what they believe to be supremacy, since “it’s all there, so I know everything that is going 
on” (Hayward, 2013:120).  
 
3.3.3 The Subway Scene: Classical Modernist Style 
 Haneke does not use classical Hollywood editing only to manipulate his audience. 
Rather, he mobilises the techniques in order to expose its manipulative function (Wheatley, 
2009:87). While the whole swimming pool sequence takes place in two minutes, one minute 
for the intense scene and the other for the embracing and moral lesson afterwards, the next 
sequence takes place over five and a half minutes. A deep focus and static shot reveals 
various people entering a subway carriage. On the opposite end are two men, standing 
upright. The one whistles and says “Excuse me, aren’t you a top model? Honestly, with your 
looks, you just have to be in that line” (Code Unknown). Upon closer inspection, the back of 
a woman’s head is visible in the farthest seat. She does not respond to the young man’s 
address. After more than a minute of constant taunts and mockery while his friends laughs, 
	 97 
the woman eventually stands up (finally visible as Anne), moves to the foreground of the 
carriage and sits in front of the camera. While the man continues his verbal abuse, the rest of 
the passengers nervously try to ignore the harassment. He comes and stands in front of her, 
asking “Now what will you do? Stand me up again? Hop off into the next car? It’s too 
easy…” (Code Unknown). Anne continues to ignore him, averting his gaze. After a while he 
sits next to her as the subway slowly comes to a halt. Just as the doors open, he turns, spits 
Anne in the face and dashes out of the car. An older man sitting on the opposite side reacts 
and trips the harasser. He returns and calls the old man a jerk. The old man takes off his 
glasses, gives them to Anne and threatens the young man. He retaliates into the corner, off-
screen from the camera. The train pulls away again and they sit through another 
uncomfortable ride to the next stop in silence. When the subway comes to a halt again, the 
young harasser says off-screen “I’ll see you around. Don’t worry” and exits the train. Just 
before it closes, he hollers at them, making them jump. Anne bursts into tears as the train 
pulls away again. She musters a thank you to the old man next to her. The scene continues for 







Figure  11:  Long take of Anne in the subway in Code Unknown 
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The camera barely moves from its static position and retains its deep focus throughout 
the duration of its five and a half minutes. The deep focus allows the audience to read the 
scene without being manipulated, stitched into the narrative or guided by continuity editing 
(Hayward, 2013:121). The sequence stands in complete antithesis to the preceding swimming 
pool sequence, exchanging the traditional, Hollywood editing for a more classically 
modernist style (Wheatley, 2009:122). If one mapped, for example, the spatial relations more 
intricately in the swimming pool sequence, it would be clear that time is invariably stretched 
out and chopped away in its two-minute duration. In the subway sequence, however, time 
becomes manifest. While many contested definitions of the long take exist, David Bordwell 
and Kirstin Thompson define a long take as “one run of the camera that records a single shot” 
(2013:211) and Donato Totaro, in his thesis on the long take, accepts a long take’s duration 
as being twenty-five seconds or longer (2001:10). Even though long takes may involve 
tracking, craning, zooming and panning, the camera never moves in Haneke’s subway scene. 
Steven Spielberg argues that when a long take is used in a film, the director is giving the 
audience the role of editor as the “audience selects who (or what) they look at while a scene 
is being played” (Spielberg in Bordwell and Thompson, 2013:214). At first, the audience is 
straining to see at whom the young man is aiming his insults, an act that enhances their 
agency and participation in the scene. Audiences are not subjected to a series of edited close-
ups or rapid cuts, but are rather allowed to choose what they look at. Bazin addresses the 
influence of the long take (or ‘depth of focus’ as he refers to) as it affects the “relationship of 
the minds of the spectators to the image, and in consequence it influences the interpretation 
of the spectacle” (1946:50). By subjecting the spectator to an unedited and (more or less) 
unmediated look at the world, the long take will “in the end […] lay bare for you all it’s 
cruelty and ugliness […] in which the image is evaluated not according to what it adds to 
reality but what it reveals of it” (1946:45). The use of the long take thus introduces a moral 
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dimension to the film, since it has the ability to activate audience participation without the 
subjective influence of an editor. For Bazin, the long take encapsulates three important 
functions. Firstly, the long take narrows the distance between the spectator and the image, 
reflecting his or her experience of reality. Due to the manifestation of time, the long take’s 
construct is more in tune with reality and thus more realistic. Secondly, the long take (as I 
have mentioned before) provides the spectator with a more active role and enables him or her 
to participate. Spectators are offered a degree of personal choice as their attention and will 
contribute to the reading of the sequence. Finally, while montage compromises the ambiguity 
of a scene, the long take introduces and maintains ambiguity as the “uncertainty in which we 
find ourselves as to the spiritual key or the interpretation we should put on the film is built 
into the very design of the image” (Bazin, 1946:50). 
The single, long take of the subway scene minimises the image’s ability to manipulate 
the audience. What is perhaps most interesting about this scene is its refusal to depict the 
conflict from a specific character’s vantage point or perspective. In contrast to continuity 
editing, the audience is not offered any sense of unitary vision or spectatorial supremacy. 
Even though Anne is one of the main characters in the film, the audience is implicated into 
the scene before they identify her as the victim of the verbal assault. What the audience relate 
to instead, if anything, are the other passengers who, like them, are spectators to the 
harassment. After becoming as uncomfortable as the passengers, Anne reveals herself and 
moves to sit directly opposite the camera (and thus the audience), an effect, which Wheatley 
argues, implicates the audience even more due to her close proximity and on-profile position 
(2009:122). The long take thus achieves a much stronger emotional response from the 
audience than the manipulative editing of the swimming pool scene, since the audience both 
fear for Anne’s part and, since they are paralleled on-screen by the diegetic passengers as 
spectators, feel guilty for being complicit in witnessing the harassment without acting on the 
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situation. The emotion involved in witnessing this sequence is thus much more disturbing and 
complex than the pleasurable suspense evoked by the swimming pool scene (Wheatley, 
2009:122). Audiences are not entertained with thrilling suspense from a distance, but are 
rather implicated and made aware of their passive viewing situation. 
The long take in the subway lacks any bright colours and symbolic framing. Some of 
the steel poles of the carriage obstruct our view, while parts of the old man’s face is covered 
by a headrest. The other passengers in the car neither draw our attention nor are they 
positioned in such a way that they are easily visible, many of who are sitting with their backs 
to the camera. The subway sequence, in its banality, encapsulates the mise-en-scène that 
Haneke uses throughout his oeuvre, from The Seventh Continent up to Amour. They are not 
known for their beauty or magnificence. Instead, Haneke opts for muddied and opaque 
images, by scraping away the lacquer of attractiveness. Beautiful and interesting pictures, for 
him, does not belong in cinema, but rather in an art gallery, for it is only in its context that 
banal images acquire dignity and beauty (Haneke, 2000:173). Beautiful cinematic images are 
usually, for Haneke, devoid of mental-tension, while the aesthetic of advertising has become 
the goal and trademark of cinema. He continues:  
Since all of us are inundated with artificial pictures of a ‘beautified’ reality, 
one of the most difficult challenges of filmmaking requires that we maintain 
an unencumbered eye for the reality-value of a picture (2000:173). 
 
A ‘beautified’ reality in cinema has, in fact, become even more prevalent since 
Haneke wrote his critique. In the year that Code Unknown was released, O Brother, Where 
Art Thou (2000) was the first film that was wholly subjected to digital correction during post-
production (Prince, 2004:28). Cinematographer Roger Deakins spent ten weeks in digital 
post-production working on the colour timing of the film. Colour timing, or what has since 
developed into digital grading, entails providing filmmakers with the ability of a painter, thus 
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controlling the “fine details of colour, shading, contrast, filtration and other attributes of the 
image – within images that can otherwise appear naturalistic” (Prince, 2004:28). Colour 
timing is a powerful editing tool that, for example, provided O Brother with a postcard, 
dustbowl and sepia look, draining the sky of its colour (Prince, 2004:28). On a much smaller 
scale, even Instagram provides ordinary smartphone users with a variety of editing tools and 
filters to embellish and enhance their digital photographs. Since mainstream cinema and our 
edited photographs bear little resemblance to their counterpart in reality, Haneke’s films 
certainly serve as an antithesis to the beautified images we have grown accustomed to.  
 
3.3.4 Is Cinema Inherently Manipulative? 
In an interview with Christopher Sharrett, Haneke explains how he constructed Code 
Unknown through mostly static sequences by limiting each shot from only one perspective, 
because he did not want to “patronise or manipulate the viewer, or at least to the smallest 
degree possible” (Haneke in Sharrett, 2010:587). He goes on to point out that cinema, no 
matter what, will always be a manipulative medium. Every creative decision made by the 
filmmaker that determines the position of the camera is manipulative to an extent. Wheatley 
uses the example of a security camera being placed by a specific someone, in a specific place, 
at a specific angle, aimed at a specific area to point out that all those factors will determine 
what the security camera will eventually record (2009:120). Like the final image produced by 
a security camera in Benny’s Video, the shot still shows Georg and Anna in long shot from a 
high angle. As Cavell points out, as I already mentioned, photography crops the world it 
records, thereby cutting the rest of the world out and thus making the implied presence of the 
unseen world “as essential in the experience of a photograph as what it explicitly presents” 
(1979:24). What you look at is still predetermined by the photographer or filmmaker. The 
responsibility of the filmmaker, for Haneke, is thus to minimise the level of manipulation you 
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subject your audience to. Even though Haneke selects what his audience looks at (a subway 
carriage), his use of long takes eliminates, at least, the manipulation of time, as filmic time 
will thus approximate real time (we sit with Anne and the passengers for the whole duration 
of the journey). In terms of the spatial relations and time in the swimming pool sequence, its 
unclear how the man gets to Pierrot before Anne’s character, even though she seems to be 
running longer. In shots that are edited, time is manipulated by being either shortened or 
stretched, or perhaps, as in the swimming pool sequence, a combination of both. Haneke’s 
preference of using continuous long takes is his way of “bowing before the spectator” 
(Haneke, 2000), showing respect and allowing them to take part in its meaning. By avoiding 
the false harmonisation provided by standard or continuity editing, Haneke’s long takes 
achieve accuracy, which, he argues, prevail over beauty. Additionally, the long takes should 
“not flaunt their own complexity” (Haneke, 2000), since attention to the construction of the 
scene would shift attention away from its content.  
It is thus clear that Haneke argues against Bazin’s statement of the long take 
achieving a sense of realism (see Bazin, 1946:45). Bazin’s claim that long takes capture 
reality as it happens is at odds with Haneke’s ideas. Cinema, for Haneke, can never represent 
reality in toto. Instead, film must be seen and used as a medium that serves as a model of 
reality, since “reality is too complex to capture” (Haneke, 2014). Haneke’s position reflects 
Cavell’s own disagreement with Bazin, as I have pointed out earlier, that the medium of film 
is a photograph of reality and not reality itself (1979:16). Haneke’s decision of juxtaposing 
two different editing systems, one driven by continuity and the other by a modernist style, is 
to draw attention to the artificiality of the former, while revealing the lesser degree of 
artificiality of the latter. No matter how ‘realistic’ a film, no matter how closely one attempts 
to follow real-life, cinema “is always manipulative, never ‘objective’, in a Bazinian sense” 
(Wheatley, 2009:120). The aim of contrasting these two different constructions is thus to 
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create a “space between film and filmic interpellation in which the viewer can make a 
cognitive analysis of what they are seeing” (Wheatley, 2009:120). He is reflecting on the 
automatisms of editing techniques, revealing its construction and the audience’s implication 
therein. Haneke made clear that he hopes Code Unknown will reveal the kind of traps that 
audiences fall into when watching a film that utilises the tropes of continuity editing, arguing 




Haneke reflects on the automatism of film editing by contrasting two scenes, the first 
of which depends on continuity editing, while the other takes a more modernist stylistic 
approach. The additional effect of reducing montage to a minimum and using a single take is 
to “shift responsibility back to the viewer in that more contemplation is required” (Haneke in 
Sharrett, 2010:587). The subway carriage presents us, like the rest of the film, with a different 
experience than that of mainstream cinema. The audience is allowed more freedom in 
choosing what to look at and thereby enabled to play the role of editor. What begins in 
liberty, however, ends in obligation, since the presentation of the world through a long take 
requires us to become responsible towards that we are witnessing (Rhodes, 2010:90).  
 
3.4 The Use of Music in The Piano Teacher and Sound in Time of the Wolf 
3.4.1 Introduction: Music and Sound in the Cinema 
 Walter Murch, the film editor and sound designer of well-known films such a The 
Conversation (1974) and Apocalypse Now (1979), draws a parallel between a foetus’s 
development and an audience’s perception of sound in cinema. Four and a half months after 
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conception, the foetus’s listening faculty is activated, meaning that, for the next four and a 
half months, sound is the foetus’s only guide to the surrounding world. Since the enclosed 
and liquid world of the womb keeps the foetus from seeing and smelling, while hinting only 
to what taste and touch might entail, foetuses “luxuriate in a continuous bath of sounds: the 
song of our mother’s voice, the swash of her breathing, the piping of her intestines, the 
timpani of her heart” (Murch, 2000). Birth, however, immediately ignites the other four 
senses. Sight, the strongest of the five, overthrows sound’s reign and appoints himself King 
over the rest of the senses, resulting in sound pulling a “veil of oblivion across her reign and 
[withdrawing] into the shadows” (Murch, 2000). Why does hearing not dominate our life, 
since it was the first sense to be activated and developed? Murch finds it mystifying that, 
even though it was the first sense acquired by human beings, hearing seems to take a 
backseat, accompanying and supplementing what we see rather than the other way around. 
The same situation, Murch argues, characterises the relationship between sight and sound in 
the cinema. Even though the birth of cinema experienced an inversion of biological 
development, the visuals preceding the arrival of sound, Murch argues that sound has not 
enjoyed the same analysis as the visuals in cinema. Film sound is rarely appreciated by itself, 
but rather serves only to enhance the visuals, making “whatever virtues sound brings to film 
[to be] largely perceived and appreciated by the audience in visual terms – the better the 
sound, the better the image” (Murch in Chion, 1990:viii). 
Cavell speculates that the difference between visual and auditory transcriptions is that 
we “are fully accustomed to hearing things that are invisible, not present to us, not present 
with us” (1979:18). Is this perhaps due to our experience of sound as a foetus? Sound as the 
doorway to the world? That we trust sound, even though we have no idea where it comes 
from? The foetus has no framework or context to place, form or contextualise the sounds that 
penetrate the womb. The disposition of the foetus perhaps echoes Cavell’s statement that 
	 105 
“our access to another world is normally through voices from it; and why a man can be 
spoken to by God and survive, but not if he sees God, in which case he is no longer in this 
world” (1979:18). Even though the value of our hearing and listening faculty might be 
underestimated, its function carries more significance than audiences realise. Haneke points 
out that audiences’ listening faculty are profoundly more sensitive than their viewing 
abilities, arguing that “the ear provides a more direct path to the imagination and to the heart 
of human beings” (2000:174). Since the flood of images on television and various media 
weaken the audience’s susceptibility of the visual domain, Haneke believes it to be 
increasingly difficult to create images that leave a strong impression and evoke a reaction 
from the audience. While the long take certainly adds to Haneke’s aim of making images 
more perceptible, images still limit the scope of the audience’s imagination, while the 
soundtrack, however, “gives the spectators more freedom to imagine their own picture” 
(2000:174). 
The two aspects of sound, non-diegetic and diegetic, are employed by Haneke in 
different ways to activate the audience’s imagination. Haneke rarely uses non-diegetic music 
or sound in his films. When music is used, however, it is either diegetically motivated or 
flows into the next scene, separated in time and space from the scene in which the diegetic 
music originated from. Silence, however, forms a major part in the soundscapes of his films. 
Elsie Walker argues that Haneke’s sparse use of music, or even absence thereof, contributes 
to the nature of his films as ‘interrogative texts’. Interrogative texts, similar to modernist 
artworks, are texts that aim to destabilise spectators, shake them out of complacency in order 
to “interrogate the medium itself and, by extension, to question dominant ideology” (Walker, 
2010:23). Haneke forces his audience to resort to the act of listening through the use of sound 
taking place off-screen, minimal sound effects and the absence of musical cues that guide the 
audience’s emotions (Walker, 2010:17). Classical realist texts, on the other hand, allow 
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spectators “a fantasy of stable mastery over what they perceive within it…[offering] a clear-
cut hierarchy of knowledge and, usually, one protagonist’s point of view is proved correct” 
(Walker, 2010:15). Soundtracks of mainstream cinema, or classic realist texts, not only score 
inevitably every transition, action, emotional or suspenseful sequence, but also maintains “the 
stubborn determination to fire all of the musical weapons at the same time”  (Kulezic-Wilson, 
2008:127). As I have established before, the modernist artist questions the specific traditions 
that have produced the art in question (Cavell, 1979:15), an approach that is similar to that of 
interrogative texts. I argue that Haneke uses and reflects upon film’s automatism of sound by 
rupturing non-diegetic music and punctuating his soundscapes with silences. I will analyse 
the music in The Piano Teacher and the silences in Time of the Wolf to point out how 
Haneke’s use of sound enhances the audience’s agency and activates their imagination, thus 
enabling them to secure an ethical place film for themselves in the film.  
 
3.4.2 The Use and Rupturing of Music in The Piano Teacher 
Right after Erika and her mother’s fight and reconciliation, the opening credits of The 
Piano Teacher are interjected with piano lessons, the pounding of the keys providing a stark 
contrast to the silent white on black titles. Between the intercutting scenes of silence and 
music, an off-screen voice instructs and criticises the hammering fingers. The intercutting 
between silence and music is a jarring experience for the spectator, since the cuts are not 
spread out according to tempo or motivated by an audio-visual correlation, nor does it 
consider sustaining the notes to the end. Instead, the intercutting serves as a violent 
interruption, making it unclear whether “the silence is interrupting the music or the other way 
around” (Coulthard, 2012:22). For Coulthard, these interruptions are integral to a film that 
calls on the audience to listen. The contrast between the uncanny silence of the titles, the 
resounding piano keys and Erika’s off-screen voice invites audiences to “interrogate its silent 
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absences, the violence, brutality and death that lie under the surface and aesthetic beauty” 
(2012:22), making clear the “spectator’s role as active listener and therefore as interlocutor 
and participant” (2012:23). 
The audience’s participation is called upon by making them aware of their listening 
faculty and the role it will play in the film. Later in the film, Erika plays the Piano Trio N° 2 
by Schubert on the piano with a cellist and violinist in an apartment, but, as soon as the scene 
ends, the diegetic music flows into the next scene separated by time and space, as Erika 
walks through a crowded mall. The disjunction between Erika’s visual locality (determined 
by the image) and her aural locality (reminded by the music that transferred from the 
previous sequence) both displaces the spectator and ruptures the border separating the 
diegetic and non-diegetic soundtrack, as the diegetic music soon takes on a non-diegetic 
function as Erika moves through the bustling shopping centre. She arrives at an adult porn 
shop and enters a private booth with a screen that emits pornographic films. Whilst the recital 
continues on the soundtrack, she puts a coin into the slot of the television booth. As soon as 
the pornographic arcade swallows Erika’s coin, the music stops abruptly, leaving the 
audience with the moaning, gurgling and sucking sounds of the pornographic film. Suddenly, 
the classic and aural beauty of Schubert’s masterpiece is replaced by the banal, obscene and 
primal sounds of fornication. The music is not permitted to complete its cycle or end when 
the scene concludes. Rather, the music is broken and severed in its sustain, a “rupturing that 
Figure 12: Opening titles for The Piano Teacher 
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jars, assaults, and disorients the listener”, denying audiences the fullness of the sound and 
placing them in a permanent state of “dissatisfaction and discomfort as [their] aural 
expectations and pleasures are thwarted” (Walker, 2010:20). The rupturing of the music and 
the sudden shift in the film’s soundscape, thus, enhances and amplifies the porn and the 
audience’s experience thereof. 
During an interview, Haneke made it clear that he does not want The Piano Teacher 
to be recognised as a pornographic film, but rather as an obscenity. An obscenity, for Haneke, 
is “anything that departs from the bourgeois norm”, since the “truth is always obscene”. 
Pornography, thus, for Haneke, “makes into a commodity that which is obscene” and “makes 
the unusual consumable” (Haneke in Sharrett, 2010:588). His definition is thus wider than 
Hayward’s definition, which states pornography as “any set of images that exist solely for the 
purpose of sexual arousal and feature nudity and explicit sexual acts” (2013:273). 
Pornography, according to Haneke’s definition, is not limited to explicit nudity and sex. 
Rather, he thinks that: 
[A]ny contemporary art practice is pornographic if it attempts to bandage the 
wound, so to speak, which is to say our social and psychological wound.  
Pornography seems to me to be no different from war films, or propaganda 
films in that it tries to make the visceral, horrific or transgressive elements of 
life consumable. Propaganda is far more pornographic than a home video of 
two people [having sex] (Haneke in Sharrett, 2010:588). 
 
It is thus not the explicit nature of a film that contributes to its definition as 
pornography, but rather the consumability and commerciality of the obscene that is its truly 
repulsive aspect. If pornography makes the obscene consumable, then I argue that this wide 
definition of pornography includes, and does not distinguish between, the violent death of an 
individual or people having sex. If scenes of carnage are packaged in such a way that makes 
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its horrors consumable, it is certainly included in Haneke’s definition of pornography. 
Walker argues that if scenes of murder and violence run the danger of being too disconcerting 
for the audience, classic realist texts or classical Hollywood films would use musical scoring 
to aestheticize the atrocity, resulting in the reassurance of the audience by keeping them safe 
and at a distance (2010:15). If a musical score aims to aestheticise and commercialise 
obscenities, then I argue that such music certainly contributes to its pornographic function 
and consumability. If the Schubert piece continued to play throughout the fornication, the 
audience would be kept at a safe distance, making Erika’s consumption of pornography 
likewise as consumable for the audience. Yet, the rupturing of the music and subsequent 
silence of the non-diegetic soundtrack, with only the aural obscenities remaining, makes the 
audience uncomfortable and heightens their awareness of the pornography. These aural 
obscenities are to be recalled and drawn upon by the audience later on, when Erika meets 
Walter in the bathroom and the men’s locker room respectively, when similar sucking and 
wet sounds are heard on the diegetic soundtrack as she performs fellatio. The sounds, thus, 
not only remind the audience of the pornographic images of the booth, but also allow them to 
add to the recollection, imagining the sexual act shielded by Walter or Erika’s body. These 
sounds are thus mobilised in such a way that the audience’s imagination is activated.  
 
3.4.3 Listening to the Silences in Time of the Wolf 
The rupturing of sound, is not, however, the most interesting aspect of Haneke’s 
soundscapes. Rather, it is in “the silences themselves that we find the loudest call to listen 
and strongest imperative to interrogate, contemplate and resonate” (Coulthard, 2010:20). 
There are no non-diegetic music or score in Time of the Wolf. The audience is, rather, 
confronted with an austere soundtrack characterised by silences. The film takes place in an 
unspecified time and place after an unidentified catastrophe hit. The film starts with Georges, 
	 110 
Anne, Eva and Benny arriving at their house in the woods, apparently to hide or escape from 
the ensuing anarchy and lawlessness. Another family, however, already took ownership of 
the house and threatens them. After the usual back and forth, the husband of the intruding 
family, unexpectedly, shoots and kills Georges. Anne, Eva and Benny are forced to leave and 
fend for themselves. As they walk through forsaken and desolate towns and empty streets, the 
clicking noise of the bike and sounds of the dystopic landscape hauntingly accentuates the 
silence around them. 
While complete cinematic silences are extremely rare, Haneke’s perceived silences 
are rather “complex and layered acoustic creations” (Coulthard, 2010:21). Silences in film 
are firstly achieved by recording room tone, since all spaces, regardless of its sonority, emits 
a resonance. The addition of other noises, such as footsteps, breathing or ordinary, human 
movements all contribute to the foley of a film’s soundtrack. Silences in film, then, are not 
muteness, but rather a “relative or approximate silence of background acoustic elements of 
space and room tone” (Coulthard, 2010:21). The first evening after Georges’ death, Anne, 
Eva and Benny enter a shed where they consume some meat and a can of cola in silence. 
Even though the eating and drinking is filmed in a frontal close-up, the focus on them is 
heightened by the amplification of their chewing and swallowing noises. The amplified sound 
of such banal activity in a room of silence makes the witnessing thereof almost unbearable, 
heightening audience awareness and, perhaps even, their irritation. The volume of the 
consumption is an example of how Haneke uses sound to acoustically assault his audience 
through its “intensity, abrasiveness and detail”, calling the audience to listen closely and 
accept that the “banal, seemingly pointless detail can be heard and must be listened to” 
(Coulthard, 2010:22). 
After another day scourging for food and walking along empty and foggy roads, they 
arrive at a barn. They decide to spend the night, during which a hysterical Eva wakes Anne 
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and tells her that Benny has disappeared. The film has made clear, so far, that all electricity 
has been cut. The barn is thus pitch black, with only the sound of Eva and Anne’s voices 
orientating the audience. Without any visuals to guide them, the audience is forced to resort 
to the act of listening, an act which Jean-Luc Nancy defines as “straining towards a possible 
meaning, and consequently one that is not immediately accessible” (2007:6). Whatever the 
psychology or trauma driving his actions, Benny’s disappearance attains significance due to 
the death of his father, as well as the budgie he buried moments before. Benny’s sensitivity 
towards the budgie certainly aligns the audience with him; along with the sympathy they feel 
towards him for losing his father and the desolate surrounding dystopia. For Nancy, to be 
listening is “always to be on the edge of meaning” (2007:7). Now that they are plunged into 
darkness, yet invested in his fate, the audience is forced to listen, not only to imagine what is 
happening in the dark barn, but also forced to consider and strain towards a possible reason 
for Benny’s desertion, their listening faculty their only guide. 
The audience experiences an uncertainty akin to Anne and Eva, enhanced by the 
darkness and fortified by the silence that surrounds them. As Anne and Eva scourge the barn, 
they use a lighter to kindle shreds of hay to illuminate the dark barn. The flame brightens 
only part of the frame, with the edges of the dark night encroaching upon the simmer of light.	
The hay, however, burns out quickly, plunging them (and the audience) back into darkness. 
The sound, however, does not fade like the quenched flame. The to and fro between the glow 
of the fire and darkness of the night keeps the visuals from being the primary guide in reading 
the scene, reinstating the sound, to use Murch’s phrase, as Queen of the senses again. 
Listening, then, is the only sense that provides spectators coherence in the scene, guiding and 
helping them as they strain to follow what is going on. As Anne and Eva go outside and shout 
his name into the dark void, they wait a few seconds to listen for a response, echoing the 
audience’s act of listening for Benny’s voice as well. The responding silence to Anne and 
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Eva’s appeals are not, as argued by Nancy, a privation or deprivation, since silence is an 
“arrangement of resonance…as when in a perfect condition of silence you hear your own 
body resonate, your own breath, your heart and all its resounding cave” (2007:21). The non-
responsiveness, thus, not only forces Anne and Eva to become aware of the resonance of their 
own bodies, but the audience is also implicated, in that straining to listen, they are likewise 
forced to consider their own bodies in the viewing  (and listening) experience. Silence, then, 
is the “essence rather than absence of sound, and the body of the subject is its origin and 
endpoint” (Coulthard, 2012:19). Benny’s disappearance into the night proves that listening, 
whether it be Anne and Eva or the audience, to be an “active process in time and space, that 
moves, resounds and reverberates and the subject it constitutes is likewise in movement and 
agitation” (Coulthard, 2012:19). Anne takes the lighter and some excess hay and decides to 
plunge into the darkness to find her son. She leaves Eva behind to attend to the fire outside 
that will mark the position of the barn. She braves the darkness and repeatedly shouts 
Benny’s name, with no response. As the audience strains to listen for some sort of response, a 
blaring sheep is heard in the distance, but, just as the flame withers again, Anne suddenly 
hears something next to her. “Is someone there?” she asks into the darkness. Silence. Some 
shuffling is heard, but it is unclear whether Anne is fidgeting for more hay or if the supposed 
threat is closing in on her. No musical cues guide the audience’s reading of the scene. 
Instead, the audience is left to visualise what the darkness around Anne holds, with only aural 
vestiges to inform their imagination. Audiences are forced to engage with Anne and Eva’s 
predicament through their listening faculty. Engaging with the characters’ predicament is not, 




3.4.4 Listening as an Approach to the Self 
 The use of sound does more than simply force the audience to engage with the film 
since, for Nancy, listening always entails “straining towards or in an approach to the self” 
(2007:9). While the sequence in Time of the Wolf only uses silence in conjunction with a 
narrative problem for the characters, other instances in Haneke’s oeuvre pair the absence of 
sound with a moral or ethical problem or conflict. Georgie’s death in Funny Games and 
Anne’s verbal harassment on the subway in Code Unknown all use sound to implicate the 
audience in its disturbing and obscene content. The soundtrack of the aftermath of Georgie’s 
death is filled by the blazing sound of the television, in which racing cars and screeching 
tyres fill the diegetic soundscape. When Anna goes over to the television to turn it off, her 
action cloaks the living room in silence. All that is heard is Paul and Peter’s car pulling out 
the driveway outside. Silence. After a while, Anna tells Georg that they have gone. More 
silence. If one listens closely, Georg’s shuffling and breathing is barely audible through the 
silence of death that dominates the scene. Even though sounds of Anna jumping to Georg, 
Georg’s breakdown and Anna’s consolation fill the soundtrack during the remaining eight 
minutes of the scene, no other sound or music is heard. The audience is thus forced to 
consider and face Georgie’s death in silence for the duration of the sequence. Apart from the 
Figure 13: Anne looks for Benny in Time of the Wolf 
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static long take, the depth of field and positioning of the characters, what makes Anne’s 
verbal harassment so unnerving on the subway in Code Unknown is the constant droning and 
humming of the train. The scene’s impact also, obviously, derives from the young man’s 
teasing and verbal obscenities. The audience listens, however, to his verbal obscenities not 
only to interpret what he says linguistically, but also to strain towards a reason as to why he is 
doing it. Did Anne do something to provoke him? Will he, during his monologue, divulge the 
reason he is harassing her?  As Nancy attests, to listen is always to strain towards a meaning 
that is not immediately accessible (2007:6). The larger theme of Code Unknown, the 
disposition of the Third World and the western world’s implication in their poverty, is caught 
between the young man’s utterances and the audience’s listening faculty. Thus, by straining 
towards a meaning that might explain his actions, audiences have to draw from their own 
experiences in the world to charge it with significance.  On the other hand, Coulthard points 
out that those silences in Haneke’s films, such as the one that fills the soundscape in the 
aftermath of Georgie’s death in Funny Games, make audiences aware of the film listening to 
them, simultaneously making their act of listening explicit and requiring their silence in 
response to the quietness on-screen. Moments of silence, such as these, “exposes us, renders 
the act of listening subjective and imperative in its reflexivity” (Coulthard, 2012:27). When 
the audience is made aware of themselves and forced to use their imagination, however, 
especially in a scene in which violence or something obscene is taking place, the silences 
work “to transform these aural moments into ethical ones” (Coulthard, 2010:21). 
Nancy’s major argument in Listening is that it is only through silence that the listener 
can approach the self, for it is “in the absence of noises, music or voices that the subject’s self 
can be heard” (Coulthard, 2012:19). The approach to self, as expounded by Nancy, is not an 
approach to the I, nor to the self of an other, but rather to the “form or structure of self as 
such, that is to say, to the form, structure and movement of an infinite referral” (2007:9). In 
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other words, the resonant subject or self is not a subject in the phenomenological or 
philosophical sense. Rather it is “the place of resonance, of its infinite tension and rebound, 
the amplitude of sonorous deployment and the slightness of its simultaneous redeployment” 
(Nancy in Coulthard, 2012:19). Since listening enables the subject to “enter into tension and 
to be on the lookout for a relation to self” Nancy stresses that it is not a relationship to the I or 
to an other, but rather “the relationship in self, so to speak, as it forms a ‘self’ or a ‘to itself’ 
in general, and if something like that ever does reach the end of its formation” (2007:12). The 
listening that Haneke requires in the scenes of Benny’s disappearance in Time of the Wolf, 
Georgie’s death in Funny Games and Anne’s harassment in Code Unknown demands the 
audience to listen resonantly, a straining that is not aimed at full comprehension, but rather, 
as Coulthard calls it, an “unsettling openness”, since “[m]ysteries without answers, open-
ended stories, inaccessible and inscrutable characters […] are the cornerstones of Haneke’s 
persistent ambiguity” (2012:17). Even though Benny returns to Anne and Eva the next 
morning in Time of the Wolf, an explanation is never given for his choice to desert them. 
Instead, they are met with Benny’s silence, his muteness continuing for the rest of the film. 
The audience’s engagement with the previous scene in which Anne and Eva were looking for 
Benny, as well as the scenes that preceded it, are the only vestiges the audience can draw 
from in order to decipher Benny’s actions. These mostly silent sequences require the 
audience to make “necessary leaps of intellectual imagination” (Walker, 2010:23), ascribing 
a meaning to Benny’s disappearance and his subsequent vow of silence. Georgie’s death is 
never atoned for in Funny Games and Anne’s humiliation is never dealt with afterwards in 
Code Unknown. She does not draw a moral lesson like her on-screen counterpart in the 
swimming pool scene; rather the audience is left to decide for themselves what Anne’s 
response to the verbal assault is. These films simply continue to the end, giving the audience 
the freedom and (aural) space to contemplate these obscenities themselves.  
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3.4.5 Conclusion 
 Juliette Binoche has revealed in an interview that Haneke literally writes silences into 
his screenplays by indicating, for example, ‘pause’, ‘short pause’ ‘long-pause’. His writing is 
similar to the notation of music, resembling the precise calculation of quarter, half notes and 
rests (Binoche in Montmayeur, 2005). Haneke constructs his films in a manner similar to that 
of music structures, an aural attentiveness that Coulthard points out “operates in concert with 
Haneke’s ethical concentrations on guilt, self-reflection, failed interpersonal communication 
and the implication of the spectator and bystander” (2012:17). She points out that the 
specificity of Haneke’s acoustic structure is integral to informing our responsibility and duty, 
an imperative and necessity to “fulfil our own rights and duties as listeners and to make what 
is heard our own” (Coulthard, 2012:26). When silences are used in films to make the 
audience aware of themselves, it creates an ethical part for them in the film, since “we are its 
interlocutors and are thus complicit in the silence” (Coulthard, 2012:26). Silences in film are 
a direct call to audiences, which demand that they listen. This call is what Coulthard terms an 
“overt recognition of complicity” which forms an essential part of Haneke’s modernist 
approach, creating an “uncomfortable viewing space where one is forced to confront one’s 
own role as spectator and is required to respond to the film” (2012:26). Unlike most films, all 
the end titles of Haneke’s films (except Funny Games) scroll over the screen in complete 
silence. There is no music accompaniment to the credits, no aural vignette encapsulating the 
film’s feeling or theme. Rather, the end credits leave the audience in a tangible silence after 
the viewing experience. The silence of the titles are, in a way, the film’s final comment and 
call on the audience to act, as “if the film were done talking and now demanding that the 
audience respond” (Coulthard, 2012:26-27). 
 At the start of Nancy’s treaty on listening, he asks what “secret is at stake when one 
truly listens…[w]hat secret is yielded – hence, also made public – when we listen to a voice, 
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an instrument, or a sound just for itself?” (2007:5). Coulthard argues that the yielded secret 
during the act of listening is not only the absence of subjectivity, but also the terror that the 
subject experiences in confronting subjectivity itself, in other words, the “horror of our own 
void of subjectivity is the terror at the heart of silence. In the absence of the once present 
soundtrack, we are left with nothing but the call to auscultate ourselves, to listen to our own 
living bodies and our own subjectivity” (Coulthard, 2012:28). Haneke’s reflection on the 
automatism of music and sound, through rupturing, amplification or deafening silences, call 
on audiences to listen, imagine and place themselves in the film by contributing to its 
meaning-making process.  
 
3.5 Conclusion: The Filmmaker’s Responsibility 
At the start of this essay, I emphasised Cavell’s two fundamental ideas concerning the 
act of viewing: the fact that film makes displacement appear as our natural condition and that 
viewing offers us respite from our responsibility to the world. The manner in which classical 
Hollywood cinema and genre allow spectators to assume a position of sagacity that exceeds 
that of the diegetic characters, traditional forms of editing guide and manipulate audiences 
and music aestheticise a film’s obscene content, all contribute, aggravate and magnify the 
spectator’s desire not to need power or bear the world’s burdens. Wheatley identifies an 
ethical problem inherent to the viewing process, arguing that the manner in which Hollywood 
cinema positions audiences “in a position of suspended awareness” to be morally 
problematic. Therefore filmmakers have an “ethical imperative to produce a work that breaks 
with cinematic illusionism and thereby grant the spectator the opportunity to engage critically 
with the cinematic image” (2009:39). 
By reflecting on his use of automatisms during filmmaking, Haneke’s modernist films 
achieve the implication of the audience and provide them with the opportunity to secure an 
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ethical position for themselves in the film. There is thus a shift in emphasis from filmmaker 
to spectator. Cavell’s argument, as well as Haneke’s approach to filmmaking, questions the 
spectator’s motivations when watching a film. What do audiences watch and what are their 
motivations for watching something, especially if the film in question contains gratuitous 
violence that draw from real-life situations? The film does not watch me watching it; the 
(entertaining) violence is not present to me, so why do I have to be held accountable? 
Cinematic automatisms that are traditionally employed simply put a spell on audiences in 
which they become “unaware of themselves and the world around them”, a reason, perhaps, 
why “we are so much more able to accept, and even enjoy, on-screen scenes or scenarios of 
immorality – of violence, revenge, rape – which we would never stand for outside the 
cinema” (Wheatley, 2009:42). Since audiences choose to watch such films, because, as the 
cliché goes, “I want to escape and just enjoy something for once”, because “life is too 
difficult as it is”, I argue that it is such a motivation that is irresponsible towards those whose 
real-life and horrific experience provided material for our viewing pleasure. The Holocaust, 
for example, does not exist purely to provide filmic material for Schindler’s List, nor the 
Second World War for Downfall. Instead Haneke, like Resnais does in the case of Night & 
Fog, draws from horrors and obscenities such as the torture of families and the rape of 
women, for Funny Games and The Piano Teacher respectively, in order to make audiences 
aware of their displaced position as spectators and to make them realise that they are indeed 
responsible for what they watching. They cannot want to not bear the burdens of the world, 
since the afflictions of the world are visible and calling them out on the screen right in front 
of them. As is clear from this chapter, Haneke constructs his film in such a way that the 
spectator is given the possibility of participating in the film. A spectator is no longer a mere 
consumer that “ingest[s] spoon-fed images, but rather the very person who completes the 
film. [A film’s] framework is born not on screen, but in the spectator’s mind” (Haneke, 
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2000). Since the ubiquity of the media has had such a profound influence on our viewing 
habits, Haneke responds to the problem by reflecting on film’s automatism, thus enabling 




MICHAEL HANEKE’S RESPONSIBILITY AND 
THE AUDIENCE’S RESPONSE-ABILITY 
IN CACHÉ, THE WHITE RIBBON AND AMOUR 
 
4.1 Introduction: Spectatorship 
4.1.1 Michael Haneke’s Experience at the Cinema 
In his essay “Terror and Utopia of Form: Robert Bresson’s Au hasard Balthazar”, 
Michael Haneke recounts his first film-going experiences, all of which put him in a state of 
shock. His first memory of going to the cinema was when his grandmother took him to see 
Laurence Olivier’s Hamlet (1948). Haneke vividly recalls how the theatre grew darker as the 
majestic curtain slowly lifted, revealing the surging waves crashing around the gloomy castle 
of Elsinore (Haneke, 2010(a):565).  After less than five minutes, however, his grandmother 
was forced to leave the theatre, because the moving images frightened the six-year old 
Haneke. Later that same year, on a cold and rainy day in Denmark, Haneke was taken to the 
cinema to watch a film that took place in Africa. He recalls how mystified he was by the 
images that revealed creatures he had never seen before, as racing antelope and grazing 
rhinoceroses flashed along the Jeep’s purview. He was in a state of rapture, captivated and 
astonished by the flashing images. After the lights went on and he emerged from the 
cineplex, however, he could not believe that he was not in Africa anymore. Even though he 
was surrounded by wild animals and the open savannah minutes before, how did “the theatre, 
which for me had been like a car I was travelling in, have driven back – and especially so 
quickly – to northern, cold Copenhagen?” (Haneke, 2010(a):565). 
Haneke’s first two experiences reveal the displacement, as Cavell argues, inherent to 
the act of spectatorship. In her book Spectatorship: The Power of Looking On (2007), 
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Michelle Aaron argues that one of the reasons why we love to watch films is because it gives 
us, similar to the young Michael Haneke in Copenhagen, the possibility and pleasure “of 
seeing things we would not normally be able to see” (2007:87). Drawing from 
psychoanalysis film theory, Aaron explains that movies depend upon the spectator accepting 
the illusion of film as a form of reality. She describes this acceptance as a tacit or 
unacknowledged agreement between the spectator and spectacle, stipulating that the audience 
has to suspend their disbelief and ignore the fact that they are watching a fabrication 
(2007:91). By ignoring the film’s fabrication and disavowing the fact that they are watching 
an illusion, audiences are encouraged to accept the spectacle as a form of reality. Since 
mainstream film, through continuity techniques, appeals to authenticity, the cinematic 
spectacle “stands in for reality” and reassures the spectator “that nothing is amiss” (Aaron, 
2007:92). To recall Cavell’s claim, that the “screen overcomes our fixed distance” and 
“makes displacement appear as our natural condition” (Cavell, 1979:41), a cinematic 
spectacle that appeals to authenticity intensifies the displacement experienced by the 
spectator. Even though Haneke was in Denmark and physically distanced from Africa, he 
unconsciously suspended his awareness of the film’s fabrication. The film thus overcame the 
distance between the savannah and Denmark. Since the young Haneke was not used to being 
displaced from yet present to another world, as opposed to most consumers of media today, 
his displacement from the African plains confused him. In his article, Haneke admits that he 
finds it difficult to explain the confusion he experienced regarding his displacement from 
Africa to today’s generation who grow up in a world “unthinkable without the constant 
presence of competing floods of images”(2010(a):566). As opposed to a young Haneke, we 
are used to being displaced from the world that we view on our screens, since, as Cavell 
argues, film has made our displacement appear and seem natural. 
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Another effect that a disavowal of film’s illusion brings about is the audience’s 
feelings of invisibility, since they witness a world that they are not present to. The silver 
screen, Cavell writes, “screens me from the world it holds – that is, makes me invisible”, as 
well as “screens its existence from me” (1979:24). The film did not acknowledge Haneke’s 
presence to the African savannah. He remained invisible to the wild animals and the diegetic 
world of the film. For the spectator, or in this instance, Haneke, that the projected world of 
Africa “does not exist (now) is its only difference from reality” (Cavell, 1979:24). The 
problem with disavowal, of ignoring the fact that one is watching a film and thus becoming 
invisible, is that it “staves off that which is threatening” and allows the audience to “indulge 
in fantasy without suffering the consequences for it” (Aaron, 2007:92). Even though film 
overcomes our distance, the spectator is still in a position of safety, a position that is 
maintained through disavowal. In other words, the contractual disavowal between audience 
and spectacle “sustains the safety of the spectator, licensing a safe indulgence in the real, with 
the promise that it is only temporary: when the spectacle stops, so too will the submission to 
it as real” (Aaron, 2007:92). I recall Cavell’s argument that I have outlined in previous 
chapters, that “movies allow the audience to be mechanically absent” (1979:25), in order to 
illustrate the manner in which spectators become invisible to the spectacle in front of them. It 
does not matter that, when watching the suffering of others that “I do nothing in the face of 
tragedy”, or, when someone slips on a banana peel, that “I laugh at the folly of others” 
(Cavell, 1979:26). The audience’s helplessness towards the spectacle “is mechanically 
assured”, since “I am present not at something happening, which I must confirm, but at 
something that has happened, which I absorb (like a memory)” (Cavell, 1979:26). Haneke’s 
first two notable experiences at the cinema rest upon the fact that those films assured his 
absence and invisibility towards the spectacle on-screen, displacing him from the world that 
the screen held. 
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Haneke’s third account of film spectatorship that put him in a state of shock was 
when, during his final year in senior high school, he watched Tony Richardson’s Tom Jones 
(1963). The film effortlessly made the viewer an accomplice to its exuberant protagonist. He 
recalls how, during a breath-taking chase sequence, the hero stopped in his tracks, turned to 
face the camera (the audience) and “commented upon the difficulty of his predicament, 
thereby making me aware of mine” (Haneke, 2010(a):566). The breaking of the fourth wall 
was as shocking as his two previous experiences and, even though he was aware by this stage 
that films are not real, he had distanced himself physically and mentally from its unnerving 
immediacy. Tom Jones’s direct address, however, made Haneke aware of his complicity with 
the film and its protagonist, making it clear that he and the audience were largely victims of 
the filmmaker’s privileged viewpoint, instead of “partners of those whom we paid to 
‘entertain’ us” (Haneke, 2010(a):567). Haneke’s invisibility, assured by the mechanic nature 
of those films he watched prior Tom Jones, was ruptured, his presence as spectator made 
visible by Tom’s address. The address thus not only acknowledged his presence to the 
spectacle, but also made him aware of his complicity. 
Reflecting upon the shocking discovery of his complicity, Haneke remembered those 
first two experiences at the cinema that put him in a state of shock, recalling how frightened 
he initially was and how enthralled he had become. By becoming aware of his complicity, 
however, Haneke began “to see the cinema with different eyes” and to “distrust those 
storytellers who pretended to render unbroken reality” (2010(a):567). In a similar vein, Aaron 
challenges the spectator’s seemingly innocent position vis-à-vis the spectacle and argues “not 
simply for the spectator’s complicity in its creation and endurance, but for the spectator’s 
complicity in its often disturbing content” (2007:92). How are audiences complicit in the act 
of spectatorship and why is this problematic, especially when the content thereof is thrilling, 
disturbing or violent? 
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4.1.2 The Spectator’s Complicity 
At the start of this dissertation I argued that, even though mainstream film allows us 
respite from bearing the burdens of the world, we cannot wish not to need power or bear 
another’s burdens, as there is an ethical demand on us to be responsible for one another. My 
existence is predicated upon another. Furthermore, I maintained that our invisible complicity 
to the spectacle in front of us is aggravated when we watch scenes of violence and atrocity. 
An example that Haneke uses in which we are unaware of our complicity is the famous 
sequence in Apocalypse Now, in which Wagner’s Ride of the Valkyries bullhorns over 
speakers while local Vietnamese flee from the attacking Americans. The launching of 
missiles and rat-tat-tat of bullets rain over the Vietnamese as they are catapulted into the air 
and ripped to pieces. The spectator is positioned as a co-passenger in the helicopter, yet, since 
our displacement from the spectacle is mechanically assured, we are allowed to revel in the 
spectacle without being held accountable for the carnage that ensues. Our invisibility renders 
us guiltless. To what extent, however, can Haneke’s critique be justified? 
Almost a third into Sam Mendes’ Jarhead (2005), a group of soldiers watch the news 
that announces Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. After the Ambassador of Kuwait’s call for 
aid from the United States, Corporal Alan Troy announces to the young soldiers in the room 
that they are going to war. The next scene shows the troops watching the famous scene from 
Apocalypse Now in a cinema, cheering and applauding as the helicopters near the Vietnamese 
village. They become restless with eager anticipation, munching their popcorn and 
mimicking the movements of the on-screen soldiers. The anticipation builds until, as the 
diegetic helicopters open fire on the locals, private Anthony Swofford, the protagonist of 
Jarhead, revelling and losing himself in the spectacular carnage, erupts in ecstasy: “Shoot 
them motherfuckers!!” (Jarhead). Haneke points out that the sequence allows audiences, as 
evident in Anthony and the troops of Jarhead, to experience the action as surrogates. Echoing 
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Cavell’s diagnosis that film unburdens us of responsibility, the “mythical narrative mode and 
an aestheticising mode of representation allow a safe release of our own fears and desires” 
(Haneke, 2010(b):576). Up until that point in the film, the young soldiers in Jarhead have not 
experienced any real combat or action. Apocalypse Now, however, meets their atavistic thirst 
and desire for destruction by positioning them alongside the onslaught aimed at the 
Vietnamese. The film thus provides a safe release for their desire to fight the enemy, as the 
attacking, on-screen US Army “transcends the helplessness and powerlessness of the viewer 
with [their] accomplishments” (Haneke, 2010(b):576).21 
Who is at fault with providing the soldiers of Jarhead with the opportunity to see the 
carnage and violence that eludes them in real-life, witness the death and destruction of the 
Vietnamese without bearing the burden of having done so, displaced and at a safe distance, yet 
immediate enough to enjoy the thrill? Or, moreover, how can the soldiers become aware of 
their role as spectators? Before a screening of Benny’s Video, Haneke said that the problem is 
not violence in films or media per se, but rather the manner in which it is employed. When one 
questions the presence of violence in the media, one is forced to aim one’s criticisms at 
institutions and organisations “where responsibility is notoriously hard to personalise and 
accountability rarely demanded” (Haneke, 2010(b):575). Instead, Haneke argues that the 
question must be shifted towards the form of representation, in other words, the formalist 
principles that guide the filmmaker’s decisions in representing violence. By reframing the 
question of whether violence should be allowed in the media to a question of representation, 
the accountability and responsibility is put on the shoulders of individuals: the editor, the 
journalist and, as my main focus will be, the film director (Haneke, 2010(b):575). The question 
																																																								
21 There are many readings that argue that the scene in Apocalypse Now is actually a critical comment on the 
horrors of the Vietnam war (see, for example, Jean Baudrillard’s essay on the film in Simulacra and Simulation 
(1981). I would point out, however, that the reaction of the soldiers in Jarhead indicates that the scene does not 
make its audience aware of their invisibility enough. As Haneke says, we as the audience ride “along in the 
helicopter, firing on the Vietnamese scattering in panic below us, and we do it without a guilty conscience 
because we – at least in the moment of action – do not become aware of this role” (Haneke, 2010(b):576). 
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then, applied to Apocalypse Now, is how can the film make the spectators of Jarhead aware of 
their invisibility, and thus their complicity, in the spectacular onslaught on the Vietnamese? 
At the end of his essay on ‘Violence and the Media’, Haneke asks how filmmakers 
can give audiences the chance to recognise the loss of reality and their own implication in it, 
thereby emancipating them “from being a victim of the medium to its potential partner” 
(2010(b):579). He continues: 
The question is not: What am I allowed to show?” but rather: “What chance 
do I give the viewer to recognise what it is I am showing?” The question – 
limited to the topic of violence – is not: “How do I show violence?”, but rather 
“How do I show the viewer his own position vis-à-vis violence and its 
portrayal?” (2010(b):579).  
 
Haneke believes that the filmmaker has the responsibility of giving the audience the 
chance to recognise that what is being shown. When the complexities of violence are, for 
example, adjusted in order to fit the mould of a suspense thriller, the audience does not 
recognise the pain, suffering, horror and irrecoverability that characterises real violence, but 
rather simply a spectacular representation thereof.  Instead, the filmmaker has the 
responsibility of, firstly, revealing the spectator’s invisible position as consumer of violence 
and, secondly, restoring the pain and suffering inherent to violence and the irrecoverability of 
its depiction. 
So far, this dissertation is hinged on Cavell’s two ideas, that, firstly, film offers us 
respite from bearing the burdens of the world and, secondly, the act of viewing makes 
displacement appear as our natural condition. While the mechanic nature of film assures our 
safe and displaced position, I argue that, since we are relational beings, we cannot wish for 
unaccountability and invisibility, because we are responsible for each other. My introductory 
chapter, thus, asked how filmmakers can destabilise, challenge and disrupt the spectator’s 
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wish not to bear another’s burdens and hold the audience accountable and responsible for 
what they are watching. In other words, how can the filmmaker meet his or her responsibility 
of ensuring the audience’s response-ability? In order to contextualise the question, I 
continued in Chapter Two with content, arguing that film and television has a problematic 
influence on our perceptions of violence, especially since we are invisible during the act of 
viewing and displaced from the brutality on-screen. The third chapter focused on form, 
mapping the ways in which Haneke reflects on the automatisms of cinema in order to enable 
the audience to secure an ethical place for themselves in the film. The separate discussions on 
content (Chapter Two) and form (Chapter Three) laid the groundwork for this chapter, in 
which I argue that the manner in which both content and form are organised are crucial 
elements in responsible filmmaking. I will respond to the question I posed in the introductory 
chapter, of how a filmmaker meets his or her responsibility of ensuring the audience’s 
response-ability, in three separate sections. Firstly, I will define responsibility according to 
Levinas’ ethical edict of ‘thou shalt not kill’ through a reading of Georges and Majid’s 
relationship in Caché. Thereafter, I will draw from Kelly Oliver’s work to read The White 
Ribbon, in which I will engage with, enhance and perhaps challenge Haneke’s idea of 
audience recognition, by arguing that responsible filmmaking entails enabling the audience to 
bear witness. I will look at how Haneke takes responsibility for his audience by addressing 
them in such way that not only are they recognised by him, but also that they are able to 
recognise that what is being shown and thus put in a position of bearing witness to the film. 
Through bearing witness, instead of passive spectatorship, I argue that audiences will become 
partners in the film and be able to respond, response-ability, as well as secure an ethical place 
or themselves in the film. My argument will continue in my reading of Amour, in which I 
illustrate how Georges’ recognition of and approach to Anne’s suffering meets Judith 
Butler’s formulation of responsibility. Moreover, I will use Butler’s work to illustrate how 
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Haneke enables the spectator to recognise the Other and how he keeps the audience’s 
recognition thereof alive and on-going. Finally, I will draw from Haneke’s final film that had 
a profound effect on him, in order to conclude how the content (I outlined in Chapter Two) 
and the form (I outlined in Chapter Three) and the harmonisation thereof is critical for the 
filmmaker’s responsibility and the audience’s response-ability.  
 
4.2 Responsibility: The Face-to-Face Encounter of Caché 
4.2.1 Emmanuel Levinas and My Place Under the Sun 
In the introductory chapter of this dissertation, I turned to Emmanuel Levinas’ radical 
writings on responsibility in order to argue why we cannot, as Cavell says, wish for 
invisibility and respite from bearing the burdens of the world when watching a film. We 
ought to regard ourselves infinitely and endlessly responsible for each other. By drawing 
from Dostoevsky’s statement, that “[e]ach of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I 
more than the others” (qtd in Levinas, 1969:146). Levinas suggests a mode of being in which 
“I am endlessly obligated to the Other”, an “ethical relation which forever precedes and 
exceeds the egoism and tyranny of ontology” (Hand, 1989:1). Western philosophy, for 
Levinas, has mostly been preoccupied with ontology, which reduces the “other to the same” 
by “interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being” 
(1969:43). In other words, Western philosophy violates that what is different by 
incorporating it into a pre-existing totality (Downing and Saxton, 2010:4). In contrast, 
Levinas’ ethics precedes ontology. Before a subject is capable of choice, his or her formation 
takes place in a ‘preontological’ sphere called “outside of being” (Butler, 2005:85-86). The 
primary scene ‘where’ or ‘when’ this formation takes place, however, cannot be described, 
since it “precedes and even conditions the spatio-temporal coordinates that circumscribe the 
ontological domain” (Butler, 2005:86). Since Levinas’ ethics precedes ontology, an “ethics as 
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first philosophy” (Levinas in Hand, 1989:75), his ethics is thus not governed by moral laws 
or principles that are generated ontologically. Instead, Levinas defines ethics as the “calling 
into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other” (1969:43). Ethics, for Levinas, 
arises in relation to the Other, a figure that represents our infinite and ethical relation to the 
world around us (Butler, 2005:x). Our encounter with the Other, an encounter that takes place 
face-to-face22, is a “primordial encounter with alterity which disturbs our solitary enjoyment 
of the world, our illusionary position of omnipotence and sovereignty” (Downing and Saxton, 
2010:3). My encounter with something other than me makes me aware that something exists 
beyond me, something that I cannot grasp. In other words, Levinas underpins his entire 
philosophy upon the encounter with the Other, an encounter which claims that “there is 
something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other” (Levinas in Wright et 
al., 1988:172). 
Why am I endlessly and boundlessly responsible for another? Blaise Pascal claims in 
Penseés that, by claiming a place for yourself under the sun, you are marking the beginning 
of, what he calls, the “usurpation of all the earth” (1958:84).23 Levinas is fond of quoting 
Pascal’s assertion and, in order to respond to the question of our existence or ‘one’s right to 
be’ in the context of the Other, he uses Pascal’s argument to ask: 
My being-in-the-world or my ‘place in the sun’, my being at home, have 
these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man 
whom I have already oppressed or starved or driven out into a third world; 
																																																								
22 Libby Saxton notes that, even though Levinas uses visual vocabulary to describe the ‘face’, the Other’s ‘face’ 
is not a phenomenon of the visible world or an object that we can perceive, but rather that which “cannot 
become a content, which your thought would embrace; it is uncontainable, it leads you beyond” (Levinas in 
Saxton, 2007:5). 
23 In his introduction to the Levinas Reader (1989), Séan Hand explains that Levinas uses Pascal’s statement to 
reject the violence at the heart of ontology as first philosophy. Our responsibility for the Other’s death is an 
inescapable answerability, a position that forms subjectivity, an individual ‘I’. Even though this ‘I’ questions its 
right to be, it has an unquestionable and primary obligation to the other. For this reason, ethical philosophy 
“must remain the first philosophy” (1989:4-5).	
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are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? (Levinas, 
1989:82). 
 
 Are we all guilty of usurping someone else’s place under the sun? Should guilt not 
rather be placed on those who have physically stripped, appropriated and killed in order to 
secure their place under the sun? Or are we, instead, like Georges in Caché, renouncing our 
responsibility because we deem ourselves innocent? 
 
4.2.2 Georges’ Encounter with Majid 
Caché tells the story of Georges, a television talk-show host, and Anne Laurent who 
live in a bourgeois, Parisian neighbourhood with their son, Pierrot. The family is victimised 
by unmarked videotapes that arrive on their doorstep, the first of which display static shots of 
their house. Anne also receives anonymous phone calls and Pierrot gets disturbing drawings 
at school, all of which increases the sense that they are being harassed. The second videotape 
shows Georges’ childhood home, while another guides the viewer to an apartment. Following 
the directions of the video to the apartment, Georges finds Majid, an Algerian who his 
parents intended to adopt after the Paris massacre of 1961.24 Georges confronts Majid about 
the tapes, upon which he denies any involvement. Georges’ guilt about the past, however, 
manifests through dreams of Majid coughing blood and cutting the head off a rooster. After 
Georges and Majid’s confrontation, Pierrot does not return home from school. Georges and 
Anne assume he is kidnapped and immediately contact the police to share their suspicions 
about Majid. The police take Majid and his son into custody, but both deny involvement with 
																																																								
24 On the 17th of October 1961, about twenty thousand Algerian men, women and children peacefully took part 
in a demonstration in the centre of Paris. The march was against the discriminatory decree issued by the French 
government that imposed a curfew on Algerian workers. The demonstrating mass of Algerians sparked fear 
among the French authorities, leading Maurice Papon to order their execution. To this day, the total number 
killed remains a mystery. An estimated body count ranges, however, from two to two hundred (Jaccomard, 
2012:258-259).   
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Pierrot’s disappearance, which leads to their release the next morning. Pierrot then returns 
home from his friend’s house where he spent the night. After the false alarm, Majid invites 
Georges over to his apartment and once again denies his involvement with the surveillance 
tapes and Pierrot’s disappearance. He then takes a razorblade, slits his throat and dies. 
Georges does not go to the police immediately, but instead seeks refuge at the cinema. He 
returns home afterwards, tells Anne what happened and reveals that, when he was a boy, he 
told lies about Majid to keep his parents from adopting him. The next day, Majid’s son goes 
to Georges’ office and asks Georges how it feels to have a man’s life on his conscience. 
Georges, however, rejects the accusations and goes home to sleep. In the final sequence, 
captured through a long shot of the front steps of a school, Pierrot and Majid’s son meet. 
They have an inaudible conversation and separate, after which the credits start rolling over 
the screen. 
Levinas’ concept of the face, or the approach of the face is, for him, “the most basic 
mode of responsibility” (Levinas in Kearney, 1986:23). The face that Levinas describes, 
however, is not necessarily or exclusively a human face, but rather “communicates what is 
human, what is precarious, what is injurable” (Butler, 2004:xviii). The face of the Other 
places a moral claim upon me, asking to “not let him die alone”, which, if that would happen, 
would make me an accomplice in his death (Levinas in Kearney, 1986:23). The moral claim 
that the face makes thus evokes the biblical command of “thou shalt not kill” (Exodus 20:13, 
KJV) 25, revealing that, in relation to the face, “I am exposed as a usurper of the place of the 
other” (Levinas in Kearney, 1986:23). Consequently, the ethics that Levinas advocates places 
the other’s life above my own and regards the other’s right to exist as more important. The 
primacy that the other’s life enjoys, for Levinas, is epitomised in the edict of ‘thou shalt not 
																																																								
25 Levinas makes clear that he does not draw from Biblical verses to prove his philosophy, but rather to illustrate 
his arguments (Levinas in Poirié, 1987:62). 
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kill’, which claims, “you shall not jeopardise the life of the other” (Levinas in Kearney, 
1986:24). 
How does my place under the sun usurp, appropriate or jeopardise the place of 
another? Additionally, is the command of ‘thou shalt not kill’ limited to the physical act of 
murder? Levinas explains that the commandment does not only prohibit physical murder, but 
also includes the various ways in which we, figuratively, kill each other. For Levinas, the 
ethical edict pertains to how, in the course of our lives and in different ways, we kill someone 
by taking their place underneath the sun. He says that the commandment must be understood 
in terms of having something that the other does not, for example, if you sit down at the table 
in the morning and drink coffee, you “kill an Ethiopian who doesn’t have any coffee” 
(Levinas in Wright et al., 1988:173). In other words, we “kill” when we drink coffee while 
the other has none; someone else could have had the coffee I drank this morning. The coffee I 
drink, the food I eat, the bed I sleep in, the house I stay in, the clothes I wear, the books I read 
and the company I enjoy all take the place of someone else who could have used, experienced 
and enjoyed them. When I claim a place for myself under the sun, I automatically and 
inevitably appropriate a place that someone else could have assumed. 
Does Georges obey the commandment of ‘thou shalt not kill’? Or is his place under 
the sun more important to him than that of another? I argue that the surveillance tapes reveal 
Georges’ attitude towards those around him and his (non-)compliance to the commandment. 
All of the videotapes that Georges and Anne receive depict or target a domicilium, a home. 
While the first two record the Laurents’ house, the third tape reveals Georges’ childhood 
home and the last two show the way to and interior of Majid’s apartment block and apartment 
itself. Georges interprets the gaze of the first videotape, together with the anonymous phone 
calls and disturbing drawings, as a threat to his home. During playback of the second 
cassette, a sudden insert of a young Algerian boy with blood on his chin interrupts the 
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diegetic video. When the shot of the Laurents’ house return, Anne asks Georges if something 
is wrong. Even though the audience can only see the long shot of the house, the diegetic 
soundscape of Georges and Anne’s living room surrounding the scene suggests Georges’ 
disturbed expression, revealing the insert to be a(n) (imaginary) memory that intruded his 
viewing. Since Georges interprets the static shots as a threat to his domicilium, the second 
video, without pointing to any concrete evidence, exposes Georges’ fear of the Other. As we 
will come to learn later in the film, the Algerian boy that momentarily intruded upon 
Georges’ memory is Majid. Georges’ harboured hostility for Majid, an antagonism that 






Figure 14: The domicilium on the five videotapes 
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The videos also trigger, or perhaps reveal, the cracks in Georges and Anne’s 
marriage. When the third videotape arrives, displaying Georges’ childhood home, he does not 
share his suspicions that it might be Majid. He does, however, make the mistake of telling 
Anne that he has a vague idea who the blackmailer might be. Georges’ hint sends Anne into a 
furious frenzy and she accuses her husband of not trusting her. Georges, however, remains 
stubborn and charges Anne of “doing exactly what he wants” (Caché), suggesting that the 
criminal’s intention is to disrupt their relationship. Babak Amou’oghli, however, argues that 
Georges’ accusation reveals not his fear of the stranger trespassing on his family and home, 
but rather his fear of letting anyone trespass into his world (2011:45). Suddenly, Anne is 
trespassing on him as well. The videos threaten Georges’ privacy, his inner life and secrets, 
forcing him to reveal them to Anne. 
Georges, however, will go to great lengths to keep his life, personal space and secrets 
to himself. He wants to live according to his rules. After the fourth video reveals Majid’s 
residence, Georges goes to his apartment to confront him. He threatens Majid: “If you 
interfere in my life, scare my family or damage me, you’ll regret it, I swear” (Caché). The 
videos, serving as a catalyst, reveals Georges’ fundamental flaw, that is, his utter 
determination of protecting his domain and home at the cost of others (Amou’oghli, 
2011:45). Even Majid poses the question to Georges: “What wouldn’t we do not to lose 
what’s ours?” (Caché). The videos, then, do not so much suggest someone threatening his 
physical home, but rather that what the home represents: Georges’ place under the sun. 
Amou’oghli argues that Georges has, throughout his life, constantly defended his place under 
the sun, a desire that Georges is willing to pursue, achieve and maintain at the cost of the 
Other. If that means removing Majid, then so be it. By telling his parents that Majid wanted 
to scare him by decapitating the rooster, because six-year old Georges did not want to share 
his bedroom with Majid, Georges initially defended his external property. Forty years later, 
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what started out as a defence of his bedroom, turned into the safeguarding of his internal 
property, in other words his ipseity (selfhood) and sense of mental integrity (Amou’oghli, 
2011:46). Georges place under the sun is not limited to his domicilium, his career or family, 
but rather his claim to himself, his subjectivity. By claiming his right to himself and his right 
to existence, Georges ignores those lives that might be jeopardised by such a proclamation. 
But can Georges be held responsible for what he did when he was six-years old? 
When Anne asks what Georges possibly could have lied about that would make Majid want 
to take revenge forty years later, Georges shrugs: “The usual stuff kids lie about. Things you 
make up. Stupid stuff” (Caché). He continues that, after Majid was taken to the orphanage, he 
forgot about Majid and his parents’ intent of adoption. When Anne questions his indifference, 
he defends himself, saying, “I don’t feel responsible for it. Why should I?” (Caché). 
Similarly, his confrontation with Majid reveals the extent of his outrage and frustration of 
being held accountable for something he did when he was a child: “You were older and 
stronger than me. I had no choice” (Caché). Levinas’ formulation of ethics and responsibility, 
however, disputes Georges’ defence of the ignorant child. Even though we may be outraged 
at being ethically responsible for one whom we do not choose, as Georges believes he is 
justified in not wanting to share a bedroom with Majid (and thus cannot be held accountable 
to the actions of his six-year old self), Butler reminds us that we need to remember Levinas’ 
formulation of responsibility. Our responsibility precedes any choices that we may or may 
not have made, meaning that when we encounter and are forced to respond to the face of the 
Other, the situation feels “horrible, impossible and where the desire for murderous revenge 
feels overwhelming” (Butler, 2005:92). Georges is initially convinced that Majid sent the 
tapes and interprets them as an act of terrorism against his ipseity. The threat of the tapes, 
together with Pierrot’s disappearance, gives Georges reasons to “visit Majid, threaten him 
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and to have him arrested, all of which will appear to push the Algerian to his death” (Kline, 
2010:554). 
For Levinas, however, the Other becomes my neighbour “precisely through the way 
the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me and in so doing recalls my responsibility and 
calls me into question” (1989:83). Majid has never summoned, called or begged Georges in 
the literal sense; actually, he makes it quite clear during their confrontation that he never 
wanted anything from Georges. Instead, Majid’s ‘face’ is that which calls Georges’ 
spontaneity and freedom into question, makes Georges aware of his desire to maintain his 
place under the sun and enjoy a life free from responsibility. Majid’s presence reveals the 
cracks in Georges’ perceived self-sufficiency and sovereignty. Georges makes the mistake of 
limiting his framework of responsibility to his ontology, in other words, to those acts he 
committed and lies he told when he was six years old. What happened to the Algerians at the 
hands of Maurice Papon, is not, according to Georges, applicable to his ontology and thus not 
his responsibility. True responsibility, however, arises in a sphere that is preontological, that 
is, before the formation of Georges’ subjectivity. The responsibility that Levinas argues for 
goes “beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other or whatever acts I may or may 
not have committed, as if I were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself” 
(1989:83). In this sense, Georges became responsible for Majid before anything else, before 
Majid’s parents were killed, before they worked for Georges’ parents and before France 
colonised Algeria. Georges’ responsibility, actually, surfaced before his formation as subject.  
His responsibility for Majid thus stems from an “unrepresentable past that was never present 
and is more ancient than consciousness”, a preontological stage in which my “responsibility 
for my neighbour, for the other man, for the stranger or the sojourner, to which nothing in the 
rigorously ontological order binds me” arose (Levinas, 1989:84). Nothing in the ontological 
order binds Georges to Majid. If responsibility is confined only to our decisions, actions and 
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reality, in other words, to our ontology, then one could argue that Georges is justified in 
rejecting his responsibility for Majid’s. What moral or ethical rules, generated ontologically, 
will determine his culpability? Will a court of law be able to incriminate Georges? As he 
makes clear to Majid’s son, near the end of the film, that “you’ll never give me a bad 
conscience about your father’s sad or wrecked life; I’m not to blame” (Caché), the moral 
code that Georges lives by, as well as the legal principles that govern society, does not 
incriminate him. But if responsibility precedes our ontology, meaning that our actions and 
decisions have no bearing on what we are responsible for, then Georges is endlessly 
responsible for Majid. In the face of Majid, to apply Levinas’ words, Georges is “inescapably 
responsible and consequently the unique and chosen one” (1989:84). Georges has an 
obligation towards Majid that he cannot refuse. The Other that Majid represents, that endless 
ethical relation that makes Georges responsible for him, makes Majid his neighbour and his 
brother. 
4.2.3 Haneke’s Responsibility: Georges (and the Audience’s) Wish for Invisibility and 
 Respite from the World 
 After Georges witnesses Majid’s horrific and visceral suicide, a long shot of a 
sidewalk shows Georges emerging from a cinema, underneath the film poster of Deux frères 







Figure 15: Georges emerges from the cinema 
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 Georges’ decision to go to the cinema after witnessing Majid’s suicide recalls, once 
again, Cavell’s diagnosis of the modern spectator not wanting to bear the burdens of the 
world. In refusing to take responsibility for Majid, Georges has failed the ethical edict of 
‘thou shalt not kill’. Even though he has ‘killed’ Majid countless times in his lifespan by 
usurping Majid’s place under the sun, the physical suicide signifies the extent to which 
Georges has driven the Other to death. Georges’ wish for invisibility, his desire to live his life 
according to his rules and without being responsible for those around him, even after 
witnessing Majid’s suicide, drives him to the cinema, the act of spectatorship providing him, 
albeit momentarily, with the self-sovereign position he craves. He does not want to face the 
burden of having witnessed Majid’s suicide, at least not yet. Thus, before he goes to the 
police, before he informs Anne about everything, Georges goes to the cinema.  His outing not 
only reveals his desire to escape from his current predicament, but also for his wish for 
respite from being complicit in, and responsible for, Majid’s life. 
 My reading of the relationship between Georges and Majid in Caché through the lens 
of Levinas’ theory of the Other serves to illustrate the ways in which we are endlessly bound 
to and responsible for each other. I agree with Kelly Oliver’s apprehension, however, of 
using the language of subject and other to theorise and interpret relations, since the 
dichotomy itself is “a result of the pathology of oppression” (2001:3).26 Nevertheless, I think 
Levinas’ conception of the ‘Other’ as a placeholder reflecting the endless ethical relations 
around us is a helpful illustration of not only our relations as spectators, but also the relations 
of filmmakers. Filmmakers are endlessly responsible for their audience, because, in many 
ways, Georges represents the spectator that does not want to bear the burdens of the world. If 
what Levinas says is true, that our subjectivity is formed preontologically and that we are 
																																																								
26 Oliver argues that, while to imagine oneself as a subject, you give “the impression that [you] are an individual 
who possess a sovereign will and…that [you] have agency”, while, if another is regarded as other, you deny 
them the “the sovereignty and agency of subjectivity” (2001:3). This type of language, thus, “enables the 
dehumanisation inherent in oppression and domination” (Oliver, 2001:3). 
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endlessly responsible for each other, then I argue that it is problematic that spectators are 
offered the opportunity of ignoring, even forgetting, their relations and responsibility during 
the act of spectatorship. After his confrontation with Majid’s son, Georges goes back home, 
takes sleeping pills, closes the curtains, undresses, climbs into bed and pulls the bedspread 
over his body. The dark bedroom replicates the dark auditorium of a cinema, enabling 
Georges to go to sleep, forget about the world and lose himself in his dreams (the penultimate 
scene of a young Majid being taken away being, most probably, Georges final dream in the 
film). Recalling the post-9/11 cocooning I discussed in Chapter Two, and similar to Georges’ 
escape to the cinema or his bedroom, spectators are also allowed to flee from the world and 
its responsibilities when they watch a film and, to recall the famous metaphor, “sleep in the 
bed of the image” (Daney, 1976:262). 
 Haneke, however, assumes his responsibility as a filmmaker and does not allow his 
audience to ‘sleep in the bed of the image’. Haneke’s responsibility to his audience, I argue, 
is twofold: firstly, he has a responsibility towards those who he is representing in the film 
and, secondly, he has a responsibility to ensure the audience’s response-ability. He fulfils 
those responsibilities through the form of his film, that is, by drawing from the automatisms 
of cinema and then reflecting upon them as such, as I argued in Chapter Three. He also 
addresses topics that deal with ethical and moral questions regarding our place in society and 
the violence that we inflict upon each other, as opposed to the content on television I 
described in Chapter Two. In other words, his content echoes the form of his filmmaking. In 
creating a modernist film that implicates the audience, dealing with scenarios that ask 
difficult questions regarding our position in the world, yet refusing closure and answers, his 
responsibility towards his audience is met by refusing audiences their wish for invisibility 
and their desire to not bear the burdens of the world. He offers them an ethical place in the 
film. Even though Georges failed in responding to the call of Majid, Haneke is clearly asking 
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a different response from his audience. Not only does he call on us to take part in the 
meaning-making process of the film, but he also demands that we take responsibility for the 
Other whose place in the sun we have usurped. 
 The question is, however, does a film audience usurp the place of the Other during the 
act of viewing? If Levinas’ philosophy is hinged on the idea of ‘thou shalt not kill’, how does 
the act of spectatorship usurp the place of another under the sun? I argue that Levinas’ theory 
can be applied to the act of filmmaking and spectatorship as well. By watching a film, I argue 
that we do usurp the place of the Other under the sun, kill the Other, if that what we are 
watching are generated at the cost of real, horrific and violent experiences that provide 
material for our viewing pleasure. In this way, Haneke’s critique of Spielberg’s use of form 
and the unsuitability thereof in representing the concentration camps in Schindler’s List 
carries greater weight when considered in light of Pascal’s maxim. Are the experiences of 
those who were subjected to the gas chambers in real-life not jeopardised when it is deployed 
in service of a cheap thrill, that is, of giving us the chance to consider whether water or gas 
will come out of the shower’s nozzle? 
 
4.3 Response-ability: Bearing Witness and The White Ribbon 
4.3.1 Encounter with the Other: Opacity as a Precondition for Responsibility 
 While Haneke criticises Downfall and Schindler’s List for simplifying the complex 
histories of Adolf Hitler and the Holocaust for entertainment’s sake, I mentioned at the start 
of this dissertation that he regards Alain Resnais’ Night & Fog as the only film that deals 
with the Holocaust responsibly. What makes Night & Fog a responsible film? At a certain 
point in Night & Fog, Resnais’ voiceover lists the ranking of German officials in the Jewish 
concentration camps. He ends at the top Commandant, who oversees the routine of the camp, 
saying that the Commandant claims to know nothing of the camp, but then: 
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Who does know anything? The reality of these camps, despised by those 
who built them, and unfathomable to those who endured them – what hope 
do we have of truly capturing this reality? We can but show you the outer 
shell, the surface (Night & Fog). 
This is perhaps why Haneke regards Night & Fog to be the only film that deals with 
concentration camps responsibly. Resnais admits his ignorance and inability to capture the 
horrors that went on inside the Jewish concentration camps and remains humble in dealing 
with a subject whose lived experience he does not know. By admitting that he is unable to 
capture the horrors of the concentration camps proves that he does not know and will never 
be able to know the lived experience of the Jews in the gas chambers. There resides a truth in 
such an experience, an unattainable truth, which filmmakers should respect by admitting 
permanent, unfeigned ignorance. Since he approaches the difficult subject matter with 
humility and responsibility, I argue that the lived experience of those who truly suffered in 
the concentration camps or, their place under the sun, are not jeopardised or usurped by 
Resnais or the audience. Instead, he respects their place under the sun and the experience they 
were subjected to, without claiming or appropriating it for entertainment’s sake. 
If Resnais met his responsibility towards the subject matter, how does the audience 
respond to a film that refuses answers and acknowledges, openly, its inability to represent the 
Holocaust as a knowable totality? How does it form, influence or, perhaps even, change the 
audience’s position as spectators? In Giving an Account of Oneself, Judith Butler argues that 
a “theory of subject formation that acknowledges the limits of self-knowledge27 can serve a 
conception of ethics and, indeed, responsibility” (2005:19). For her, responsibility can only 
be assumed when one is made aware of the limits inherent to knowing oneself. In terms of 
spectatorship, an audience can only become responsible when they become aware of the 
																																																								
27 It is not that Butler says we cannot know ourselves at all. To be aware of the opacity inherent to one’s self is 
still, after all, to know something about oneself: “To know oneself as limited is still to know something about 
oneself, even if one’s knowing is afflicted by the limitation that one knows” (Butler, 2005:46). 
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limits of self-knowledge. I can never know myself completely. If the subject, or, as I argue, 
the audience, is “opaque to itself, not fully translucent and knowable to itself, it is not thereby 
licenced to do what it wants or to ignore it obligations to others” (Butler, 2005:19-20). 
Understood through Butler’s formulation, Night & Fog is constructed in such a way that the 
film is opaque to the audience, as opposed to a film that is transparent, explanatory and all-
knowing in its dealings with the Holocaust. The film admits its inability to know and 
represent and, instead, acknowledges the limits of its knowledge about the Holocaust. By 
being confronted with the opacity of the film, audiences are made aware of their own 
inability to know the Holocaust. While a film such as Schindler’s List attempts to represent 
the Holocaust as a knowable totality, thereby allowing the audience a privileged vantage 
point that eluded those who actually were in the concentration camps, Night & Fog refuses 
such a position to its audience. 
These moments of opacity about ourselves, or “unknowingness” as Butler refers to, 
only emerge when we are put in the context of relations that call upon “primary forms of 
relationality that are not always available to explicit and reflective thematisation” (2005:20). 
It is only when an audience is put in relation to something that they do not know that they 
become aware of their own opacity. The echoes of Levinas’ face-to-face encounter in 
Butler’s argument is clear if one recalls the preontological sphere in which responsibility for 
the Other is established, a responsibility that stems “from a time before my freedom – before 
my (moi) beginning, before any present” (1989:84). Since we cannot trace the relations that 
took place preontologically, our formation as subjects is thus “formed in the context of 
relations that become partially irrecoverable to us…[revealing] opacity [to be] built into our 
formation” (Butler, 2005:20). If opacity is part of what constitutes our subjectivity, then 
Resnais is correct in stating that he cannot attempt to represent the Holocaust as a knowable 
totality. Our opacity to ourselves is part of what constitutes us as human beings. Mainstream 
	 143 
films, however, usually attempt to construct narratives that aim to explain the ways in which 
we are related to each other, extracting meaning and purpose from a reality that is complex 
and confusing. As I pointed out in Chapter Three, the narratives of Hollywood films are 
usually constructed along the lines of cause and effect, in which the film answers all the 
questions and satisfies all the emotions of the audience (McKee, 1997:140). The construction 
of narratives in order to produce a coherent whole or knowable totality leads, however, to a 
false sense of unity and knowingness. A narrative that positions the audience as privileged, 
all-knowing and sagacious, as McKee appeals for, fails to make audiences aware of the 
opacity that constitute their subjectivity. In other words, if a film depicts a world in which 
complete self-knowledge is attainable and everything can be known, the audience is not 
confronted with the limits that are inherent to their subjectivity and that of others. Not being 
aware of their opacity, audiences are allowed to revel and enjoy a film without being 
obligated or responsible for it.  
 If moments of unknowingness arise in relation to the Other, that we become aware of 
our own opacity when confronted with another we do not know, Butler argues that it is 
“precisely by virtue of the subject’s opacity to itself that it incurs and sustains some of its 
most important ethical bonds” (2005:20). As the film succeeds in conveying the 
irrecoverability of the Holocaust and the audience becomes opaque to themselves when 
watching Night & Fog, the viewing situation becomes a face-to-face encounter. Since the 
audience is not allowed to know the Holocaust completely, they are confronted with what 
they do not know, which means that they are made aware of their responsibility towards the 
representation of the Holocaust. These moments of unknowingness that arise when the 
audience watches Night & Fog, however, can only occur if the audience recognises them as 
such. Is that what Haneke means when he calls for audience recognition, to let them 
recognise the irrecoverability attached to violence and thus become aware of their own 
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opacity? Certainly, to an extent, but how do we recognise an unknowability? Kelly Oliver 
asks how it is possible to recognise something that is unfamiliar and disruptive, for, “[i]f it is 
unfamiliar, how can we perceive it or know it or recognise it?” (2001:2). What she calls for, 
instead, is to go beyond recognition towards an act of witnessing, a process that relies on 
address and response (2001:2). Before I continue with the opacity of the Other (which I will 
do with Amour), I will make a brief detour in outlining the act of witnessing. I will explain 
and contextualise Oliver’s theory of witnessing through a reading of The White Ribbon, by 
arguing that, by positioning the audiences as witnesses, Haneke enables audiences to not only 
recognise that what is shown, but also go beyond recognition in order to secure an ethical 
position for themselves in the film. 
 
4.3.2 The Audience’s Response-ability: Bearing Witness 
 In her book Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (2001), Kelly Oliver recalls the 
testimony of a woman who witnessed the uprising of Jewish prisoners who set fire to 
Auschwitz. While the woman remembers seeing four chimneys burn down, historians pointed 
out there was only one chimney, a mistake that motivated them to disqualify her testimony on 
the grounds of unreliability. Psychoanalysts, however, countered the historians’ mistrust by 
arguing that the woman was not testifying to the number of chimneys, but rather to 
something more profound and important, which is “the seemingly unimaginable occurrence 
of Jewish resistance at Auschwitz, that is to say, the historical truth of Jewish resistance at 
Auschwitz” (Oliver, 2001:1). Oliver explains that the woman was trying to witness to 
something that cannot be perceived, that is, something unrecognisable that goes beyond 
comprehension. Moreover, the woman’s position and identity structured her experience. She 
was a Jew in Auschwitz, a prisoner in a deadly, anti-Semitic concentration camp and a 
woman in the mid-twentieth century. She thus occupied a “particular historical position in a 
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concrete context that constitute[d] her actuality as well as her possibilities” (Oliver, 2001:16). 
We are therefore compelled to interpret her testimony through the lens of her socio-historical 
position. Due to her point of view, her witness to the Jewish resistance is undeniably unique 
and distinct. 
 For Oliver our lived experience is thus sustained between the tension of our subject 
position and subjectivity. What is the difference between the two? The woman’s subject 
position, for example, is her socio-historical position in the culture and context of occupied 
Poland. In other words, history, circumstance and her relations with the finite world 
determined her position as subject. Subjectivity, on the other hand, is “experienced as the 
sense of agency and response-ability that are constituted in the infinite encounter with 
otherness, which is fundamentally ethical” (Oliver, 2001:17). In other words, the woman’s 
subjectivity is dependent on her sense of agency and ability to respond to her ethical 
environment and to others in it. Did she have a sense of agency in Auschwitz? For Oliver, our 
sense of agency and ability to respond is destroyed by oppression, torture and persecution, 
which lead to the destruction of our subjectivity (2001:17). The woman’s chance to witness 
to the horrors she experienced before the historians and psychoanalysts, however, restored 
her subjectivity. Thus, for Oliver, witnessing forms the basis of, or restores, our subjectivity, 
since the roots of our subjectivity is both our ability to be addressed (address-ability) and our 
ability to respond to the address (response-ability) (2001:7). Echoing Levinas’ theory of 
responsibility, Oliver draws from psychology and neuroscience to argue that our receptivity 
to the energies in our environments makes us ethically obligated to each other, since “we are 
by virtue of our environment and by virtue of relationships with other people” (2001:15). Our 
ethical responsibilities and obligations are thus rooted in our subjectivity, requiring us to 
“respond to our environment and other people in ways that open up rather than close off the 
possibility of response” (Oliver, 2001:15). Her understanding of subjectivity resonates with 
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Butler’s theory of subject formation, which, as I mentioned before, and will elaborate on 
later, is formed in the context of relations that are irrecoverable and opaque to us. 
 Audiences have different subject positions. Every single spectator occupies a specific 
socio-historical position in a specific culture, which will influence the manner in which they 
interpret and experience a film. Their subjectivity, however, is only constituted in the infinite 
encounter with otherness. If the audience’s address-ability forms part of their subjectivity, 
then the film has to address the audience in such a way that they have to respond, in other 
words, make them aware of their response-ability. When we are addressed by something that 
is opaque to us, we become response-able and, by implication, responsible. Similar to Haneke 
having his invisibility ruptured by Tom Jones’ address, he became aware of his response-
ability, that is, aware of his position as spectator and subjectivity, and thus responded to the 
address: he became aware of his complicity. In this way, Haneke became responsible for the 
viewing situation, a responsibility that has, eventually, made him the filmmaker he is today. 
The responsibility intrinsic to subjectivity, for Oliver, is twofold. Firstly, responsibility 
carries the possibility of response, called response-ability. Secondly, born from the possibility 
of response, we have an ethical obligation to not only respond to others but also to enable 
response-ability from them (Oliver, 2001:15). As a filmmaker with subjectivity, Haneke’s 
responsibility calls on him to address his audience by enabling them to become response-
able. He has an ethical obligation to respond to his audience and, consequently, enable their 
response-ability. If the process of witnessing constitutes our subjectivity through our ability 
to be addressed by and respond to another, then I argue that audiences should, as opposed to 
passive spectators, be positioned as witnesses to a film, so that, through address and response, 
they are made aware of their subjectivity as spectators. 
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4.3.3 The Audience as Witness in The White Ribbon 
 How does Haneke reposition his spectators as witnesses? After the opening credits of 
The White Ribbon, over a black screen, a voice narrates:  
I don’t know if the story I want to tell you is entirely true. Some of it I only 
know from hearsay. After so many years, a lot of it is still obscure and many 
questions remain unanswered. But I feel I must talk about the strange events 
that occurred in our village. They could perhaps clarify certain things that 
happened in this country (The White Ribbon). 
 
 Within the first two sentences, the narrator admits the unreliability of his account. He 
confesses that he will not be able to give a comprehensive report, since he is uncertain about 
the specificities. Even though the country he refers to, Germany, has a complex and dreadful 
history, he never explicitly mentions the Second World War or Nazism, leaving the audience 
to make, if they please, the connection themselves. Nevertheless, the narrator hopes that the 
story he bore witness to might shed some light on the complexities that characterised 
Germany in the twentieth century. Fourteen minutes into the film, his identity is revealed as 
the teacher, proving that he was an eyewitness to most of the occurrences. Even though he 
experienced most of the incidents first hand, he admits his inability of providing an 
encompassing account of the strange events that took place in the village. In other words, he 
does not construct a knowable totality as McKee calls for in his screenwriting bible, in his 
retelling of the story. Instead, his narrative is punctuated with uncertainties, such as “If I 
remember correctly…” (The White Ribbon). All the scenes and recollections are up for the 
audience to interpret themselves, since the narrator is not willing to read any situation for or 
instead of the audience. By admitting his ignorance regarding the strange events that are 
about to unfold, the narrator addresses the audience by inviting them to witness the 
occurrences that took place in the village of Eichwald. 
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The strange occurrences that the teacher witnesses to are instances of violence that 
took place in the village. He narrates various events such as the accident of the doctor, whose 
horse tripped over a wire spun between two trees, the torture of the baron’s son, Sigi, who 
was found upside down in the sawmill, his trousers pulled down and bleeding from lashes, 
the burning of the barn and the disfigurement of Karli’s eyes, the midwife’s child who suffers 
from Down syndrome. He also narrates the death of the farmhand’s wife who fell through the 
floor of the sawmill and their eldest son, Max, exacting revenge on the baron by destroying 
his crop. The eldest son’s vengeance, however, drives the farmhand to suicide, leaving his 
eight children to fend for themselves. While the perpetrators of these acts of violence, apart 
from Max, are never revealed to the audience, the teacher has his suspicions as to who might 
be culpable. When the steward’s wife gives birth to a boy, Ferdinand is unhappy about the 
baby’s gender. Later, the baby gets sick due to a window that was left open. When 
Ferdinand’s sister, Erna, tells the teacher that she dreamt her brother opened the window, she 
also says she dreamt that something will happen to Karli. After Erna’s ‘premonition’ comes 
true and Karli is severely attacked, the teacher realises that the children, especially Klara and 
Martin, might be implicated in the acts of violence that has plagued the village. 
In addition to the violence, the teacher also witnesses to other events that took place 
in the village that might contextualise the strange occurrences. After Klara and Martin arrive 
home one evening and their father, the pastor, warns them of their punishment and caning 
Figure 16: The teacher questions Klara and Martin 
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that will follow the next day, the teacher finds Martin balancing himself treacherously on a 
wooden beam high above the ground near the river. He orders him down, rebukes his 
behaviour and asks why Martin would do something so dangerous. Martin answers that he 
was giving God a chance to kill him and, since God did not do so, “he must be pleased” (The 
White Ribbon). Later in the film, a young boy named Rudi asks his older sister Anna what the 
word ‘dead’ means. She answers that ‘dead’ refers to when you stop living and that, 
eventually, everyone will die. Rudi throws his bowl of soup to the ground in frustration, 
angry at the dismal prospects of mortality. After his mother falls down the sawmill, Kurti 
curiously approaches her body as it awaits burial, lifting the white cloth that covers her 
lifeless face. The flirting with, frustration of and curiosity with death has an effect on the 
youth of the village who, clearly, becomes disillusioned by their parents’ blindness to their 
hypocrisy and passivity, especially the pastor, the doctor and the baron of the estate. After the 
pastor arouses Martin’s guilt for his masturbatory behaviour, the next scene depicts the 
doctor having intercourse with the midwife. At a different stage, Rudi walks in on his father, 
the doctor, molesting Anna. Max, on the other hand, blames the baron for the death of his 
mother. When his father fails to do something about it, he takes matters into his own hands 
by destroying the baron’s cabbages. When the baron’s wife expresses her fear of the 
villagers, her husband ignores her qualms and, instead, questions her suspected adultery.  
Through the teacher’s narration and Haneke’s construction, the audience witnesses 
the atrocities, oppression and hypocrisy that characterise the village. What does the 
audience’s position as witnesses entail? Oliver attaches a double meaning to the act of 
witnessing. Witnessing, firstly, entails an eyewitness testimony that is based on first-hand 
experience. The second meaning, which she deems the heart of subjectivity, entails bearing 
witness to something that goes beyond recognition and cannot be seen (2001:16). The teacher 
that narrates the film witnessed the strange events that occurred in the village and invites the 
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audience to do the same. Both the teacher and audience are thus witnesses, in both senses of 
the word, to the events of The White Ribbon. The teacher was, firstly, an eyewitness to what 
happened in the village, even if most of it is based on hearsay. Secondly, by relaying his 
testimony, he is declaring that he bore witness to something that goes beyond that which can 
be seen. Similar to the Jewish woman who bore witness to something that goes beyond her 
perceptions and recognition, that is, Jewish resistance, the narrator bore witness to something 
that goes beyond recognition as well. In narrating a story in which he does not have all the 
answers, yet bore witness to, the teacher is hoping that he might shed some light on the 
generation that grew up to become the Nazi’s. Is this how the seeds of fascism was sown? 
Will these children become complicit, as adults, in the Holocaust? Being invited by the 
teacher’s narration to be eyewitnesses to that which he witnessed, the narrator enables the 
audience to bear witness to these occurrences that might make them consider, for themselves, 
whether the seeds of fascisms was sown in patriarchal and rigid Protestant German societies 
in the beginning of the twentieth century (see Haneke in Calhoun, 2009). The beginning of 
the First World War signalled the first big shift in societies, breaking away from the feudal 
systems that existed for thousands of years. Yet, Haneke maintains that the film is not solely 
preoccupied with the rise of German fascism, but rather aims to analyse the origins of evil, 
radicalism and terrorism in any given country (Haneke in Calhoun, 2009). By witnessing the 
events of The White Ribbon, the audience is given the opportunity to respond to Haneke’s 
investigation of the origins of terror. How does the audience’s position as eyewitnesses and 
bearing witness enable them to respond? 
For Oliver, the tension that exists between eyewitness testimony and bearing witness 
“both positions the subject in finite history and necessitates the infinite response-ability of 
subjectivity” (2001:16). The audience is not only positioned in terms of the finite history of 
early twentieth century Germany, but are also situated in an infinite relation with a history 
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which necessitates, in the end, their response. Since, Haneke argues, most films about the 
Holocaust get caught up in the history and thereby fail to implicate the audience, Haneke 
argues that The White Ribbon carries a universal significance, suggesting the existence of a 
link between our behaviour at home and that of the outer world (Haneke in Calhoun, 2009). 
He wishes to show how forms of oppression can make one believe a liberator who comes 
along and promises salvation. He draws a similarity with the Pied Piper who comes and saves 
a village from a rat infestation, is refused payment and thus charms the children away from 
the village, and Adolf Hitler, who promised salvation to the generation who grew up in an 
oppressive, feudal system before the First World War and was subjected to harsh and poor 
conditions thereafter. For Haneke, it is the “war that takes place between people that makes 
them receptive to such ideologies” (Haneke in Calhoun, 2009). Through the microcosm of 
Eichwald, Haneke hopes that, through witnessing, the audience will be able to think about the 
ways in which the seeds of fascism and terrorism are sown. In order to recognise these seeds 
and the slow violence that steadily and stealthily produces bouts of visible violence, the 
audience must recognise something that goes beyond recognition.  
How does the audience move beyond recognition through witnessing, for example, 
the experiences of Martin? The audience’s repositioning in The White Ribbon as witnesses 
enables them, I argue, to testify both to something that they can see with their eyes, for 
example Martin’s punishment and humiliation at the hands of his father, as well as to bear 
witness to something that they cannot see, which is the inklings of Martin’s gravitation 
towards fascist ideology. In bearing witness to something that audiences believe through 
faith, as opposed to the juridical sense of witnessing that of first-hand knowledge (Oliver, 
2001:18), I argue that the audience responds to Martin’s story in a way that allows them to 
take part in the film’s meaning-making process. Martin’s character is opaque to the audience: 
he challenges God by walking on a wooden beam, we hear his yelps of pain when he is 
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caned, we do not see him masturbating, yet we see his hands tied to his bed. We never see 
him commit any of the heinous crimes that plague the village and he never confesses to them. 
Yet, through witnessing, we attempt to formulate, strain to understand and try to comprehend 
the effect of Martin’s upbringing and how he processes these experiences that might 
formulate the fascist ideology he will, most probably, support in twenty years’ time. As 
Oliver argues, we are by virtue of others. Our response-ability to Martin’s story, thus, makes 
us aware of the “ethical and social responsibility to those others who sustain us” (2001:19). 
We have, in other words, not only become response-able to Martin’s experience, but also 
responsible for what his experience might mean to others and to us today.  
 
Haneke sustains his audience’s subjectivity through the process of witnessing. He 
thus has a “responsibility to [the audience’s] response-ability, to the ability to respond” 
(Oliver, 2001:19). Oliver explains that we have an obligation to ensure that others are 
enabled to respond in such a way that “opens up rather than closes off the possibility of 
response” (2001:19). She draws from Levinas to explain that we are responsible for the 
other’s response-ability. In terms of filmmaking, then, filmmakers are responsible for the 
audience’s response-ability, in other words, for the audience’s ability to respond. This 
Figure 17: Martin being accused by his father 
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responsibility is, for Oliver, an absolute necessity if we wish to “serve subjectivity, and 
therefore humanity” (2001:19). A filmmaker’s responsibility towards the audience is thus an 
imperative and duty to his or her neighbour, the spectator. In The White Ribbon, Haneke 
upholds his responsibility by constructing, not only Martin’s experience, but also the whole 
story of the village, in such a way that it is open for interpretation, which, consequently, 
opens the possibility of response from the audience. Devices such as the contradictory and 
fragmentary nature of the characters’ experiences (most of it off-screen), the black and white 
cinematography as well as the use of the narrator aims to “create a distance from a false 
naturalism that suggests we know exactly what happened” (Haneke in Calhoun, 2009). The 
knowable totality is exchanged for one that is fractured and opaque. We have to keep the 
possibility of response open. How is the possibility of response kept open? In order to answer 
the question, I will now return to Butler’s postulation about our opacity in order to, in 
keeping with Oliver’s witnessing, elucidate how an on-going recognition, or beyond 
recognition, keeps the Other alive.  
 
4.4. I Will Never Know You: On-Going Recognition in Amour 
4.4.1 Inflicting Ethical Violence: “I Know You” 
 When a film projects a world that is knowable, understandable and explainable, the 
audience is, consequently, offered a position of sagacity, knowingness and power. They get 
the opportunity to see a world in which all contradictions and complexities are solved for the 
sake of a happy and conclusive ending. They are not confronted with the opacity present in 
themselves, since the world viewed affirms that everything is transparent and explainable. 
When a film presents such a simplistic and naïve view of the world, in which each cause has 
an effect and every problem can be solved, the film testifies to a worldview that is false. We 
are not able to recognise the Other, because such a worldview does not allow for differences, 
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contradictions, complexities and the opacity that, not only constitutes our humanity, but also 
binds us together. Butler makes clear that our own opacity occasions our capacity to confer 
recognition on someone else, an ethics that is “based on our shared, invariable and partial 
blindness about ourselves” (2005:41). We need to be confronted with opacity in order to 
become aware of our own opacity. Therefore, if a film acknowledges its own opacity, that is, 
its inability to present a world as a knowable totality, then the film recognises the audience’s 
opacity, makes them aware of their own opacity, which, consequently, enables them to 
recognise the film and the Other depicted in it. When it comes to scenes of pain and 
suffering, how can an audience recognise the horrors of violence if not made aware of the 
opacity and irrecoverability thereof? When pain and suffering is depicted as a knowable 
totality, understandable and transparent, or, even, as entertainment, we usurp the place of the 
Other who experienced and suffered such brutality and horror in real-life. Will our 
recognition, however, ever be enough? Or should the filmmaker ensure that the audience 
continues to recognise the irrecoverability of suffering, thereby keeping their awareness of 
the Other’s opacity alive? 
 Amour tells the story of Georges and Anne28 who are two octogenarian, married 
musicians living in a bourgeoisie apartment in Paris. One morning, Anne suffers a stroke. 
After her operation fails, she is paralysed on her right side and put in a wheelchair. She 
makes Georges promise that he will never let her be taken to a hospital or nursing home 
again. Georges starts to take care of her, but she expresses her wish to die after her attempted 
suicide is foiled when he returns home. Georges continues to take care of Anne while her 
																																																								
28 By now its clear that most of Haneke’s characters are called Georges and Anne (French films) or Georg and 
Anna (German-speaking films). Evi/Eva and Benny are also recurring names. By naming most of his characters 
the same, Haneke aims to work “against the individualisation that the naming of fictional characters 
conventionally aspires to”, thereby inviting “spectators to conceive of these characters as related to one another 
[…], as representing multiple versions of a particular type, not particular individuals at all” (Lawrence, 
2010:75). Similar to the first eight minutes of The Seventh Continent, in which the Schröbers are introduced 
without faces or personality, the names also suggest that his characters simultaneously refer to no one and 
everyone. For Michael Lawrence, the names are indicative of the characters’ “incarnations or reincarnations 
rather than distinct fictional human individuals realistically represented in consecutive films” (2010:75). 
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condition goes from bad to worse. Their daughter, Eva, wants her father to place her in some 
sort of care, but Georges refuses. As the film progresses, Anne loses most of her bodily 
functions as well as her ability to speak coherently. Near the end of the film, Georges 
consoles Anne by telling her a story from his childhood. When he finishes the story and she 
calms down, he reaches for a pillow and smothers her until she dies. After he buys flowers, 
cuts the tips off, chooses a dress from Anne’s closet and tapes the door shut, he wakes up one 
morning and sees Anne washing the dishes. Upon her request, he takes his shoes, puts on his 
coat and follows her out of the apartment. 
 Similar to the narrator’s invitation to the audience in The White Ribbon, Haneke 
forces us to not only watch, but also witness the events that lead up to Anne’s death 
(Wijdicks, 2013:25). Anne’s stroke is not spectacular, her suffering is not depicted in the 
closed romantic way that typical Hollywood films do, there are no elucidations about her or 
Georges’ feelings, no emotional music underscoring their experience or any sentimental last 
words. As Eelco Wijdicks, a professor of neurology, points out, many films29 that deal with 
degenerative neurologic diseases either represent the condition poorly or exaggerate a certain 
aspect thereof. Many would focus on, for example, the desire to engage with the patient and 
maintain the loving relationship, resulting in a sentimental or melodramatic story that aims to 
make the disease understandable and thus consumable for the audience. Amour, on the other 
hand, deals with the “human toll on relationships when a love one declines, facing the 
constant threat of crumbling away until there is no vitality left” (Wijdicks, 2013:25). In 
keeping Anne’s suffering free from sentimentality, Haneke allows the audience to recognise 
her pain as something that is irrecoverable and impenetrable. Since her suffering is not 
romanticised, the audience is forced to suspend their expectations for a sealed-off and 
																																																								
29 Wijdicks’ examples include Iris (2001), Away From Her (2006), which deals with Alzheimer’s disease, and 
Legends of the Fall (1994), Flawless (2007) and Diving Bell and the Butterfly (2007), which depict characters 
that suffer a stroke. 
	 156 
clarifying depiction of suffering. Her degeneration is opaque, making the audience aware of 
their own opacity and thus enabling their response-ability. 
 Since a subject is formed when the limits of self-knowledge is acknowledged (Butler, 
2005:19), Butler argues that by suspending the demand for self-identity or complete 
coherence when encountering the Other, we counter a certain ethical violence. Ethical 
violence, she explains, demands that we “manifest and maintain self-identity at all times and 
require others to do the same” (2005:42). This, once again, recalls Levinas’ concern of 
usurping the place of the Other for one’s own benefit. By claiming my place under the sun, 
like Georges in Caché, and refusing to acknowledge the mistakes, flaws or contradictions that 
exist within me, through me or by virtue of me, I inflict ethical violence on the Other. Thus, 
if we claim to know ourselves fully and present ourselves coherently, we then “fail in some 
ways that are nevertheless essential to who we are” (Butler, 2005:42). There is a scene in 
Amour in which a nurse combs a bedridden Anne’s hair, narrating her actions as if to an 
infant: “There you go…You want to look your very best so everybody can admire you. 
There. You want to look? Hold on.” She holds up a mirror, but Anne, with the little 
movement and agency she has left, turns her head away. The nurse, however, continues in her 
childish voice: “Well? Isn’t that beautiful?” (Amour). The next day, Georges fires her. She is 
furious and protests: “Who do you think you are? I’ve been doing this for years. I don’t need 
you to teach me my job” and adds, “You are a mean old man. I pity you” (Amour). When the 
scene is read through Butler’s formulation of ethical violence, the nurse’s action reveals her 
maintenance of self-identity, of knowing herself fully and coherently and the ethical violence 
such confidence inflicts. She knows who she is: a nurse with many years of experience. 
Nobody can tell her how to do her job. Thus, by implication, she claims to know and 
understand Anne as well. She objectifies Anne and treats her as a simple, disabled patient. 
She does not, however, respect Anne’s suffering or acknowledge the person, with 
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experiences, tastes, desires and beliefs, behind the suffering. If she acknowledged Anne’s 
personhood, she would have combed her hair with reverence, respectful of the other she is 
serving. In other words, it is easier for the nurse to treat Anne like a child if she claims to 
know and understand Anne, which is, to her, simply a disabled and elderly patient. By 
protecting her ipseity, the nurse objectifies Anne and inflicts ethical violence on her 
personhood. Georges, however, knows that Anne is a person to whom he is, before all others, 
responsible for. When he tells the nurse that “I sincerely hope that one day somebody treats 
you like you treat your patients and that you have no way to defend yourself” (Amour), he 
makes the nurse’s arrogance visible. She, however, remains blind to the ethical violence she 
inflicts through claiming to know herself and Anne fully. Even her interaction with Georges 
reveals how she pigeonholes him as well, as simply a “mean old man”. She does not allow 
for the possibility that he might be right or that she might have done something wrong. Her 
arrogance, self-importance and self-assurance lead her to usurp a place that could have been 










Figure 18: Anne refuses to look into the mirror 
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4.4.2 The Ethical Stance and Suspending Judgment: “Who Are You? 
 After Georges tells Anne a story from his childhood, she remarks that she has never 
heard the story before, upon which he answers that there are a lot of stories he has never told 
her. Teasingly, she warns him that he should be careful not to ruin his image during old age 
through these unheard of stories. When Georges playfully asks her which image she refers to, 
Anne answers him: “You are a monster sometimes, but you are kind” (Amour). The paradox 
in Anne’s baffling answer reveals, I argue, the opacity she acknowledges in Georges’ 
character. Her answer also, perhaps, indicates her refusal to pigeonhole Georges, thereby 
allowing for contradictions in his character. She is thus receptive to the possibility of always 
learning something new about him. Butler theorises that we should all assume an ethical 
stance towards one another. The ethical stance consists in asking the question “Who are 
you?” If we ask the question because we have a desire to recognise another, the desire is 
under an obligation to “keep itself alive as desire and not to resolve itself” (2005:43). If we 
ask the question, however, in order to know another fully, in other words, to be able to say 
‘Oh, now I know who you are’, we cease to recognise the other (Butler, 2005:43). The 
question that the ethical stance entails, thus, has to be asked without expecting a full or final 
answer. Georges and Anne both understand that, even though they have been married for 
many years, they will never know each other completely. The fact that, right before her death, 
Georges tells her another story of his childhood that she has not heard before, proves how 
they keep getting to know each other. In the same vein, Oliver says that phrases such as “I 
cannot know you”, “I cannot be you” and “I will never master you” allow for relationships to 
not only continue recognising each other, but also to move beyond domination. Our 
relationships are sustained by asking who you are and allowing the question to go 
unanswered. We must never expect a final answer. But, as soon as I claim to know you, 
declare that I understand you fully, I stop “having a relationship with you and instead have a 
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relationship with myself, with my own projections onto you. When I think I know you, the 
relationship is over” (Oliver, 2001:210). In this way, the relationship between Georges and 
Anne is sustained, even after death, because, for them, there is always one more thing to 
know and learn of the other. 
 Georges approaches Anne’s slow deterioration in a similar way. He recognises her 
pain as unique and as something that he will never understand. Yet, by acknowledging the 
opacity inherent to her suffering and the inaccessibility of her experience, he is able to 
respond (response-ability) and thus become responsible for her. In a similar way, the audience 
becomes response-able to Anne’s suffering due to the opacity and restraint of Haneke’s 
depiction. Haneke has mentioned his disdain for actors who portray someone suffering or 
dying with dramatic fury. For Haneke, the effect of such a spectacular representation of 
violence, suffering or death is twofold. Firstly, such a representation robs individuals, who 
truly suffered and died in real-life, of their last possession, which is the truth of such an 
experience. Secondly, it robs spectators of their most precious possession as viewers, namely 
their imagination. Audiences are “forced into the humiliating perspective of a voyeur at the 
keyhole who has no choice but to feel what is being felt […] and think what is being thought” 
(Haneke, 2010(a):569). Such a representation reduces the irrecoverability of someone’s 
suffering in real-life for a sentimental, emotional and entertaining version thereof, sealing off 
the possibility of response. Anne’s slow deterioration, however, is not acted with dramatic 
fury in order to evoke melodramatic tears from the curious eyes that ogle at her suffering. But 
does a teary reaction not count as a response? Since the audience is privileged in witnessing 
Anne’s degeneration by being intimately present, their proximity allows, yet does not 
guarantee, an ethical response. Susan Sontag criticises photographs of atrocity that aim to 
move those who see it. She argues that, even though an emotional response to brutality seems 
sincere, being moved is not necessarily better. The illusionary proximity between spectators 
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and the cruelty depicted suggests a link between those that suffer and the privileged viewer. 
Sontag argues, however, that this link is false. The proximity to atrocity, however, usually 
generates a feeling of sentimentality and makes us sympathetic, causing us to believe that we 
are not accomplices in that which caused the suffering, but rather that our “sympathy 
proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence 30 ” (Sontag, 2003:91-92). While 
photographs of pain or suffering performed with dramatic fury aim to make us teary eyed and 
emotional, such a sealed-off form of representation allows us to absolve ourselves of the pain 
and suffering of those who truly experience pain and suffering. We argue that, since we cried 
during the film, we have done our part, our ‘tears are our bit’, but in actual fact our emotional 
driven reactions to such provocative images are “exactly what keeps us at a distance from 
them” (Aaron, 2007:116-117). In essence, the sealed-off illusion that such spectacular 
representation provides serves only to satisfy our solipsistic desire for catharsis.  
 If Anne’s suffering was performed with melodramatic emotion in order to evoke tears, 
the audience is not taking responsibility for the horrors that old age might entail, but is rather 
absolved from responsibility. Being moved to tears or sympathy is the audience’s solipsistic 
way of reassuring themselves that they are able to recognise the horrors of old age, but that is 
usually all, as “involuntary emotion is the opposite of reflection and implication” (Aaron, 
2007:116). The audience is not able to reflect on the suffering they witness, because they are 
too engrossed in their solipsistic emotions. Crying is a form of catharsis. Haneke, however, 
does not allow for catharsis. Neither does he allow the audience respite from their complicity 
and responsibility. Even though the audience might expect Amour to serve their desire for 
catharsis or even shed light on the pain and suffering that old age might bring, in other words, 
																																																								
30 Aaron misquotes Sontag in her book by mistaking “impotence” for “importance” (Aaron, 2007:117). Even 
though this is an error, I find it interesting that Aaron’s (mis-)quotation still makes sense when read in the 
context of Sontag’s work. If we become teary-eyed when witnessing horrors, not only does our sympathy keep 
us from doing anything about another’s suffering (impotence), but our tears is a way of reassuring ourselves that 
we are able to not only recognise suffering, but also to respond to it in our own solipsistic way.  Our sympathy, 
then, also proclaims our arrogance (importance) of thinking we understand and fathom the suffering that we see. 
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explicate the Other through its depiction, once again, we must not expect an answer that will 
satisfy. By asking “who are you, Anne?” or “what is suffering like when one has a stroke?”, 
we learn more by letting the question go unanswered. Similar to Georges’ approach to Anne’s 
suffering, Haneke refuses the audience to know or to understand the suffering that Anne is 
going through. By refusing the audience the satisfaction of a full answer and letting the 
question remain open and enduring, Haneke enables the Other to live, since “life might be 
understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we may try to give of it” (Butler, 
2005:43). The perishing and deterioration of a loved one exceeds any account a filmmaker can 
recreate. Anne’s pain and suffering can only be conveyed ethically if Haneke remains reverent 
to that what he does not know. The audience will then, in turn, be able to respond to her 
suffering. Her suffering remains opaque to me, I cannot and will never be able to understand 
the suffering she is going through. Thus, I can respond to, engage with, struggle with and 
wrestle with the morality that faces, not only Anne and Georges, but also us all.  
 But how, then, do we respond to Georges smothering of Anne? Haneke gives no 
explicit explanation for Georges’ decision nor does he pronounce judgment over Georges’ 
action. Is the onus placed on the audience? How do we judge Georges’ action? For Butler, 
before we can judge another, we must be in some relation to them, since our relations ground 
and inform our ethical judgments (2005:45). The audience is already related and ethically 
bounded to Georges, through the opacity of his character and his decision to smother Anne. 
Before we condemn his actions, then, we must remember that we are related to Georges, 
regardless whether his actions merit condemnation. Butler says that if we remember that we 
are related to those who we condemn, we still have the chance to learn and be addressed by 
them, as well as to be educated by “what their personhood says about the range of human 
possibility that exists” (2005:45). Can we discover something about Georges’ love and 
humanity through his decision to kill his wife? Haneke’s suspension of judgment together 
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with the audience’s relation to Georges, allows the audience to be addressed by and then 
respond to Georges’ action. Our response-ability to Georges’ action through a suspension of 
judgment enables our responsibility, because, as Butler says, one of the ways we become 
responsible for another is when we suspend our judgments, for “[c]ondemnation, denunciation 
and excoriation work as quick ways to posit an ontological difference between judge and 
judged, even to purge oneself of the other” (2005:46). If we condemn Georges for smothering 
Anne without regarding our infinite relation to him, we run the risk of purging and 
externalising ourselves of our opacity (Butler, 2005:46). The ethical stance that Georges takes 
towards Anne, our relation to her suffering and Haneke’s suspension of judgment all work 
together to enable the audience to reflect ethically on the pain, suffering and eventual death 
that takes place in Amour. In the context of the film’s title, what is love when the one you love 
wants to die? Who are you, amour? In order to address the question, truly respond to the 
question and strain towards a possible answer, the question is left unanswered, it remains open 
and, just as Anne leads Georges out of the apartment at the end of the film, lets the other live. 









  Figure 19: Leaving the apartment at the end of Amour 
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4.5 Conclusion: Harmonisation of Content and Form in Au hasard Balthazar 
 At the start of this chapter, I mentioned Haneke’s experience of watching Hamlet and 
a film set in Africa, fascinations which presented a new world through displacement, while 
Tom Jones recognised his presence and made him aware of his complicity. Even though he 
realised that his position as spectator rendered him into a “helpless victim of the story being 
told and its teller” (Haneke, 2010(a):567), Haneke admits that he still hungered for cinematic 
stories. Nevertheless, he was still bothered by the idea that he was being manipulated through 
these enchanting experiences (2010(a):567). Then, as a university student a few years later, 
Haneke’s saw Robert Bresson’s Au hasard Balthazar (1966). The film tells the life story of a 
donkey, baptised Balthazar, who is adopted by a French family. He grows up with Marie, the 
daughter in the family, but is separated from her after a few years. Balthazar goes from owner 
to owner, most of who treat him cruelly and exploit him, while Marie likewise suffers at the 
hands of some of Balthazar’s various owners. The film ends when Balthazar is shot whilst 
carrying a load for smugglers as they attempt to cross a border. He dies the next morning. 
While spectators are usually “aligned with an on-screen suffering character who tells us what 
to react and to feel” (Aaron, 2007:115), Haneke points out that Balthazar neither invites 
identification nor prescribes the audience with emotions. Instead, Balthazar is a “projection 
screen, a blank sheet of paper, whose sole task is to be filled with the viewers’ thoughts and 
feelings” (2010(a):568). While actors peddle their “ability to exteriorise emotion”, Balthazar 
does not pretend to suffer or grieve when he is exploited (Haneke, 2010(a):569). His death at 
the end of the film, for example, is not spectacular or loaded with sentimentality. Balthazar’s 
expression remains motionless, even though blood oozes from his bullet’s wound. After a 
herd of sheepdogs bark and sheep encircle him, their bells ringing, Balthazar is revealed on 
the ground, breathing his last. Au hasard Balthazar stands in contrast to Cavell’s critique of 
film allowing us to view the world unseen and relieving us of its burdens. Rather, the film 
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succeeds at implicating the audience, as the audience is invited to bear witness to Balthazar’s 
life and thus enabled to respond. 
 Apart from the donkey’s ability to embody the automatism of real-life through its 
inability to act and pretend, what about Au hasard Balthazar satisfied Haneke’s misgivings 
regarding film’s power to manipulate? Haneke cites Robert Bresson’s Notes sur le 
cinematograph (1975) in which the filmmaker wrote: “Do not think of your film beyond the 
means that you have chosen for yourself” (2010(a):573).31 Haneke applies Bresson’s adage in 
today’s media saturated society, a culture in which the form determines the content (as I 
discussed in Chapter Two), to mean that a film’s form can never determine its content. 
Haneke argues that, when one watches Au hasard Balthazar, it is impossible to tell whether 
the means, or form, determined the content or vice versa. For Haneke, the unity of content and 
form makes everything dissolve into pure relationality, since it leaves “no room for ideology 
or interpretation of the world, commentary or consolation” (2010(a):573). Instead, the 
audience is given the chance to relate to the film, respond to the film and draw their own 
conclusions. While audiences are usually “luxuriously accommodated within the lies” by 
films and media in which form is given precedent over content, Au hasard Balthazar opens 
the hearts and minds of the spectators through a language which captures “the traces of life” 
(Haneke, 2010(a):573). By harmonising the film’s content and form, I argue that Bresson 
imbues Au hasard Balthazar with the same opacity that constitutes our subjectivity, since his 
film’s form does not allow for a coherent and all-knowing perspective.  
 Opacity is thus an important precondition for responsibility, an effect that is achieved 
only through the filmmaker’s techniques of reduction and omission. In Caché, The White 
Ribbon and Amour Haneke omits critical information. We do not know who sent the tapes in 
Caché and are neither consoled with an answer to the First World’s implication in the Third 
																																																								
31 “Ne pense pas à ton film en dehors des moyens que tu t'es fait” (Bresson, 1975). 
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World’s poverty. We are left to connect the dots between fascism and the children’s 
upbringing in The White Ribbon ourselves. We are not given the privilege of leaving the 
theatre after Amour with a sense of closure, consolation or reassurance, but instead are forced 
to respond to and confront the reality of old age and the true meaning of love. In other words, 
“[r]eduction and omission become the magic keys to activating the viewer”, a technique 
which, for Haneke, takes the spectator seriously (Haneke, 2010(a):573). If it is Haneke’s 
responsibility to address the audience in such a way that they become aware of their address-
ability and response-ability, then reduction and omission of that what cannot be known, that 
is, the Other’s experience, enables Haneke to address the audience responsibly. As soon as I 
‘know who you are’, that is, as soon as I understand and fathom the other (or the film itself, or 
its protagonists, or its unbroken reality), then I am no longer addressed by the film. The film 
ceases to impinge upon me, ceases to require a response from me and fails to keep my 
response-ability alive. The ethical power of recognition retains its power only if we consider it 
to be unsatisfiable (Butler, 2005:43). If a film, and by implication, life, can only be 
understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we can give of it, then, I argue, the 
filmmaker has an obligation to admit that his or her account will break down at a certain 
point. For only when a filmmaker constructs a film that is opaque, will a film continue to 
address me and, by implication, require a response.  
 What are the ‘magical keys’ that should be omitted in order to capture that which 
exceeds representation? Haneke identifies five aspects that Bresson omitted from Au hasard 
Balthazar (2010(a):573-574), omissions which I argue Haneke strives for in his own films. 
Firstly, the actors’ persuasive gestures should be omitted, since it invites and prescribes the 
audience with emotions. As I mentioned before, Anne does not suffer with theatrical passion 
in Amour, but rather imbues her performance with restraint. Secondly, what should be omitted 
are any psychological or sociological explanations that might aim to explain and thus simplify 
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the complex ways in which we relate to one another. There are no psychological explanations 
to buffer the audience’s reading of Georges and Anne, but rather only the fragments 
chronicling Anne’s deterioration. For Haneke, it is rather these experiences that should enjoy 
our attention, not a psychological explanation thereof. Thirdly, Bresson omits the 
representation of the world as a knowable totality or any kind of wholeness in Au hasard 
Balthazar, which includes the representation of the body. As Amour progresses, Anne’s body 
is reduced in representation, from its entirety to limbs and torso, sectionalised, conveying the 
breakdown of the body and the loss of identity. Additionally, the layout of their apartment is 
also obscure, until it is revealed at the very end of the film. Fourthly, what should be omitted 
is the unusual, for it will “defraud the misery of everyday existence of its dignity” (Haneke, 
2010(a):574). Banal activities such as Georges feeding and washing a bedridden Anne, as 
well as the exercises he does with her, captures the tedious routines that fill the days of those 
living with a person with a neurological illness. Finally, what should be omitted, is 
“happiness, because its depiction would desecrate suffering and pain” (Haneke, 2010(a):574). 
The absence of happiness, or sentimental closure in Amour, allows the otherness of Anne’s 
suffering to continue in the spectators minds, seeing that no consolation is provided to 
reassure them as they leave the theatre. 
 These five omissions or retractions, according to Haneke, respect the audience’s 
capacity for perception and their imagination, which, as I have argued, enable their response-
ability. As Butler says, one can only take responsibility for oneself when one avows “the 
limits of any self-understanding” and thereby “establish these limits not only as a condition 
for the subject [or film] but as the predicament of the human community” (2005:83). We 
recognise the Other’s humanity when we admit that we cannot, and never will, know another 
or ourselves completely. If we claim that we do, we usurp the place of the Other under the 
sun, kill the Other, especially when we watch films that are generated at the cost of real, 
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horrific and violent experiences that provide material for our viewing pleasure. The filmmaker 
must ensure that audiences recognise the violence through the process of witnessing, an on-
going process that is kept alive by the adage of ‘I can never know you fully’. When 
filmmakers adhere to Bresson’s statement, that a film must never exceed its means, and a 
harmonisation of form and content is achieved, I argue that the audience has the best chance 
of securing an ethical place for themselves in the film. With their minds suddenly opened, the 
audience is able to respond responsibly and let the Other live, for it restates the place of the 







 When we go to the cinema, stare at the television, and watch videos on the Internet or 
scroll on our smartphones, we are, like the Schröbers in The Seventh Continent, present to a 
world that is not present to us (Cavell, 1979:23). We get to see a world to which we are 
invisible. Not only are we displaced from the world that we are viewing, but, also, our 
displacement feels and seems natural (Cavell, 1979:41). Furthermore, like Benny’s movies 
and videogames in Benny’s Video, our screens are saturated with violence, enabling us to 
watch scenes of atrocity, murder, pain and suffering without being held accountable for doing 
so. Television, the Internet and smartphones are massive tools of decontextualisation, an 
instantaneous flow of information in which violence becomes interchangeable and 
domesticated in its image (Doane, 1990:225). A simple click of a button or a further scroll 
downward will erase the brutality and horror that filled the four corners of the screen 
moments ago. Similar to the murdered characters that become part of the news bulletin in 71 
Fragments, we watch our neighbours, those who we are responsible for, suffer violence on an 
impersonal image system. Those who produce these images have a responsibility, as Haneke 
says, to make these images of violence and horror perceptible again that would enable the 
viewer’s critical engagement (2000:172). Haneke’s films, thus, serve as a response to the 
dominant forms of media, with the aim not only to represent violence in ways that are ethical 
and respectful towards those who truly suffered, but also to ensure that audiences are not 
manipulated and thereby enabled to take part in the meaning-making process. 
 Do we go to the cinema, like Georges in Caché, in order to escape our responsibilities 
to each other? Do we seek refuge and reassurance in the cinema? Like the swimming pool 
sequence in Code Unknown, or the first thirty minutes in Funny Games, we want to enjoy 
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films contained by and restricted to genre. We want to be reassured: children will always be 
caught before they fall from a building. Cinematic automatisms that are simply employed as a 
means to an end make audiences forget about the world and allow them to lose themselves in 
the thrilling suspense. Reality does not, unfortunately, adhere to the rules of genre or the 
conventions of narrative: intruders like Paul and Peter in Funny Games can murder a whole 
family. When we are confronted with a difficult situation, like Anne’s search for Benny in 
Time of the Wolf, there will be no music to accompany the mood. The manner in which 
classical Hollywood cinema and genre, however, allow spectators to assume a position of 
sagacity that exceeds that of the diegetic characters, traditional forms of editing guide and 
manipulate audiences and music aestheticise a film’s obscene content, all contribute, 
aggravate and meet the spectator’s desire not to bear the burdens of the world. We wish for 
respite from our complicity in the world (Cavell, 1979:40). Yet, is this not, also, a wish for 
self-assertion? Do we use films to assert ourselves, to incite, fuel and satisfy our desires, like 
Erika in The Piano Teacher, or our atavistic thirst for destruction, like the soldiers in 
Jarhead? If we wish to assert ourselves at the expense of “any consideration of the world, of 
consequence, and, indeed, of others”, Butler argues that we feed a “‘moral narcissism’ whose 
pleasure resides in its ability to transcend the concrete world that conditions its actions” 
(Butler, 2005:105). Do audiences not transcend the world when they watch a film in which 
they are elevated above the characters, empowered to view the world as all-knowing and 
sagacious, yet invisible, spectators? The manner in which Haneke ruptures the “hermetically 
sealed-off illusion” (2000: 172) provided by escapist and entertainment cinema, however, is 
by changing the way in which his films are related to their automatisms. While traditional 
film simply uses automatisms as a means to an end, the modernist filmmaker questions 
traditional automatisms by reflecting upon them (Trahair, 2013:4). Thus, by reflecting on the 
use of genre, editing, long takes, music and sound, Haneke ruptures the audience’s wish for 
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invisibility, reassurance and easy answers. Instead, he implicates the audience and provides 
them with an ethical place in the film.  
 As Pascal says, as soon as we claim our place under the sun, we automatically usurp 
the place of another (1958:84). We therefore have a responsibility to the Other, a 
responsibility that precedes our ontology. Applied to the act of spectatorship, I argue that we 
usurp the place of those who truly suffered when we watch films that are generated at the cost 
of real, horrific and violent experiences for entertainment’s sake. If we are, as Dostoevsky 
writes, responsible for everyone before everyone, then filmmakers are, firstly, guilty before 
all: 
There is only one salvation for you: take yourself up, and make yourself 
responsible for all the sins of men. For indeed it is so, my friend, and the 
moment you make yourself sincerely responsible for everything and 
everyone, you will see at once that it is really so, that it is you who are guilty 
on behalf of all and for all (Dostoevsky, 2004:320). 
 
 If filmmakers ‘take themselves up’ and make themselves responsible for their 
audience, they can enable audiences to become responsible as well. No longer will audiences 
be able to take refuge in the cinema, be invisible to the world that they are viewing and free 
from the burdens of the world. Instead, they become responsible for themselves and their 
neighbour. Thus, Haneke’s responsibility as filmmaker is twofold: firstly, he has a 
responsibility towards those individuals and experiences that he is representing in the film 
and, secondly, he has a responsibility towards his audience. He fulfils his responsibilities by 
approaching both his content and form in responsible ways. The content or narratives of his 
films ask ethical and moral questions regarding our relations with others in society, as well as 
the violence we consume via the media and inflict upon each other. The form, on the other 
hand, draws from the automatisms of cinema and then reflects upon them. The two 
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approaches thus incite audiences to reflect on the film. Butler explains that one can only 
become reflexive when incited by another to do so, explaining that “one person’s discourse 
leads another into self-reflection” (2005:125). Haneke thus achieves his audience’s self-
reflexivity through the film’s discourse, as Haneke’s address arrives as “an incitement, a form 
of seduction, an imposition or demand from outside to which [we] yield” (Butler, 2005:125). 
The content and form both reflect, in separate and specific ways, Haneke’s intention of taking 
responsibility for his audience.  
 Since the content and form echo Haneke’s responsible approach to filmmaking, the 
harmonisation thereof ensures that he neither imposes his opinion or interpretation of a given 
subject, nor does he offer commentary or consolation to the audience (Haneke, (2010(a):573). 
Instead, he asks what a given subject or question might mean to them. Similar to the narrator 
in The White Ribbon, we are not sagacious. Even though we might believe that we are wholly 
perspicacious beings (Butler, 2005:102), we do not have the ability to understand and explain 
everything quickly, accurately and in its totality. Like Georges in Amour, we can never know 
the Other completely (Butler, 2005:43), just as moments of unknowingness about ourselves 
only arise in relation to others: opacity is a part of who we are (2005:20). Opacity is therefore 
a precondition for responsibility. We can only become responsible for another when we are 
made aware of the opacity intrinsic to ourselves. Haneke’s films are constructed as an opacity 
that does not explain, elucidate or interpret for us, but rather question, probe and provoke us. 
He thus invites us to witness the film. The result of the process of witnessing, in being 
addressed by Haneke (address-ability) and responding to his address (response-ability) is the 
formation of the audience’s subjectivity (Oliver, 2001:7). Even though every single spectator 
occupies a different subject position, that is, a specific socio-historical position that 
influences and determines the manner in which they interpret a film, their subjectivity can 
only be constituted when they encounter otherness, an encounter with another that questions 
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their place under the sun. When we are addressed by something that is opaque to us, we 
become response-able and, by implication, responsible. Audiences thus become accountable 
for the viewing experience, for it is the formation of our subjectivity and opacity that 
influence the ways in which we “conceive of our relationships and responsibilities to others, 
especially others whom we perceive as different from ourselves” (Oliver, 2001:19). Thus, if a 
filmmaker addresses the audience through the film’s opacity, that is, presents a world that 
rejects a knowable totality, then the film recognises the audience’s opacity, makes them 
aware of their own opacity, which, consequently, enables them to move beyond recognition 
of the film and the Other depicted in it. Audiences can now respond in a way that is ethical 
and responsible. 
 So when we watch a film that attempts to humanise Hitler through melodramatic 
techniques, like Downfall, we are presented with a representation that aims to elucidate, 
explain and contain him. When we are grippingly waiting to see whether water or gas will 
come out of the showerhead in Schindler’s List, we are spared the realities of the gas 
chambers. We erroneously believe that we get to know the dictator and the gas chambers 
through the representation. But this is not ethical. Butler calls on us to admit that ethics, our 
responsibility towards the Other, requires that we “risk ourselves precisely at moments of 
unknowingness” (Butler, 2005:136). We risk ourselves when we are confronted with a Hitler 
that eludes containment, explication and clarification; we risk ourselves when we are 
confronted with our inability to enter the gas chambers, as in Night and Fog. In risking 
ourselves, we are confronted with our inability to know Hitler or the gas chambers in its 
totality. We, therefore, have to ask, again, who are you, Hitler; who are you, gas chambers. 
And continue to do so. For those who truly suffered continue to live only if we continue to 
ask. If we are willing to undergo such an ordeal, to be confronted with the opacity of the 
Other, to “become undone in relation to others”, we are provided with the chance of 
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becoming human (Butler, 2005:136), and, as I would add, to bear the burdens of the world. I 
come undone when I watch a film by Michael Haneke, a position which gives me the chance 
“to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to be prompted to 
act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-sufficient ‘I’ as a kind of 
possession” (Butler, 2005:136). If audiences are addressed by a responsible filmmaker, 
claimed and bound by a film that questions their place under the sun, moved and prompted to 
respond and thereby relinquish their invisibility, audiences will assume responsibility for the 
Other. As Father Zosima says in The Brothers Karamazov, the moment we admit we are 
responsible for everything and everyone, we realise that we are guilty on behalf of and for all. 
We are guilty for desiring refuge from the world in the cinema, for being entertained at the 
cost of those who truly suffered, for wanting respite from our responsibility. Thus, in our 
media saturated society, filmmakers have the opportunity to make spectators human again, to 
remind them that they are relational beings and that they are responsible for each other. If 
cinema has, so far, allowed me to witness a world that I am not present to, enabled me to see 
things I would not normally be able to see and offered me respite from my complicity, then 
responsible filmmaking will address and rupture my invisibility, vacate my self-sufficiency, 
make me response-able and, in turn, offer me the privilege of sharing the burdens of my 
neighbour. For only when filmmakers uphold their responsibility, will an audience be able to 
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